The overarching question imparting urgency to this exploration is: Can U.S.-Russian contention in cyberspace cause the two nuclear superpowers to stumble into war? In considering this question we were constantly reminded of recent comments by a prominent U.S. arms control expert: At least as dangerous as the risk of an actual cyberattack, he observed, is cyber operations’ “blurring of the line between peace and war.” Or, as Nye wrote, “in the cyber realm, the difference between a weapon and a non-weapon may come down to a single line of code, or simply the intent of a computer program’s user.”
William W. Hogan is research director of the Harvard Electricity Policy Group (HEPG), which is examining alternative strategies for a more competitive electricity market, and Faculty Director of the Consortium for Energy Policy Research, which promotes outreach, education, communication and capacity-building of energy policy study. Hogan has been a member of the faculty of Stanford University where he founded the Energy Modeling Forum (EMF), and he is a past president of the International Association for Energy Economics (IAEE). Current research focuses on major energy industry restructuring, network pricing and access issues, market design, and energy policy in nations worldwide. Hogan received his undergraduate degree from the U.S. Air Force Academy and his PhD from UCLA.
Selected recent publications (all available on www.whogan.com):
Electricity Market Design and Efficient Pricing: Applications for New England and Beyond (June 24, 2014)
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s (FERC, Commission) jurisdictional authority is not properly suited for electricity markets. A discussion of elements of market design, and the respective roles of market operators, regulators and market participants, suggests both changes in policy and in the scope of market manipulation enforcement. Electricity market design requires care in providing the necessary features and rules to support an efficient market. Ideally, behavior that violates these rules and exploits market flaws should be prohibited and subject to enforcement sanctions. However, the problem of designing these markets is complex enough that market manipulation policy must recognize that some apparent market defects are features and not flaws.
Electricity Scarcity Pricing Through Operating Reserves (April 25, 2013)
Suppressed prices in real-time markets provide inadequate incentives for both generation investment and active participation by demand bidding. An operating reserve demand curve developed from first principles would improve reliability, support adequate scarcity pricing, and be straightforward to implement within the framework of economic dispatch. This approach would be fully compatible with other market-oriented policies. Better scarcity pricing would also contribute to long-term resource adequacy.
Multiple Market-Clearing Prices, Electricity Market Design and Price Manipulation (March 31, 2012)
Integration of physical transactions and financial contracts is central to successful electricity market design. Virtually every energy transaction has some impact on prices. The mere fact that a physical transaction can affect prices to some degree, and thereby influence the prices of related financial contracts, cannot be a per se definition of price manipulation. A stand-alone profitability test distinguishes transactions that are consistent with workably competitive markets from transactions that serve no economic purpose other than to manipulate prices and profit from other financial contracts. Generalizing this standard to the degenerate conditions that give rise to multiple market-clearing prices provides a principled solution without undermining the market-design foundations that integrate economic dispatch, locational prices and financial transmission rights.Last Updated: Jan 28, 2020, 11:16am