The overarching question imparting urgency to this exploration is: Can U.S.-Russian contention in cyberspace cause the two nuclear superpowers to stumble into war? In considering this question we were constantly reminded of recent comments by a prominent U.S. arms control expert: At least as dangerous as the risk of an actual cyberattack, he observed, is cyber operations’ “blurring of the line between peace and war.” Or, as Nye wrote, “in the cyber realm, the difference between a weapon and a non-weapon may come down to a single line of code, or simply the intent of a computer program’s user.”
Nuclear non- and counter-proliferation has been a far more important and consistent drivers of U.S. grand strategy than has been recognized in the scholarly literature. When it has been discussed, the motives and driving forces behind American nuclear non-proliferation policies have often been misunderstood. Why have scholars missed “America’s Strategies of Inhibition”? What are the implications for our understanding of the history of U.S. grand strategy that recognizes the priority the United States has placed on limiting the spread of nuclear weapons, and mitigating its consequences when it occurs?
Coffee and tea will be provided - all are welcome, join us!