As the only passage connecting the Pacific and Arctic Oceans, the Bering Strait is a vital “highway” for wildlife and ships alike. Though the United States and Russia have a relatively successful record of cooperation across their shared maritime boundary in the Strait, the fallout from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has complicated that cooperation at a time when maritime traffic risks in the Strait are increasing.
Sea ice loss, driven by rapid climate change, has made the waters of the Bering Strait more navigable, which in turn has led to increasing vessel traffic, particularly along Russia’s Northern Sea Route (NSR). The expansion of shipping activity heightens risks to Arctic ecosystems and communities on both sides of the Strait, including groundings, collisions, spills of oil or other contaminants, noise and air pollution, and vessel strikes on marine mammals and small watercraft. These risks are magnified by increasingly unpredictable and extreme weather conditions and a lack of emergency response infrastructure.
As climate change and economic activity in the region accelerate, the United States and Russia have a common interest in mitigating these shared environmental risks. A November workshop hosted by Harvard Kennedy School’s Arctic Initiative, the Wilson Center’s Polar Institute, and the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) brought together seventeen experts to explore potential actions that the United States and Russia could pursue, jointly or independently, to protect the Bering Strait’s sensitive marine ecosystem and coastal communities.
The workshop featured recent papers by Arctic Initiative Postdoctoral Research Fellow Andrey Todorov and Inga Banshchikova, Policy Research Associate with the WWF U.S. Arctic Program. Over 80 virtual participants, including representatives from the U.S. Coast Guard and the International Maritime Organization (IMO), attended.
A Valuable but Vulnerable Corridor
Biologically, the Bering Strait is extremely productive and provides a habitat and migration pathway for a wide range of fish, marine mammals, and seabirds. This rich marine life is critically important for the subsistence activities of the Siberian Yup’ik, Central Yup’ik, Chukchi, and Iñupiat people.
Ship traffic in the region is on a steady upward trend: the number of transits through the Strait rose from 242 transits in 2010 to 555 transits in 2021. This activity is driven in large part by Russia’s ambitions to develop the Northern Sea Route. The war in Ukraine has caused Russia to target Asian markets, rather than European markets, for its Arctic resource exports. As a result, shipping traffic (and the corresponding potential for an environmental disaster) in the Bering Strait, the eastern terminus of the NSR, is likely to grow.
As an international strait, all ships are permitted to the right of transit passage. In 2018, the IMO approved a joint U.S.-Russian proposal to establish voluntary two-way shipping lanes and three Areas to Be Avoided (ATBAs) around St. Lawrence Island, King Island, and Nunivak Island. Though voluntary, compliance with these measures has been high. On top of IMO measures, there are various regional and bilateral agreements pertaining to ship traffic management and fisheries.
The Path of Least Resistance Under Harsh Conditions
Given the high geopolitical tensions between the United States and Russia, the panelists were not optimistic that bilateral cooperation on regulating Arctic shipping would soon resume. The war and subsequent suspension of cooperation with the other Arctic nations may have far-reaching consequences for Russia’s Arctic policies. Todorov pointed out that, due to sanctions, Russia will need to use outdated and less eco-friendly technologies. He added that the socioeconomic crisis in Russian society may significantly weaken the country’s commitment to environmental protection.
However, the panelists identified several measures that could be implemented without Russian cooperation. Both Todorov and Banshchikova recommended that the United States establish, through the IMO, an ATBA around Little Diomede Island, which would help route vessels away from sensitive areas in the event they must deviate from the existing shipping lanes. Big Diomede Island, on the Russian side, would not be covered.
Other measures taken by the United States could include maintaining lines of communication with the Russian coast guard and improving domestic emergency prevention and response capabilities. The international shipping community could adopt voluntary dynamic shipping measures tailored to vessel size and class, which would reflect weather conditions, seasons, and wildlife migration patterns. In the long term, decarbonizing oceanic shipping would also reduce the risk of oil spills and black carbon emissions.
In the current geopolitical climate, mandatory measures will be difficult to implement, but voluntary measures may go a long way toward preventing future maritime disasters and drastic environmental consequences.
Recordings of the workshop sessions are available to watch via the Belfer Center's YouTube channel.
