A large literature on U.S. foreign policy takes for granted that America's alliances entangle the United States into military conflicts that it might otherwise avoid. Yet proponents of this argument have presented very little evidence that this entanglement mechanism has actually played a significant role in U.S. foreign policy. The speaker looks for such evidence in all post-1945 U.S. military conflicts and finds hardly any. U.S. entanglement is rare, he argues, because (1) the United States, as a superpower, is capable of flouting its commitments with relative impunity, (2) U.S. alliance agreements are vague and contingent commitments, and (3) these alliances help the United States deter potential aggressors and restrain allies from initiating or escalating conflicts that might threaten U.S. interests.

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