Cheater’s Dilemma: Iraq, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the Path to War

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Published: Summer 2020

The U.N., left, and Iraqi flags sit on the table of the conference hall prior to the talks on details for a return of the U.N weapons inspectors to Iraq at the IAEA headquarters in Vienna, Austria, Monday, Sept. 30, 2002.

Summary

From 1991 to 2003, the Iraqi leadership faced a cheater’s dilemma: how much should it reveal of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities when additional revelations made the lifting of sanctions unlikely, and continued denial also prevented the lifting of sanctions. The leadership’s struggle to resolve this dilemma was compounded by pervasive principal-agent problems. These issues offer insight into the origins of the 2003 war, and the incentives and constraints that shape how other authoritarian regimes respond to external pressures to eliminate their WMDs.

Recommended citation

Målfrid Braut-Hegghammer, "Cheater's Dilemma: Iraq, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the Path to War," International Security, Vol. 45, No. 1 (Summer 2020), pp. 51-89, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00382.