A Strange Arms Debate: Legitimation, Essential Equivalence, and Carter's Nuclear Strategy

About

Speaker: Colleen Larkin, Research Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom

President Jimmy Carter entered office committed to reducing the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. foreign policy. He espoused the logic of mutually assured destruction and hoped for major arms control progress. Yet by the end of his presidency, he had embraced a competitive nuclear posture and accelerated the arms race. What explains this shift in Carter’s strategy?

The speaker offers a theory of legitimation and domestic coalition competition to understand policy change, in which speakers engage in legitimation contests to win support for their policy vision and undermine opposing coalitions. She introduces co-optation as a rhetorical strategy which, alongside persuasion and rhetorical coercion, can reshape coalitions and guide policy outcomes. 

Using newspaper and archival sources, she conducts a case study of Carter’s failure to secure ratification of the SALT II treaty. Carter approved the MX missile in part to delegitimize SALT critics. Opponents' co-optation of his rhetoric, however, enabled further mobilization against the treaty and pushed Carter towards competitive nuclear strategies. This seminar highlights the discursive and domestic influences on nuclear strategy and speaks to debates about the value of nuclear superiority and the lessons of the nuclear revolution.

Open to Harvard ID Holders Only: Admittance will be on a first come–first served basis. Coffee &Tea Provided.

Contact

For more information, email the International Security Program Assistant at susan_lynch@harvard.edu.