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CHECHNYA: WHAT NEXT?
Panel with Igor Rotar, John Reppert, and Michal Libal
Summary by Peter Rutland
Peace is not in sight for the hard-pressed inhabitants of the troubled Russian province of Chechnya. That was the conclusion of a panel discussion at the Kennedy School of Government on 17 November, held under the auspices of the Caspian Studies Program.
Russia''s aims in this second Chechen war, and the likelihood of their reaching them, were discussed by three distinguished panelists: Igor Rotar, a journalist who writes for Nezavisimaya Gazeta; General John Reppert, executive director of the Belfer Center, the former head of the On Site Inspection Agency who completed three tours of duty at the US Embassy in Moscow; and Dr. Michal Libal, currently German ambassador to Kazakhstan and formerly head of the OSCE mission to Georgia.
Igor Rotar stressed the political importance of the Russian military action in Chechnya to the future stability of the entire North Caucasus. He recalled that the current round of military action began with the Chechen attack on neighboring Dagestan in early August. After those attackers were repulsed, and in the wake of a wave of terrorist bombings in Moscow and Volgodonsk of unknown origin, Russia decided to start military operations against the rebel province.
Rotar underlined that the political situation across the whole North Caucasus is highly unstable. The region is inhabited by a multitude of ethnic groups with many grievances from times past, grouped together in republics with borders that cut across ethnic groups. In addition the region suffers from economic stagnation and an explosion of crime, including a veritable kidnapping industry. Tensions have been rising in Dagestan, North Ossetia, Ingushetia and Karachaevo-Cherkessia. The injection of a new element - militant Islamic groups operating out of Chechnya - threatened to destabilize the entire region, and triggered the Russian action.
Rotar was asked whether he was convinced that radical Islam is a factor in the region, or if this is merely an excuse used by Russian hardliners anxious to reverse their humiliating defeat in the first Chechen war (1994-96). Rotar said that he had personally been told by Chechen field commander Shamil Basaev during meetings in 1995-96 that the latter had visited Afghanistan and was motivated by a desire to drive out the "unbelievers" from his native land. However, Rotar did say that he thought it unlikely that Basaev had been behind the Moscow bombings, although he did not rule out the possibility that they could have been the work of another Chechen commander. Rotar suggested that financial support from the Islamic world may be an important factor behind the rise of the radical Chechen commanders.
Ambassador Libal, who was speaking in a personal capacity, echoed Rotar''s analysis of the potentially destabilizing effects of the state of near-anarchy which has prevailed in Chechnya in recent years. Chechnya''s government had "ruined the chance they had gotten after the 1996 accords" which ended the first war by allowing warlords to flourish. The province turned into "a sort of black hole dominated by armed bands and a kidnapping industry." It represented "a danger to its neighbors," since some Chechen leaders were trying to exercise a sort of "mini-imperialism" over the north Caucasus. Libal concluded that "no power can replace the Russian Federation to restore stability in the North Caucasus." The breakdown of Russian power in the region would have "catastrophic consequences," leading to "chaos and a war of all against all."
Libal argued that Russia should stop accusing the West of interference and should instead "live up to its responsibilities" to impose order, which may involve negotiating with moderate Chechen leaders. The international community has legitimate concerns over the fate of civilians in the region - concerns which are not merely an "internal affair" of Russia, given Russia''s obligations as a member of the OSCE. The West could also play a constructive role in helping to devise a lasting peace for the region, including helping to rebuild its economic and social infrastructure.
John Reppert noted that the Russian military has rethought its tactics in light of its failure in the first Chechen war, and seems determined to press for victory the second time around. In contrast to the past, they have implemented what seems to be a measured escalation of force. The first stage involved heavy air strikes while some 50,000 troops were massed to seal off the borders of the rebel province. With that accomplished, on 30 September they moved forward to seize the plains north of the Terek river. On 21 October Russian forces moved into central Chechnya, preceded by heavy bombardment from artillery, missiles and aircraft. Their goal was to surround and seal off the major cities and persuade the civilian leaders to surrender. This having been accomplished in Chechnya''s second city, Gudermes, they are now turning their attention to Grozny.
At the start of the fighting the population of Chechnya was around 400,000. Of that number, some 200,000 have fled the province, mainly into Ingushetia. Reppert estimated that the Russians aim to kill or capture some 10,000 of the roughly 50,000 Chechen men of military age.
Reppert thought that this strategy had a reasonable chance of success, at least in the short term. By avoiding street fighting, the Russian forces may escape the humiliating defeats inflicted on them in 1994-96 by the mobile and highly-motivated Chechen fighters. By sealing off Grozny and driving the guerillas into the mountains, the Russian army hopes to starve them into submission during the winter.
The Russians now face a difficult decision: whether to try to take Grozny, or instead try to keep up a blockade of the city through the winter. Terrorist attacks could push the Russians to try for a quick solution. As time goes on, the political balance in Russia could shift against the war if there are no victories to report and guerrilla raids cause Russian casualties to mount.
An important difference from the first Chechen war is that the government has mounted a skillful media campaign, which seems to have convinced the Russian public that the military operations should be supported. Just how long that consensus can be sustained if the war, like its predecessor, turns into a messy and protracted affair, remains an open question.