Research, ideas, and leadership for a more secure, peaceful world

Past Event
Seminar

Does Instability Help or Hinder Coercion? Re-Evaluating Libya's Reconciliation with the West

Open to the Public

Speaker: Melissa Willard-Foster, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Vermont

Contrary to the dominant view that instability makes targets of coercive pressure more likely to concede, the speaker will argue that instability prolongs their resistance. Leaders' policies reflect their domestic political interests, thus, conceding to policy change invites political costs. The more powerful a leader's domestic opposition, the more likely it can benefit when the leader is forced to make a costly concession. Although resistance may be costly too, targets can more easily mitigate these costs than they can convince the challenger to change its demands. As a result, instability is more likely to encourage a target's resistance. The speaker tests her argument on Libya's rapprochement with the West, showing that Qaddafi refused to surrender the Pan Am flight 103 bombing suspects due to domestic political costs. It was only after Qaddafi recovered his power and the United States softened its terms that he complied, which paved the way for the 2003 deal.

Please join us! Coffee and tea provided. Everyone is welcome, but admittance will be on a first come–first served basis.

Date: Time: - Location: Room 350
Image of Muammar al-Qaddafi at the Libya/Tunisia border, 7 November 2008

About

Speaker: Melissa Willard-Foster, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Vermont

Contrary to the dominant view that instability makes targets of coercive pressure more likely to concede, the speaker will argue that instability prolongs their resistance. Leaders' policies reflect their domestic political interests, thus, conceding to policy change invites political costs. The more powerful a leader's domestic opposition, the more likely it can benefit when the leader is forced to make a costly concession. Although resistance may be costly too, targets can more easily mitigate these costs than they can convince the challenger to change its demands. As a result, instability is more likely to encourage a target's resistance. The speaker tests her argument on Libya's rapprochement with the West, showing that Qaddafi refused to surrender the Pan Am flight 103 bombing suspects due to domestic political costs. It was only after Qaddafi recovered his power and the United States softened its terms that he complied, which paved the way for the 2003 deal.

Please join us! Coffee and tea provided. Everyone is welcome, but admittance will be on a first come–first served basis.

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