Press Release
from Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School
Since well before Sept. 11, 2001, and throughout the decade since the 9/11 attacks, analysts in the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs have examined Osama bin Laden and the Al Qaeda terrorist movement. These studies and articles have focused on aspects including the threat of nuclear terrorism, the role of foreign fighters and how to combine soft and hard power to combat Al Qaeda. Check back for updates to this sampling of research and commentary.
AP Photo
Op-Ed, Chicago Tribune, December 1, 2008, by Graham Allison, Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
In the final weeks of the presidential campaign, vice presidential candidate Joe Biden offered an inconvenient prediction: "It will not be six months," he said, "before the world tests Barack Obama. We're going to have an international crisis, a generated crisis, to test the mettle of this guy." History is on Biden's side.
Connecting the Dots: Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda's Involvement in Terrorism Prior to 9/11
Praeger Security International Online, November 30, 2006, by Joshua Gleis, Former Associate, International Security Program
On the night of November 5, 1990, El Sayid Nosair walked into the Marriot East Side Hotel, pulled out a .357 chrome-plated magnum pistol and shot one bullet into the neck of Rabbi Meir Kahane. Kahane was dead on arrival at the hospital.... Long after Kahane's funeral, few people realized what type of person they had in custody. El Sayid Nosair was a critical connection to members of what would become Al Qaeda; a connection that was overlooked by members of the U.S. intelligence agencies. So began the first link in the long trail that led to the attacks on September 11th, 2001.
AP Photo/IntelCenter
Al Qaeda's Religious Justification of Nuclear Terrorism
Working Paper, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, November 12, 2010, by Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
...Bin Laden would develop an idea that would breathe life back into Zawahiri's dreams: the United States must become the target of the jihad. If the Americans could be provoked into war, they could be defeated like the Soviets, and expelled from Muslim lands for good. The fall of the U.S. superpower would lead to the overthrow of secular Arab states. This insight led to successive Al Qaeda strikes against the U.S., including the unsuccessful bombing of the World Trade Center (1993), bombings of two U.S. embassies in East Africa (1998), and the bombing of the USS Cole (2000). It was not evident at the time, but the road to 9/11 began on the day Al Qaeda was formed.
Op-Ed, Washington Post, August 31, 1998, Graham Allison, Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
For Americans watching the deepening economic crisis in Russia, the most important question is why it matters to us. Given modest levels of U.S. investment and trade and muffled impacts on American markets, Russia's crisis would be important, but no more so than earlier crises in Korea and Indonesia. But Russia is not Indonesia. The reason why Russia's meltdown matters for Americans is much more specific and potentially catastrophic. As an economic crisis accelerates the disintegration of authority in Russia, history has left a superpower arsenal.
... Consider approximately 70,000 nuclear weapons equivalents in stockpiles of highly enriched uranium and plutonium. One unit to Osama bin Laden's terrorists would provide the critical ingredient for a crude nuclear device. Compound this with biological weapons materials, chemical weapons and thousands of ICBMs and know-how for producing more missiles without limit.
AP Photo
"The Foreign Fighter Phenomenon: Islam and Transnational Militancy"
Policy Brief, February 2011 by Thomas Hegghammer, Former Associate, Initiative on Religion in International Affairs/International Security Program, 2009–2010
This policy brief is based on "The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters: Islam and the Globalization of Jihad," which appears in the Winter 2010/11 issue of International Security.
...Foreign fighters matter because they can affect the conflicts they join, as they did in post-2003 Iraq by promoting sectarian violence and indiscriminate tactics. Perhaps more important, foreign fighter mobilizations empower transnational terrorist groups such as al-Qaida, because war volunteering is the principal stepping-stone for individual involvement in more extreme forms of militancy. For example, when Muslims in the West radicalize, they usually do not plot attacks in their home countries right away, but travel to a war zone such as Iraq or Afghanistan first. A majority of al-Qaida operatives began their militant careers as war volunteers, and most transnational jihadi groups today are by-products of foreign fighter mobilizations. War volunteering is therefore key to understanding transnational Islamist militancy.
Round by Round: Winners and Losers in the Post-9/11 Era
Op-Ed, Daily Star, September 6, 2006, by Joseph S. Nye, Harvard University Distinguished Service Professor
September 11, 2001 is one of those dates that mark a transformation in world politics. Just as the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, signified the Cold War's end, Al-Qaeda's attack on the United States opened a new epoch. A non-governmental group killed more Americans that day than the government of Japan did with its surprise attack on another transformative date, December 7, 1941. While the jihadi terrorist movement had been growing for a decade, 9/11 was the turning point. Five years into this new era, how should we characterize it?
