The overarching question imparting urgency to this exploration is: Can U.S.-Russian contention in cyberspace cause the two nuclear superpowers to stumble into war? In considering this question we were constantly reminded of recent comments by a prominent U.S. arms control expert: At least as dangerous as the risk of an actual cyberattack, he observed, is cyber operations’ “blurring of the line between peace and war.” Or, as Nye wrote, “in the cyber realm, the difference between a weapon and a non-weapon may come down to a single line of code, or simply the intent of a computer program’s user.”
The Sept. 19 Six-Party statement of principles marked the end of the beginning of the North Korean nuclear crisis. At the 5th round of talks scheduled for November, each party's attention will shift to how and when the respective principles and goals agreed to in the 4th round will be implemented.
Among these potential "deal-breaker" questions, a critical one will be how dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear weapons programs will be verified. In this seminar, previous inspection regime models that may be applicable to the current crisis will be examined.
Please join us! Coffee and tea provided.
This seminar is co-sponsored by STPP's Managing the Atom Project.
Everyone is welcome, but admittance will be on a first come–first served basis.