Harvard’s Managing the Atom Responds to Nuclear Suppliers Group Adoption of Stronger Guidelines on Limiting Transfers of Enrichment and Reprocessing Technologies

At its plenary meeting from June 23 and 24 in the Netherlands the NSG adopted by consensus important new guidelines that strengthen controls over the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing facilities, equipment and technology.  The NSG decision is consistent with the recommendations of a recent report by the Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.  See report here.

The NSG's previous policy on enrichment and reprocessing transfers provided that “[s]uppliers should exercise restraint in the transfer of sensitive facilities, technology and material usable for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices” and that any enrichment facility or enrichment technology should not be designed or operate for the production of greater than 20 percent enriched uranium without the consent of the supplier. Enrichment and reprocessing facilities can be used to produce bomb-grade uranium and plutonium.

The NSG retains these conditions of supply but adds new ones.  Under the new guidelines, suppliers are not to authorize the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing facilities, and equipment and technology ... if the recipient does not meet all of the following criteria:

o   Is a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and is in full compliance with its obligations under the Treaty;

o   Has not been identified in a report to the IAEA Secretariat which is under consideration by the IAEA Board of Governors, as being in breach of its obligations to comply with its safeguards agreement, nor continues to be the subject of Board of Governors decisions calling on it to take additional steps to comply with its safeguards obligations or to build confidence in the peaceful nature of its programme ....;

o   Is adhering to NSG guidelines and has reported to the Security Council of the United Nations that it is implementing effective export controls as identified by Security Council Resolution 1540; and

o   Has brought into force a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, and an Additional Protocol, based on the model Additional Protocol or, pending this, is implementing appropriate safeguards agreements with the IAEA, including a regional accounting and control for nuclear materials, as approved by the IAEA Board of Governors.”

o   Has concluded an intergovernmental agreement with the supplier including assurances regarding non-explosive use, effective safeguards in perpetuity, and retransfer.

o   Has made a commitment to international standards of physical protection and  to IAEA safety standards and international safety conventions.

The new guidelines also allow suppliers of ENR to consider "any relevant factors as may be applicable" to ensure the transfer is used for peaceful purposes only.

In addition, the new NSG guideline provides that for the transfer of an enrichment facility or equipment based on existing technology, suppliers should "[a]void, as far as practicable, the transfer of enabling design and manufacturing technology associated with such items" and seek from recipients an appropriate agreement to accept the transfer "under conditions that do not permit or enable replication of the facilities."

“The NSG adoption of a new guideline on enrichment and reprocessing facilities, equipment and technology is an important step forward in controlling the spread of these sensitive nuclear technologies,” said Fred McGoldrick, associate with the Project on Managing the Atom and lead author of the Belfer Center’s recent report titled "Recommendations for Limiting Transfers of Enrichment and Reprocessing Technologies.”

That report also recognizes that additional steps -- beyond the recent decision by the NSG at its June meeting -- need to be taken to ensure effective controls on enrichment and reprocessing, including improving the implementation of the guidelines by NSG member states, promoting fuel assurances to reduce an incentive for states to seek enrichment and reprocessing facilities, placing enrichment and reprocessing facilities under some form of multinational auspices and control, exploring the feasibility of offering cradle-to-grave fuel cycle services, continuing research and development on IAEA safeguards and on more proliferation-resistant fuel cycle  technologies and applying the maximum diplomatic pressure to states that seek to transfer sensitive nuclear technology to countries that are in violation of their nonproliferation commitments, are located in unstable regions or present unacceptable proliferation risks.

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