The overarching question imparting urgency to this exploration is: Can U.S.-Russian contention in cyberspace cause the two nuclear superpowers to stumble into war? In considering this question we were constantly reminded of recent comments by a prominent U.S. arms control expert: At least as dangerous as the risk of an actual cyberattack, he observed, is cyber operations’ “blurring of the line between peace and war.” Or, as Nye wrote, “in the cyber realm, the difference between a weapon and a non-weapon may come down to a single line of code, or simply the intent of a computer program’s user.”
Choi will discuss how suppliers provide civilian nuclear assistance without increasing the risk of proliferation. Global interest in nuclear energy has rapidly increased the number of civilian nuclear programs and formed a complex nuclear traffic network. However, recent studies have shown the proliferation risks of civilian nuclear assistance and warned suppliers to be cautious of technology transfer. In order to lead the nuclear renaissance to peaceful uses, it is important to identify under which conditions the civilian assistance program prevents recipients from developing nuclear weapons. Choi will argue that recipients who obtain sensitive assistance with insufficient nuclear power generation capacity for economic uses are likely to develop nuclear weapons. Therefore, suppliers should consider the capacity of recipients to use the technology received for economically viable purposes. Choi will explain this argument comparing Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea, which failed to prevent nuclear proliferation, and Japan and South Korea, which successfully operate civilian nuclear technology.