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Caspian Studies Program
Summary by Peter Rutland
Gerard Libaridian, advisor to former President Levon Ter-Petrossian of Armenia, gave a presentation at Harvard University on 8 November in which he analyzed the likely impact of the 27 October attack on parliament. Libaridian, who is currently a senior fellow at the EastWest Institute in New York, was speaking to the Caspian Studies Program at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government.
Mention of John F. Kennedy reminds us that Americans are all too aware that the assassination of political leaders can occur even in a mature and stable democracy. Nevertheless, the slaughter of eight officials in the parliament on 27 October must raise doubts about the stability of Armenia's young democracy.
The killing of Prime Minister Vazgen Sargsian and Parliament Speaker Karen Demirjian removed two key leaders at a crucial juncture, when the country seemed on the verge of an agreement with Azerbaijan to break the deadlock over the status of Nagorno Karabakh. Libaridian said it was widely expected "that some sort of document will be signed "at the OSCE meetings in Istanbul on 18 November - not a peace treaty per se, but "a basis for renewal of negotiations." US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott was in Erevan on the day of the killings, and there was a strong sense that he "was pushing the Armenians to sign some document the contents of which have still not been disclosed." Libaridian said "I am convinced that Aliev and Kocharian were inching towards some sort of agreement."
The attack prompted a wave of speculation about who was behind the killings. A crazed attack by a lone gunman is one thing: but an attack by five gunmen, who were calm and methodical in the execution of their operation, seemed to hint at a larger conspiracy. They held the deputies hostage overnight, and seemed to be waiting for some action outside the Parliament building. Was their assault the first part of a coup attempt, whose second stage failed to materialize? How did the gunmen so easily enter the parliament building?
Adding to the air of suspicion, Libaridian noted, was the fact that "the government has had very little to say about the incident" in the ensuing two weeks. President Robert Kocharian, who had played an active role in negotiating the release of the hostages and ensuring the arrest of the attackers chose not to address the nation in the wake of the killings, apart from a speech eulogizing the victims.
Conspiracy theories, already a favorite pastime in that part of the world, flourished on all sides. Many Western commentators pointed an accusing finger at Russia, who they see as interested in maintaining instability in the region and hence keen to derail the peace talks with Azerbaijan. Others, including Russian Duma Speaker Gennadii Seleznev, saw the hand of the United States, since Demirjian was the former Communist leader of Armenia and Russia's favored candidate in the 1998 presidential elections, and Sargsian was one of the architects of strategic relations with Moscow while heading Armenia's Defense Ministry. Libaridian was dubious about the idea that Russia was behind the attack. He found it "hard to believe that Moscow would eliminate two of its closest friends in the region."
Other conspiracy candidates included all of Armenia's neighbors, not to forget internal groups such as any of the "Mafias" (possibly threatened by Sargsian's anti-corruption drive). Libaridian noted that these conspiracy theories are pure speculation, based on guesses about who stands to benefit from the killings. Perhaps evidence of some conspiracy will emerge. (In the past week a dozen additional people have been detained, including legislator Mushegh Movsisian and journalist Nairi Badalian.) But for the time being the conspiracy theories have no foundation in fact.
Instead, Libaridian suggested that the roots of the attack could lie in certain strands of the political culture which has grown up in Armenia over the past decade. He said the attack was "reflective of a certain kind of thinking" which legitimizes the use of violence in order to "save the nation" and to execute a dramatic and historic act. This was precisely the rhetoric that was being used by the leader of the gunmen, Nairi Hunanian in his public statements during the crisis. Political discourse in Armenia has been laden with the rhetoric of hatred and betrayal, and "sustained by demagogues offering simplistic solutions" to the nation's manifold woes. Libaridian saw a possible parallel with the mob attack on the Armenian Parliament in 1996, led by the leaders of some recognized political parties, which culminated in the beating of then Speaker Babken Ararktsian and his two deputies. The October assault was not solely the assassination of a number of individual leaders, but an attack on the institution of Parliament itself. Another factor contributing to the politics of violence has been the creeping sense of despair in many sections of the population, due to rising poverty and endemic corruption.
In the short term, Armenia's political system seems to have weathered the test. The vacuum caused by the killing of the Prime Minister, the parliament Speaker and his two deputies was filled through constitutional procedures, and the army did not try to use the opportunity to take power. Libaridian said "There has not been a retreat from democracy in Armenia. The constitution has been tested one more time, and it worked." The appointment of the deceased Premier's brother, Aram Sargsian, as prime minister, was a symbolic affirmation of continuity.
However, the attack could have a more telling long-term impact on political developments in Armenia. It is uncertain that Aram Sargsian, most recently a cement works director, will be able to fill his brother's shoes. Libaridian had personally met Vazgen Sargsian on 6 October and found him "a changed man," "very different" from the Sargsian of 1996-97 who had joined with Kocharian to oust Ter-Petrossian. Since taking office Sargsian was "maturing as a statesman in more ways than one." He was starting to realize that Armenia's economic stagnation could not be solved by a few quick and resolute acts, such as cracking down on corruption or tightening tax collection. It will require better economic ties with the outside world, which in turn hinges upon resolution of the conflict with Azerbaijan. Hence Sargsian seemed to have overcome the "fear of peace" which prevails in parts of Armenian society, and was basically "on board" for the peace process. Another positive development had been the alliance of Sargsian and Demirjian, the heads of the two largest parties and the representatives of two different generations of political leaders, that together constituted a solid majority in Parliament. They will not be easy to replace as leaders, and there is a danger that their parties may disintegrate in their absence.
Furthermore, Libaridian said he felt a certain unease in Armenia about the rise to power of Karabakh Armenians, with Sargsian and Demirjian seen as "Armenians coming to rescue Armenia from the Karabakh leadership." The loss of the two leaders may sharpen that perceived divide.
The attack may also serve to weaken the authority of President Kocharian and his will to achieve peace, given the absence of a legitimacy which Vazgen Sargsian's support would have given to any peace deal, and Kocharian's emergence following the crisis as something of a "lonely figure."
Finally, the attack has caused deep concern in Tbilisi and Baku, where leaders now may instinctively become more timid in their foreign policy and security initiatives.