The overarching question imparting urgency to this exploration is: Can U.S.-Russian contention in cyberspace cause the two nuclear superpowers to stumble into war? In considering this question we were constantly reminded of recent comments by a prominent U.S. arms control expert: At least as dangerous as the risk of an actual cyberattack, he observed, is cyber operations’ “blurring of the line between peace and war.” Or, as Nye wrote, “in the cyber realm, the difference between a weapon and a non-weapon may come down to a single line of code, or simply the intent of a computer program’s user.”
Maïlys Mangin is an Associate on the Project on Managing the Atom (MTA) at the Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. She wrote a dissertation on the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in nuclear nonproliferation policies, with a specific focus on the regulation of Iran’s nuclear activities. Her research focuses more broadly on political history of Nuclear Arms Control, political history of US foreign and defense policy, the effects of international system's changes on international institutions, as well as on the role of news media, intelligence and international institutions in nuclear negotiations. Aside from her dissertation, she has several other ongoing projects on nonproliferation, Nuclear Arms Control and on how to limit the risks of nuclear war. Her research draws on archival studies, elite interviewing and press analysis.
She is a member of the French Nuclear & Strategy Network (RSN-NG). Prior to joining MTA, she worked for the French Ministry of Defense in Washington D.C. and New Delhi, as well as for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) in Vienna. She has a master's degree in International Relations from University Paris 1 Pantheon-Sorbonne, a master's degree in Defense and Security Studies from University Lyon 3 Jean Moulin, and a PhD in Political Science from the University of Lille.Last Updated: Jan 16, 2023, 8:53pm