Past Event
Seminar

Institutional Design to Prevent Illicit Nuclear-Related Trade

Open to the Public

How do states design agreements to promote their goals? What accounts for variation in design elements, even within single regimes? This presentation will explore efforts to prevent the trade in nuclear-related materials for illicit purposes, through the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and the Proliferation Security Initiative.

Please join us! Coffee and tea provided. Everyone is welcome, but admittance will be on a first come-first served basis.

Swiss engineer, Daniel Geiges, center, outside the high court in Pretoria, South Africa, Feb. 5, 2008. Geiges was given a 13-year suspended sentence for charges relating to a network run by disgraced Pakistan nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan.

About

How do states design agreements to promote their goals? What accounts for variation in design elements, even within single regimes? This presentation will explore efforts to prevent the trade in nuclear-related materials for illicit purposes, through the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and the Proliferation Security Initiative. It will employ a game-theoretic analysis of the basis for cooperation and explore the subsequent choice between design elements in each agreement, focusing on the role of legality, precision, and membership.

Please join us! Coffee and tea provided. Everyone is welcome, but admittance will be on a first come-first served basis.