Strengthening the IAEA Safeguards Regime

A paper presented at The 12th Republic of Korea-United Nations Joint Conference on Disarmament and Non-proliferation Issues, Non-Proliferation Regime in the 21st Century: Challenges and the Way Forward, Jeju, Republic of Korea on November 14-15, 2013.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) entered into force in 1970. Since then, the world has undergone tremendous social, political and economic changes, which have resulted in a constantly evolving non-proliferation landscape. During the last two decades, we have seen three major developments related to nuclear non-proliferation:

• an increased dissemination of nuclear technology and nuclear “know-how”, particularly in light of renewed interest in nuclear power;
• the emergence of clandestine procurement networks providing sensitive technologies and nuclear materials, and
• a number of states that have ‘gone nuclear’ through the clandestine route or come close to it.

The international safeguards system has not remained stagnant in the light of such developments. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) continues to evolve its nuclear verifications system. While some improvements require political will and agreement from its member states, other technical developments are undertaken by the IAEA Secretariat that remain within its verification authorities. While the IAEA has made important strides in strengthening safeguards, there remain on-going challenges.

Strengths and weaknesses of the current verification system

Which then are the areas that the IAEA should focus on in providing for a more effective safeguards regime? Proliferation cases of the last two decades have shared several common features. Proliferating countries used clandestine facilities and exploited loopholes within the IAEA verifications system itself, such as acquiring nuclear material like uranium from ores or yellow cake where no actual IAEA verification is applied. Much of the clandestine work also took place at undeclared / unreported facilities. The logic is simple - the IAEA verification system is robust enough to detect diversion of nuclear material, but still falls short of any foolproof method to detect clandestine facilities or to a certain extent, a misuse of declared facilities.

Efforts have been made to address these deficiencies. The IAEA verification system was overhauled fifteen years ago by providing the inspectorate with more access rights, namely introducing the Additional Protocol (AP) and an early provision of design information^[1]. A ‘State Level Approach’^[2] system was also implemented, where the state’s nuclear program is assessed annually using a holistic method. Equally vital to the IAEA’s verification scheme was the inculcation of an investigative inspection culture, a cornerstone to complement better access and information provided for under a reformed verification regime.

Special inspections

The IAEA also has in its safeguards toolbox the powerful authority to carry out ‘special inspections’^[3], invoked only twice: 1992 in Romania, and 1993 in North Korea^[4]. It is important to understand that the term “special inspection”, while ‘rare’ should not necessarily be ‘special’ in extremis. There remain circumstances where special inspections would be a logical choice to pursue.

In some cases, the IAEA Secretariat decided to pursue the route of “transparency visits” to clarify^{[5] [6]} or investigate allegations on undeclared nuclear activities as well as inconsistencies on nuclear material declarations, where access rights under the safeguards agreement could have been used. Where the state opted to clarify its declarations like in Libya and the Republic of Korea, the cooperative approach worked. However, as the cases of Iran and Syria demonstrate, the transparency approach led to the using of stalling tactics, loss of valuable information, and, in case of Iran, building additional nuclear capabilities of concern. The use of special inspections on these two cases pursued as an access right. The possibility of dispelling doubts through such inspections should be an advantage to all except those states who have violated their commitments. The IAEA’s right to use special inspections was already debated in early 1990’s, and any additional debate in the Board will not, under current circumstances, bring a solution to the problem of its wider use. Rather, the IAEA Secretariat should continue to weigh special inspections more in terms of its ‘inspection’ than ‘special’ element.

Reporting of the Safeguards Implementation Problems – When to Ring the Bell

The vital nature of picking up and reporting early signs in any state that could involve potential diversion or cause for suspicion of safeguards failures cannot be overstressed. Early corrective measures can be useful. In more serious cases of potential subversion of peaceful nuclear use, early notification to the IAEA Board including on safeguards implementation problems can provide for more timely ratification.

When problems start to arise, the IAEA Secretariat’s practice of periodically issuing stand-alone written reports that include all items of concern and developments remain useful. Misinformation provided by the inspected state should be noted in addition to reflecting responses the IAEA has received to questions raised. Prompt and clear reporting will enable Member States to make their own risk assessment and act on them. It is important to report regularly even where no progress has been made, especially since a lack of cooperation could be one form of non-compliance. There is a tendency for problems getting more wicked at later stages, reducing possibilities for easy solutions.

Conclusion

To continue to achieve its goal of nuclear non-proliferation, the IAEA’s safeguards system has to be continuous in seeking improvements, while adapting to changing circumstances. The Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) with an AP should be considered as a modern non-proliferation norm. The norm should also include the understanding that cooperation for an AP-plus approach will be provided in specific cases where needed by the Secretariat. States have competing political interests that make such a scenario unlikely in the near term. It is also important that the Secretariat exercises fully its legal rights under the CSA and AP. Budgetary resources are also finite. A strong analytical culture and motivated individuals are also necessary to maintain a robust international inspectorate. While the IAEA is striving to achieve all these, without the requisite support and ingredients, existing levels of safeguards should be understood as what it can do instead of what it should do.

^{[1] Design information is to be provided by the State as early as possible before nuclear material is introduced into a new facility. Further, the State is to provide preliminary information on any new nuclear facility as soon as the decision is taken to construct, or to authorize the construction of, the facility, and to provide further information on the safeguards relevant features of facility design early in the stages of project definition, preliminary design, construction and commissioning. This provision is known as Code 3.1. of the Subsidiary Arrangements to the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/153(Corrected).}

^{[2] Progress in Evolving the State-level Concept Jill N. Cooley, International Atomic Energy Agency,}

^{Presentation at the Seventh INMM/ESARDA Joint Workshop Future Directions for Nuclear Safeguards and Verification Aix-en-Provence, France 17-20 October 2011. http://www.inmm.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Evolving_the_IAEA_State_Level_Concept&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=2965.}

^{[3] The IAEA may make special inspections (a) in order to verify the information contained in special reports; or if the Agency considers that information made available by the State, including explanations from the State and information obtained from routine inspections, is not adequate for the Agency to fulfill its responsibilities under the safeguards agreement. See Para 73, The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, INFCIRC/153(Corrected), IAEA.}

^{[4] See for the background: John Carlson and Russell Leslie, Special Inspection Revisited, Paper presented at INMM 2005 symposium Phoenix, USA – July 2005, http://www.dfat.gov.au/asno/publications/inmm2005_special_inspections.pdf.}

^{[5] Press Release 92/11, 14 February 1992, IAEA.}

^{[6] Recent Media Reports Concerning Syria, IAEA Press Release 2007/018,15 October 2007.}