The overarching question imparting urgency to this exploration is: Can U.S.-Russian contention in cyberspace cause the two nuclear superpowers to stumble into war? In considering this question we were constantly reminded of recent comments by a prominent U.S. arms control expert: At least as dangerous as the risk of an actual cyberattack, he observed, is cyber operations’ “blurring of the line between peace and war.” Or, as Nye wrote, “in the cyber realm, the difference between a weapon and a non-weapon may come down to a single line of code, or simply the intent of a computer program’s user.”
Daniel is interested in energy and environmental economics, public economics, and industrial organization. Prior to his Ph.D. studies, he worked as a research assistant at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and as a Pre-Doctoral Fellow at the Energy Policy Institute at Chicago. Daniel received a B.A. in Economics with Honors from Swarthmore College.