The overarching question imparting urgency to this exploration is: Can U.S.-Russian contention in cyberspace cause the two nuclear superpowers to stumble into war? In considering this question we were constantly reminded of recent comments by a prominent U.S. arms control expert: At least as dangerous as the risk of an actual cyberattack, he observed, is cyber operations’ “blurring of the line between peace and war.” Or, as Nye wrote, “in the cyber realm, the difference between a weapon and a non-weapon may come down to a single line of code, or simply the intent of a computer program’s user.”
Following the money, disrupting financial flows, and undermining terrorist groups' financial bases are all key elements of current global counter-terrorism efforts. Counter-terrorism financing (CTF) initiatives are part of a complex international regime, comprising UN instruments, UN counter-terrorism bodies, and ad hoc global and regional non-governmental institutions, such as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).
Does this system work? How and why? This seminar will examine the state of the regime, its specific compliance-inducing mechanisms, and states' responses to its provisions. The seminar will argue that the regime's relative success is a function of its socialization practices put in the service of a particular pedagogic project. This project is characterized by an elaborate model of standard setting, norm projection, and rule enforcement that has enabled a heterogeneous audience of state and non-state actors to converge around a particular—albeit not uncontested—set of anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing recommendations.
Please join us! Coffee and tea provided. Everyone is welcome, but admittance will be on a first come–first served basis.