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Past Event
Seminar

War and Responsibility: Executive Constraint Overlooked

Harvard Faculty, Fellows, Staff, and Students

Speaker: M. Patrick Hulme, Postdoctoral Fellow, International Security Program

In the context of the war powers, it is widely believed that the United States has a little constrained "imperial presidency". Congress avoids going "on the record" on matters of war and peace, and American presidents de facto have virtually unlimited discretion over use of military force decisions. Overlooked, however, is that with great power comes great responsibility. American combat deaths in less-than-successful military ventures expose presidents to political costs more easily levied on an executive that acts absent sufficient political cover from lawmakers. Taking account of these Loss Responsibility Costs, this seminar shows that the United States actually has an executive substantially constrained by Congress.

Open to Harvard ID Holders Only: Admittance will be on a first come–first served basis. Coffee & Tea Provided.

Date: Time: - Location: Room 350
President John F. Kennedy in the Oval Office, 1961: "Loneliest Job in the World"

About

Speaker: M. Patrick Hulme, Postdoctoral Fellow, International Security Program

In the context of the war powers, it is widely believed that the United States has a little constrained "imperial presidency". Congress avoids going "on the record" on matters of war and peace, and American presidents de facto have virtually unlimited discretion over use of military force decisions. Overlooked, however, is that with great power comes great responsibility. American combat deaths in less-than-successful military ventures expose presidents to political costs more easily levied on an executive that acts absent sufficient political cover from lawmakers. Taking account of these Loss Responsibility Costs, this seminar shows that the United States actually has an executive substantially constrained by Congress.

A model of the war powers factoring in these costs in a crisis bargaining game is introduced, and two principal results are highlighted. First, while smaller uses of force are undertaken unilaterally, the largest uses of force (i.e., full scale wars) are only undertaken subject to formal authorization from Congress. Second, exposure to these costs constrains presidential behavior even in the context of smaller uses of force undertaken unilaterally. Empirical evidence supporting both propositions is then provided. Novel data gathering sentiment from congressional floor speeches in nearly two hundred crises shows that, far from having an imperial presidency, congressional sentiment appears to operate as a necessary condition in degree for the scale of force utilized by the White House.

Open to Harvard ID Holders Only: Admittance will be on a first come–first served basis. Coffee & Tea Provided.

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Paper: War and Responsibility: Executive Constraint Overlooked

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