To compete and thrive in the 21st century, democracies, and the United States in particular, must develop new national security and economic strategies that address the geopolitics of information. In the 20th century, market capitalist democracies geared infrastructure, energy, trade, and even social policy to protect and advance that era’s key source of power—manufacturing. In this century, democracies must better account for information geopolitics across all dimensions of domestic policy and national strategy.
Choi will discuss how suppliers provide civilian nuclear assistance without increasing the risk of proliferation. Global interest in nuclear energy has rapidly increased the number of civilian nuclear programs and formed a complex nuclear traffic network. However, recent studies have shown the proliferation risks of civilian nuclear assistance and warned suppliers to be cautious of technology transfer. In order to lead the nuclear renaissance to peaceful uses, it is important to identify under which conditions the civilian assistance program prevents recipients from developing nuclear weapons. Choi will argue that recipients who obtain sensitive assistance with insufficient nuclear power generation capacity for economic uses are likely to develop nuclear weapons. Therefore, suppliers should consider the capacity of recipients to use the technology received for economically viable purposes. Choi will explain this argument comparing Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea, which failed to prevent nuclear proliferation, and Japan and South Korea, which successfully operate civilian nuclear technology.