Assessment of the Nuclear Programs of Iran and North Korea: Foreword

During the last two decades, there have been successes but also disappointments in fighting against nuclear proliferation. On the positive side, we witnessed the dismantlement of nuclear weapons programs in South Africa, Iraq, and Libya. The Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) was indefinitely extended and continues to be the global framework against the spread of nuclear proliferation. There are now 115 Additional Protocols in force, which enhance IAEA’s verification capabilities. On the downside, the withdrawal of North Korea from the NPT and its subsequent nuclear tests charted a dangerous and negative course. As an additional adverse development, we have seen the emergence of North Korea’s uranium enrichment program. The international community has also not been able to curb Iran’s uranium enrichment and suspected military nature of its nuclear program. We see Iran marching slowly but steadily toward amassing nuclear weapons’ capability. Syria stands in flagrant violation in its safeguards undertakings.

When we are looking at these proliferation cases, there are a number of lessons –positive and negative – learnt. First, facts reported by the IAEA are essential for the international community in assessing the compliance and risks of possible clandestine activities. Second, the IAEA verification scheme is biting when it fully exercises its verification rights, and when it is provided with the requisite cooperation.Third, when countries face questions raised by the IAEA, those that chose to turn the course and/or cooperated to remove concerns and ambiguities resolved their nuclear dossiers in a satisfactory manner and fairly swiftly. Fourth, when states adopt the course of confrontation, as are currently the cases with Iran, Syria, and North Korea, the situation becomes more complicated and more difficult to resolve. Fifth, dragging non-compliance and challenging of the authority of the United Nations Security Council and the IAEA Board of Governors erodes the international non-proliferation regime.

This book addresses two proliferation cases, Iran and North Korea providing extensive snapshots on the currently known nuclear programs, and analyses failures and weaknesses of past verification activities, and makes innovative suggestions for ways forward.

Olli Heinonen