The overarching question imparting urgency to this exploration is: Can U.S.-Russian contention in cyberspace cause the two nuclear superpowers to stumble into war? In considering this question we were constantly reminded of recent comments by a prominent U.S. arms control expert: At least as dangerous as the risk of an actual cyberattack, he observed, is cyber operations’ “blurring of the line between peace and war.” Or, as Nye wrote, “in the cyber realm, the difference between a weapon and a non-weapon may come down to a single line of code, or simply the intent of a computer program’s user.”
Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow Karthika Sasikumar will present an MTA seminar entitled "From Target to Designer: Multilateral Export Controls and Safeguards in Indian Nuclear Policy" on Tuesday April 26 at 9:30am in the Belfer Center library.
This talk is about measures that India has taken to contain the diffusion of the materials and technology for nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. I will talk about export controls that form barriers to the outward flow of materials and technology from India, as well as safeguards that are designed to prevent flows from the civilian nuclear program—a recipient of foreign assistance—to the Indian weapons program. I will also discuss India’s participation in international arrangements to restrict such sensitive flows that are outside traditional nonproliferation institutions (e.g. the Proliferation Security Initiative).