Journal Article - Quarterly Journal: International Security

Cheater’s Dilemma: Iraq, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the Path to War

| Summer 2020

Summary

From 1991 to 2003, the Iraqi leadership faced a cheater’s dilemma: how much should it reveal of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities when additional revelations made the lifting of sanctions unlikely, and continued denial also prevented the lifting of sanctions. The leadership’s struggle to resolve this dilemma was compounded by pervasive principal-agent problems. These issues offer insight into the origins of the 2003 war, and the incentives and constraints that shape how other authoritarian regimes respond to external pressures to eliminate their WMDs.

For more information on this publication: Belfer Communications Office
For Academic Citation:

Målfrid Braut-Hegghammer, "Cheater's Dilemma: Iraq, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the Path to War," International Security, Vol. 45, No. 1 (Summer 2020), pp. 51-89, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00382.

The Author