The overarching question imparting urgency to this exploration is: Can U.S.-Russian contention in cyberspace cause the two nuclear superpowers to stumble into war? In considering this question we were constantly reminded of recent comments by a prominent U.S. arms control expert: At least as dangerous as the risk of an actual cyberattack, he observed, is cyber operations’ “blurring of the line between peace and war.” Or, as Nye wrote, “in the cyber realm, the difference between a weapon and a non-weapon may come down to a single line of code, or simply the intent of a computer program’s user.”
MTA Fellow Ian Stewart talks about engaging the private sector in nonproliferation efforts by supplementing export controls and sanctions with anti-proliferation in the supply chain.
Proliferation increasingly requires the indigenisation of the nuclear fuel cycle and the acquisition from overseas of proliferation-sensitive technologies. However, the tools used by the international community to deny proliferants access to these prerequisite goods -- technology sanctions and state-centric export controls -- are increasingly challenged by the globalisation of the manufacturing base and complex trade pathways. This presentation introduces the principle of "anti-proliferation" in the private sector's supply chains and considers how it could supplement state-centric export controls.