The overarching question imparting urgency to this exploration is: Can U.S.-Russian contention in cyberspace cause the two nuclear superpowers to stumble into war? In considering this question we were constantly reminded of recent comments by a prominent U.S. arms control expert: At least as dangerous as the risk of an actual cyberattack, he observed, is cyber operations’ “blurring of the line between peace and war.” Or, as Nye wrote, “in the cyber realm, the difference between a weapon and a non-weapon may come down to a single line of code, or simply the intent of a computer program’s user.”
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is responsible for verifying the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear materials and facilities in almost every state in the world. IAEA safeguards have evolved over time in recognition that a progressively broader approach to verification is required to ensure the validity of the Agency's conclusions regarding the compliance or non-compliance of each state with its safeguards agreement. However, the IAEA still confronts a number of forms of limited cooperation, poor safeguards performance, or ambiguous nuclear behavior by states.
How does the IAEA reach the conclusion that a state is in "non-compliance" with safeguards and thereby alert the international community to the possibility that the state is (or was) seeking to acquire nuclear weapons? This seminar will examine how the IAEA has drawn safeguards conclusions in past cases. It will recommend modifications to the IAEA's reporting procedures to enhance the credibility of its safeguards conclusions and improve opportunities for the timely resolution of compliance issues.
Please join us! Coffee and tea provided. Everyone is welcome, but admittance will be on a first come–first served basis.