Some believe that 9/11 ushered in a "clash of civilizations" between Islam and the West. Indeed, that is probably what Osama bin Laden had in mind. Terrorism is a form of theater. Extremists kill innocent people in order to dramatize their message in a way that shocks and horrifies their intended audience. They also rely on what Clark McCauley and others have called "jujitsu politics," in which a smaller fighter uses the strength of the larger opponent to defeat him.
Owls are Wiser About Iraq Than Hawks
Op-Ed, Financial Times, October 21, 2002, by Joseph S. Nye, Harvard University Distinguished Service Professor
The debate over whether the US should go to war with Iraq is often cast as one between hawks who urge the prompt use of force and doves who oppose it. But a third position - let us call it that of owls - makes more sense. Owls would use force to back up the United National Security Council resolutions violated by Saddam Hussein but take the time necessary to develop a broad, multilateral coalition. Now that the US Congress has authorised the use of force, the crucial choice is between hawks and owls.
Impatient hawks who ask why the US should let other countries decide what is in the national interest miss the point. A patient, multilateral approach to Iraq is in the country's best interest. Unilateralism and multilateralism are not religions, but tactics, and can sometimes reinforce each other, as President John F. Kennedy showed during the Cuban missile crisis. Indeed, owls could accept a move to unilateral pre-emption if Mr Hussein were planning a terrorist attack, or just about to obtain nuclear weapons. But in the current situation, multilateralism is essential. The long-term danger we face is the trap set by Osama bin Laden.
The Origins of Global Jihad: Explaining the Arab Mobilization to 1980s Afghanistan
Policy Memo, International Security Program, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, January 22, 2009, by Thomas Hegghammer, Former Associate, Initiative on Religion in International Affairs/International Security Program
Summary: The Arab involvement in Afghanistan was the result of two main factors: the entrepreneurship of the Palestinian preacher Abdallah Azzam and the rise of a "soft pan-Islamism" promoted since the mid-1970s by non-violent international Islamic organizations such as the Muslim World League.
The Arab involvement in the 1980s Afghan jihad is widely recognized as a crucial stage in the history of militant Islamism. It generated the battle-hardened and uprooted network of Arab Afghans from which al-Qaida and other groups emerged. It also set a precedent for similar mobilizations to Bosnia, Chechnya, Iraq, and elsewhere. We know much about the consequences of the Arab involvement but much less about its causes. Why did the Arabs go to Afghanistan in the first place?
AP Photo
Reading the Tea Leaves in Pakistan
Op-Ed, Boston Globe, February 21, 2008, by Graham Allison, Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
Fortunately, Pakistan's nuclear weapons are secured by its army, the country's most effective national institution. Unless the army were destabilized or became substantially disaffected because of extended political instability, it will fulfill its custodial responsibilities. In contrast, a government that truly reflects the current views of the Pakistani people is more likely to be an unspoken opponent than an ambiguous ally in the US war against Al Qaeda and other terrorists in the region. Hard as it is to believe, Osama bin Laden is four times as popular among Pakistanis as President Bush, whose approval rating is 7.7 percent.
AP Photo
No Sign until the Burst of Fire: Understanding the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier
Journal Article, International Security, Spring 2008, by Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason
The Pakistan-Afghanistan border area has become the most dangerous frontier on earth, and the most challenging for the United States’ national security interests. Critically, the portion of the border region that is home to extremist groups such the Taliban and al-Qaida coincides almost exactly with the area overwhelmingly dominated by the Pashtun tribes. The implications of this salient fact—that most of Pakistan’s and Afghanistan’s violent religious extremism, and with it much of the United States’ counterterrorism challenge, are contained within a single ethnolinguistic group—have unfortunately not been fully grasped by a governmental policy community that has long downplayed cultural dynamics. The threat to long-term U.S. security interests in this area is neither an economic problem, nor a religious problem, nor a generic “tribal” problem. It is a unique cultural problem. In both southern Afghanistan and the tribal areas of Pakistan, rather than seeking to “extend the reach of the central government,” which simply foments insurgency among a proto-insurgent people, the United States and the international community should be doing everything in their means to empower the tribal elders and restore balance to a tribal/cultural system that has been disintegrating since the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979.
