The overarching question imparting urgency to this exploration is: Can U.S.-Russian contention in cyberspace cause the two nuclear superpowers to stumble into war? In considering this question we were constantly reminded of recent comments by a prominent U.S. arms control expert: At least as dangerous as the risk of an actual cyberattack, he observed, is cyber operations’ “blurring of the line between peace and war.” Or, as Nye wrote, “in the cyber realm, the difference between a weapon and a non-weapon may come down to a single line of code, or simply the intent of a computer program’s user.”
The proliferation of threat systems and Anti-Access, Area Denial (A2/AD) strategies make performing special operations forces' (SOF) air mobility missions increasingly complicated and limit the capability to defeat air defenses and penetrate into denied airspace. Combined with an aging inventory, ill-suited to evading these threats, Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) and the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) must look to technology to defeat the more modern threat systems and anti-access strategies. The best answer to penetrate future, denied regions is in stealth or low observable (LO) technology. National strategy documents already prioritize the SOF mission and identify the need for maintaining a very capable SOF. Current fiscal realities and a cut in defense spending seem to discourage talk of funding a new capability or procuring a new platform. However, the case for improving SOF enablers and funding SOF programs is well documented in recent strategic guidance and budget priority documents. Regardless of the fiscal situation, SOF will get the support it needs from national leadership to maintain its dominance in asymmetric warfare. The United States needs to invest in procuring and developing the next generation LO SOF mobility aircraft.
Please join us! Coffee and tea provided. Everyone is welcome, but admittance will be on a first come–first served basis.