Commitment Problems and Compellent Threats
Why has the United States been generally unsuccessful at using military threats to compel weaker states to change their behavior?
Why has the United States been generally unsuccessful at using military threats to compel weaker states to change their behavior?
Why has the United States been generally unsuccessful at using military threats to compel weaker states to change their behavior? Using a cross-national dataset of crises triggered by compellent threats, Mr. Sechser's dissertation aims to isolate the critical factors associated with successful compellence. In this presentation, he will discuss the role of asymmetric power, showing why major powers may be disadvantaged when using threats to extract concessions from weaker states. The inherent inability of major powers to commit to future restraint can motivate weaker states to resist even moderate compellent demands in hopes of averting future exploitation.
Please join us! Coffee and tea provided.
Everyone is welcome, but admittance is on a first come–first served basis.