Since well before Sept. 11, 2001, and throughout the decade since the 9/11 attacks, analysts in the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs have examined Osama bin Laden and the Al Qaeda terrorist movement. These studies and articles have focused on aspects including the threat of nuclear terrorism, the role of foreign fighters and how to combine soft and hard power to combat Al Qaeda. Check back for updates to this sampling of research and commentary.
AP Photo
Op-Ed, Chicago Tribune, December 1, 2008, by Graham Allison, Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
In the final weeks of the presidential campaign, vice presidential candidate Joe Biden offered an inconvenient prediction: "It will not be six months," he said, "before the world tests Barack Obama. We're going to have an international crisis, a generated crisis, to test the mettle of this guy." History is on Biden's side.
Connecting the Dots: Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda's Involvement in Terrorism Prior to 9/11
Praeger Security International Online, November 30, 2006, by Joshua Gleis, Former Associate, International Security Program
On the night of November 5, 1990, El Sayid Nosair walked into the Marriot East Side Hotel, pulled out a .357 chrome-plated magnum pistol and shot one bullet into the neck of Rabbi Meir Kahane. Kahane was dead on arrival at the hospital.... Long after Kahane's funeral, few people realized what type of person they had in custody. El Sayid Nosair was a critical connection to members of what would become Al Qaeda; a connection that was overlooked by members of the U.S. intelligence agencies. So began the first link in the long trail that led to the attacks on September 11th, 2001.
AP Photo/IntelCenter
Al Qaeda's Religious Justification of Nuclear Terrorism
Working Paper, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, November 12, 2010, by Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
...Bin Laden would develop an idea that would breathe life back into Zawahiri's dreams: the United States must become the target of the jihad. If the Americans could be provoked into war, they could be defeated like the Soviets, and expelled from Muslim lands for good. The fall of the U.S. superpower would lead to the overthrow of secular Arab states. This insight led to successive Al Qaeda strikes against the U.S., including the unsuccessful bombing of the World Trade Center (1993), bombings of two U.S. embassies in East Africa (1998), and the bombing of the USS Cole (2000). It was not evident at the time, but the road to 9/11 began on the day Al Qaeda was formed.
Op-Ed, Washington Post, August 31, 1998, Graham Allison, Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
For Americans watching the deepening economic crisis in Russia, the most important question is why it matters to us. Given modest levels of U.S. investment and trade and muffled impacts on American markets, Russia's crisis would be important, but no more so than earlier crises in Korea and Indonesia. But Russia is not Indonesia. The reason why Russia's meltdown matters for Americans is much more specific and potentially catastrophic. As an economic crisis accelerates the disintegration of authority in Russia, history has left a superpower arsenal.
... Consider approximately 70,000 nuclear weapons equivalents in stockpiles of highly enriched uranium and plutonium. One unit to Osama bin Laden's terrorists would provide the critical ingredient for a crude nuclear device. Compound this with biological weapons materials, chemical weapons and thousands of ICBMs and know-how for producing more missiles without limit.
AP Photo
"The Foreign Fighter Phenomenon: Islam and Transnational Militancy"
Policy Brief, February 2011 by Thomas Hegghammer, Former Associate, Initiative on Religion in International Affairs/International Security Program, 2009–2010
This policy brief is based on "The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters: Islam and the Globalization of Jihad," which appears in the Winter 2010/11 issue of International Security.
...Foreign fighters matter because they can affect the conflicts they join, as they did in post-2003 Iraq by promoting sectarian violence and indiscriminate tactics. Perhaps more important, foreign fighter mobilizations empower transnational terrorist groups such as al-Qaida, because war volunteering is the principal stepping-stone for individual involvement in more extreme forms of militancy. For example, when Muslims in the West radicalize, they usually do not plot attacks in their home countries right away, but travel to a war zone such as Iraq or Afghanistan first. A majority of al-Qaida operatives began their militant careers as war volunteers, and most transnational jihadi groups today are by-products of foreign fighter mobilizations. War volunteering is therefore key to understanding transnational Islamist militancy.
Round by Round: Winners and Losers in the Post-9/11 Era
Op-Ed, Daily Star, September 6, 2006, by Joseph S. Nye, Harvard University Distinguished Service Professor
September 11, 2001 is one of those dates that mark a transformation in world politics. Just as the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, signified the Cold War's end, Al-Qaeda's attack on the United States opened a new epoch. A non-governmental group killed more Americans that day than the government of Japan did with its surprise attack on another transformative date, December 7, 1941. While the jihadi terrorist movement had been growing for a decade, 9/11 was the turning point. Five years into this new era, how should we characterize it?
