Beyond the Brink: Rethinking Assured Retaliation and the Nuclear Revolution

Why do states pursue nuclear postures that go beyond a secure second-strike capability? Although the theory of the nuclear revolution argues that this posture should be sufficient for deterrence, many nuclear powers have – or are pursuing – postures with more flexible options and robust command and control infrastructure to provide a wider range of employment options. In my dissertation, I explain this discrepancy between theoretical expectations and observed postures based on the logic of what I call “third strike dynamics”: When a state threatens limited first use, it retains a portion of its forces in reserve that can deter retaliation by implicitly or explicitly threatening a “third strike.” This creates two pathways for states to deviate from the predictions of the theory of the nuclear revolution. First, states that want to use the threat of nuclear escalation for coercion will not only seek postures for limited first use but will also pursue the capabilities needed to credibly threaten third strikes to deter retaliation. Second, states that believe they face this threat of first use and third strikes will pursue more flexible postures to signal that they are undeterred from retaliating in response to limited first use. Through case studies spanning from the 1950s to the present day, I illustrate how this logic of third strike dynamics has been a persistent concern for nuclear powers throughout the nuclear era.