Exporting the Bomb: Why States Provide Sensitive Nuclear Assistance

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Nearly every state armed with nuclear weapons received a substantial amount of external assistance in the development of its nuclear program from a more advanced nuclear state. This raises an interesting question about the motivation of the nuclear suppliers: Why do states provide sensitive nuclear assistance to nonnuclear weapon states, contributing to the international spread of nuclear weapons? The presentation considers this question using new data on sensitive nuclear transfers and an analysis of important cases of sensitive nuclear cooperation. The speaker argues that the spread of nuclear weapons is more threatening to relatively powerful states than it is to relatively weak states and that the asymmetric effects of nuclear proliferation lead to three strategic conditions under which states are more likely to export sensitive nuclear materials and technology. Alternative explanations that focus on the economic incentives of the nuclear suppliers do not find support in the data. The findings of this research have important policy implications and go beyond existing academic approaches to focus on the distributional, as opposed to the aggregate, effects of nuclear proliferation on international politics.

Please join us! Coffee and tea provided. Everyone is welcome, but admittance will be on a first come–first served basis.