Some believe that 9/11 ushered in a "clash of civilizations" between Islam and the West. Indeed, that is probably what Osama bin Laden had in mind. Terrorism is a form of theater. Extremists kill innocent people in order to dramatize their message in a way that shocks and horrifies their intended audience. They also rely on what Clark McCauley and others have called "jujitsu politics," in which a smaller fighter uses the strength of the larger opponent to defeat him.
Owls are Wiser About Iraq Than Hawks
Op-Ed, Financial Times, October 21, 2002, by Joseph S. Nye, Harvard University Distinguished Service Professor
The debate over whether the US should go to war with Iraq is often cast as one between hawks who urge the prompt use of force and doves who oppose it. But a third position - let us call it that of owls - makes more sense. Owls would use force to back up the United National Security Council resolutions violated by Saddam Hussein but take the time necessary to develop a broad, multilateral coalition. Now that the US Congress has authorised the use of force, the crucial choice is between hawks and owls.
Impatient hawks who ask why the US should let other countries decide what is in the national interest miss the point. A patient, multilateral approach to Iraq is in the country's best interest. Unilateralism and multilateralism are not religions, but tactics, and can sometimes reinforce each other, as President John F. Kennedy showed during the Cuban missile crisis. Indeed, owls could accept a move to unilateral pre-emption if Mr Hussein were planning a terrorist attack, or just about to obtain nuclear weapons. But in the current situation, multilateralism is essential. The long-term danger we face is the trap set by Osama bin Laden.
The Origins of Global Jihad: Explaining the Arab Mobilization to 1980s Afghanistan
Policy Memo, International Security Program, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, January 22, 2009, by Thomas Hegghammer, Former Associate, Initiative on Religion in International Affairs/International Security Program
Summary: The Arab involvement in Afghanistan was the result of two main factors: the entrepreneurship of the Palestinian preacher Abdallah Azzam and the rise of a "soft pan-Islamism" promoted since the mid-1970s by non-violent international Islamic organizations such as the Muslim World League.
The Arab involvement in the 1980s Afghan jihad is widely recognized as a crucial stage in the history of militant Islamism. It generated the battle-hardened and uprooted network of Arab Afghans from which al-Qaida and other groups emerged. It also set a precedent for similar mobilizations to Bosnia, Chechnya, Iraq, and elsewhere. We know much about the consequences of the Arab involvement but much less about its causes. Why did the Arabs go to Afghanistan in the first place?
AP Photo
Reading the Tea Leaves in Pakistan
Op-Ed, Boston Globe, February 21, 2008, by Graham Allison, Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
Fortunately, Pakistan's nuclear weapons are secured by its army, the country's most effective national institution. Unless the army were destabilized or became substantially disaffected because of extended political instability, it will fulfill its custodial responsibilities. In contrast, a government that truly reflects the current views of the Pakistani people is more likely to be an unspoken opponent than an ambiguous ally in the US war against Al Qaeda and other terrorists in the region. Hard as it is to believe, Osama bin Laden is four times as popular among Pakistanis as President Bush, whose approval rating is 7.7 percent.
AP Photo
No Sign until the Burst of Fire: Understanding the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier
Journal Article, International Security, Spring 2008, by Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason
The Pakistan-Afghanistan border area has become the most dangerous frontier on earth, and the most challenging for the United States’ national security interests. Critically, the portion of the border region that is home to extremist groups such the Taliban and al-Qaida coincides almost exactly with the area overwhelmingly dominated by the Pashtun tribes. The implications of this salient fact—that most of Pakistan’s and Afghanistan’s violent religious extremism, and with it much of the United States’ counterterrorism challenge, are contained within a single ethnolinguistic group—have unfortunately not been fully grasped by a governmental policy community that has long downplayed cultural dynamics. The threat to long-term U.S. security interests in this area is neither an economic problem, nor a religious problem, nor a generic “tribal” problem. It is a unique cultural problem. In both southern Afghanistan and the tribal areas of Pakistan, rather than seeking to “extend the reach of the central government,” which simply foments insurgency among a proto-insurgent people, the United States and the international community should be doing everything in their means to empower the tribal elders and restore balance to a tribal/cultural system that has been disintegrating since the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979.