To compete and thrive in the 21st century, democracies, and the United States in particular, must develop new national security and economic strategies that address the geopolitics of information. In the 20th century, market capitalist democracies geared infrastructure, energy, trade, and even social policy to protect and advance that era’s key source of power—manufacturing. In this century, democracies must better account for information geopolitics across all dimensions of domestic policy and national strategy.
Contemporary debates on Russian nuclear strategy focus on making sense of Russia’s nuclear capabilities, signaling and nuclear declarations. This seminar argues that understanding how nuclear capabilities and strategy interact with conventional capabilities is fundamental to understanding nuclear strategy. It demonstrates how Russian nuclear debates and strategy decisions have been affected by perceived conventional vulnerabilities and that a reduction in such vulnerabilities has produced nuclear strategy change. It thus shows that the orthodox Western interpretation of Russian nuclear strategy today as one of “escalating to de-escalate” comes short of explaining when Russia would go nuclear in conflict, and why.
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard is a Postdoctoral Fellow (Assistant Professor) in the Department of Political Science at the University of Oslo, where she is part of the Oslo Nuclear Project. Her work focuses on Russian nuclear strategy, deterrence dynamics and crisis stability in Europe, including in the High North. She was previously a Nuclear Postdoctoral Fellow and a Stanton Nuclear Security Predoctoral Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) at Stanford University, a Research Fellow at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies (IFS) and a Senior Security Policy Analyst in the Norwegian Armed Forces. She holds a Ph.D. from Kings College London and an M.A. from Georgetown University.