How do states align with external armed groups? Is such a policy the strategy of the weak? Paradoxically, is the rise in armed group power due to the decline of the state power of its regional sponsors? By drawing primarily from a case study of Syria, this lecture will seek to answer the more general question of state-armed group alliances in international relations theory and practice.
Though often overlooked, Syrian alignment with external armed groups has been a primary pillar of the state's regional balancing efforts since the Asad regime assumed power in 1970. While the relationship has never been static, the last two decades have been transformative for Syria and its armed group proxies, particularly since the transfer of power from Hafez al-Asad to his son Bashar in 2000. As Syrian state and regional power declined, agents were promoted to allies. Today, as the regime teeters due to an increasingly violent and widespread domestic uprising, the state that Asad built is under existential threat. As Syria wanes, are its armed group agents in the balance as well?
Please join us! Coffee and tea provided. Everyone is welcome, but admittance will be on a first come–first served basis.