Bush in India: It's More Than Just Nuclear

For the first time in months, the word “nuclear” is not synonymous with Iran. Last week, President Bush and Indian Prime Minister Singh agreed upon the way forward on civilian nuclear cooperation with India. A breakthrough was achieved, albeit one that is controversial and will now be dissected both by the U.S. Congress and the Indian parliament. And, it is this that the press will undoubtedly focus on.

But, the broader U.S.-India relationship, for many a “no brainer,” is the big story here.

Last July 18, President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announced a broad strategic relationship that covered issues from energy and the economy, to agriculture, military cooperation and HIV/AIDS. However, what stood out was the deal to move past India's 1998 nuclear tests to a new understanding on civil nuclear issues. This deal would separate India's civilian and military nuclear facilities, place the civilian facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, and put India at the core of international efforts to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

For the past seven months the pundits have been arguing: (a) that this proposal throws away the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) for some elusive goal such as containing China or easing the sale of F-16s to India's rival Pakistan, and (b) that the deal will collapse and with it the entire logic of the U.S.-India transformed strategic relationship.

Last week's events proved them wrong.

Both the July 18, 2005 and March 2, 2006 agreements describe a deep, broad and enduring U.S.-India relationship encompassing a wide range of issues. There is a strong strategic logic to this engagement and alignment with India that goes beyond the nuclear deal and even beyond China strategy. But the two talking points that you will hear from most will focus on these; so let us begin with them.

The advantage of the nuclear deal for India is straightforward: it represents India's best opportunity to obtain international cooperation on advancing much needed civilian nuclear power generation. The value for the United States of working with India to do so should also be clear. India is expected to grow at 8 to 10 percent a year for the next decade. The impact on energy prices and global warming if India turns entirely to fossil fuels for this growth would be significant, to say the least.

What about the NPT? The NPT is important, but India is not about to join it and meanwhile the threat of proliferation and the need for international cooperation on interdiction and containment has grown. India's export control record on nuclear matters is exemplary. The NPT, as its most ardent supporters will agree, has imperfections. Now we will get India's help with addressing some of these. As some members of Congress looking at this have said, we will never get India to be part of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, but it can be a critical player, if not leader, in the “non-proliferation team.”

What about China? The first thing to recognize is that India and the United States see China similarly (and remember that we each have the shared experience of fighting wars with China). Neither India nor the United States wants to “contain” China. India wants to get rich off of China's growing GDP, just like most American businesses do. But like the United States, India has an interest in seeing China play a role in international relations as a positive stakeholder.

As a multiethnic, multireligious democracy that shares values with the United States, India is primed to set a good model of what a stakeholder should do in international society. A successful India provides a valuable demonstration effect that puts healthy pressure on China to adhere to international norms of behavior. As investment continues to increase in India, China will have to think about improving its own intellectual property rights protection and rule of law and might even start to think twice about the competitive advantages of a more civil and democratic society.

And what about the sustainability of the U.S.-India alignment? The bilateral agenda – the areas where we need India and India needs us – is vast. It is reflected in Thursday's deal. Suffice it to say that India's military is advanced, capable and active, as we saw following the Dec. 26, 2004 tsunami when within 24 hours India joined the United States, Australia and Japan in a core response group.

Beyond this, India shares many of the United States' fundamental tenets in combating terrorism (with 150 million mostly poor Muslims, India has no al-Qaeda because it has the democratic framework that allows people to determine their future peacefully). Also in the joint statement was recognition that we need to work together in the area of science and technology, where India is easily on par with, if not in many cases ahead of, U.S. companies. We're also working with India in the health area, on fighting HIV/AIDs and avian influenza, on the environment and in economic cooperation, an area of huge potential given India's population and growing middle class.

The list could go on. But, what overarches all of this are our mutual values and goals. Ironically, what should be so surprising about the July and March deals, is not how much was achieved but how long it took us to realize the potential.

So yes, the civilian nuclear cooperation deal is controversial. While it must still get through our Congress and through the 44-country Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), it will open the way to help India grow and to help us all to avoid negative effects on global energy prices and the environment. But this is merely one sign-post in India's path toward becoming a global leader. Whether it is economics, energy, nonproliferation, democracy or security, India has a vital role to play and the capacity and will to play it.

And so, the United States and India have compelling interests that continue to converge. It is a partnership that brings out those values in both nations and societies that make us great and that pools the resources of the world's largest and most powerful democracies to address the greatest challenges to our future security and prosperity.

XeniaDormandy was Director for South Asian Affairs at the NSC until last fall and is now Executive Director for Research at Harvard’s BelferCenter. Michael Green was Special Assistant for National Security Affairs and Senior Director for Asiaon the NSC staff until December 2005.  He is now Senior Advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and Associate Professor at GeorgetownUniversity.