The overarching question imparting urgency to this exploration is: Can U.S.-Russian contention in cyberspace cause the two nuclear superpowers to stumble into war? In considering this question we were constantly reminded of recent comments by a prominent U.S. arms control expert: At least as dangerous as the risk of an actual cyberattack, he observed, is cyber operations’ “blurring of the line between peace and war.” Or, as Nye wrote, “in the cyber realm, the difference between a weapon and a non-weapon may come down to a single line of code, or simply the intent of a computer program’s user.”
Several years ago, Russia passed legislation making it possible for Russia to import foreign spent fuel. This concept has drawn both fierce opposition from environmentalists and strong support from nuclear power advocates. At present, Russia's commitment to take back spent fuel from the power plant under construction in Iran, and the possibility of Russia agreeing to manage spent fuel from other countries, is playing a major part in international discussions of the concept of providing assurances of fuel supply and spent fuel management to states that agree to forego (at least for a time) construction of their own national enrichment and reprocessing facilities. Podvig will address the current practical issues surrounding possible implementation of such proposals.
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