Anatoly (Tolya) Levshin is a Postdoctoral Fellow with the International Security Program at the Belfer Center. He is also Director's Fellow with the Reimagining World Order research community at Princeton University, which he formerly co-curated with its director, Professor G. John Ikenberry, and Hans J. Morgenthau Fellow with the International Security Center at Notre Dame University. Before coming to the Belfer Center, Anatoly served as Associate Research Scholar and Lecturer at Princeton. In July 2021, Anatoly completed his doctoral dissertation under the supervision of John Ikenberry (chair), Aaron L. Friedberg, Gary J. Bass, and Marc Ratkovic — also at Princeton. Anatoly also holds an M.A. in Political Science from Princeton, an M.Phil. in International Relations from Oxford University, and a B.A. (Hons.) in Political Studies from Queen's University.

Anatoly's research combines theory-building, archival research, and state-of-the-art quantitative techniques, such as multi-agent adversarial deep inverse reinforcement learning, that facilitate granular analysis of complex strategic environments with the aid of artificial intelligence. He is currently writing a book on the theory and history of multilateral pacification — a practice that encompasses states’ use of proscriptive anti-war rules, usually supported by diplomatic, financial, or military sanctions, to deter deployment of military power in particular geographical locales or against particular states. That book, tentatively entitled The Statecraft of Pacification: the League of Nations, United Nations, and Multilateral Regulation of the Systemic Risk of Interstate Wars, grapples with a critical question: can states use multilateral pacification to fortify the international system against the threat of interstate war — and, if so, how? The book will provide an original dataset of regimes of pacification; identify the causal effect of multilateral pacification on international peace; and show that states have historically used multilateral pacification to cooperatively regulate the risk of the inefficient escalation of interstate wars.