The overarching question imparting urgency to this exploration is: Can U.S.-Russian contention in cyberspace cause the two nuclear superpowers to stumble into war? In considering this question we were constantly reminded of recent comments by a prominent U.S. arms control expert: At least as dangerous as the risk of an actual cyberattack, he observed, is cyber operations’ “blurring of the line between peace and war.” Or, as Nye wrote, “in the cyber realm, the difference between a weapon and a non-weapon may come down to a single line of code, or simply the intent of a computer program’s user.”
In this seminar, Gene Gerzhoy will explore why some states with nuclear weapons programs acquiesce to foreign nonproliferation demands, while others refuse to abandon their bomb aims. Although proliferation scholars have increasingly sought to explain nuclear reversals, no theory exists for explaining why states abandon bomb pursuits in response to foreign pressure. To resolve this puzzle, Gerzhoy will argue that nuclear decision-making varies with the target's security stake in nuclear armament and the sender's coercive leverage, which depends on the deployment of inducements aimed at the target's resource dependencies. Gene's hypotheses will then be tested against the historical record of countries that initiated nuclear weapons projects using the method of causal process observation.
Coffee and tea provided. Please join us - Everyone is welcome, but admittance will be on a first come–first served basis.