To compete and thrive in the 21st century, democracies, and the United States in particular, must develop new national security and economic strategies that address the geopolitics of information. In the 20th century, market capitalist democracies geared infrastructure, energy, trade, and even social policy to protect and advance that era’s key source of power—manufacturing. In this century, democracies must better account for information geopolitics across all dimensions of domestic policy and national strategy.
How do states design agreements to promote their goals? What accounts for variation in design elements, even within single regimes? This presentation will explore efforts to prevent the trade in nuclear-related materials for illicit purposes, through the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and the Proliferation Security Initiative. It will employ a game-theoretic analysis of the basis for cooperation and explore the subsequent choice between design elements in each agreement, focusing on the role of legality, precision, and membership.
Please join us! Coffee and tea provided. Everyone is welcome, but admittance will be on a first come-first served basis.