Reports & Papers
from
Caspian Studies Program
Conflicts in Georgia:
Effects on Energy Transport and Regional Security
Irakli Machavariani
Caspian Studies Program
May 24, 2001
By Blanka Hancilova, CSP Student Associate
On May 24, Irakli Machavariani, who is the Personal Representative of the President of Georgia on Political Problems of National Security and Conflict Resolution at the State Chancellery of Georgia, spoke at the Kennedy School on conflicts in Georgia. Previously, Mr. Machavariani was the Deputy Chief, Staff of the Head of State of Georgia. He also worked as a State Advisor for Interethnic Problems and a Secretary of the Commission on Abkhazia at the State Council of Georgia. Monica Toft, Assistant Director of Harvard's Olin Institute and Assistant Professor of Public Policy at the Kennedy School, who has written extensively on ethnic conflict, chaired the seminar.
Machavariani opened his talk by outlining his thesis, namely that the existing conflicts in the Caucasus have no direct implications for the energy transportation and more broadly the security situation in the region. However, as he continued, "we could speak about common sources of the conflicts which can be a threat to the regional security."
According to him, the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia belong to the transitional period at the beginning of the 1990s, and are directly linked to the processes of the dissolution of the USSR and emergence of the independent Georgian state. "At the time of the break-up of the Soviet Union, people were not able to express their will, they lacked political maturity and civic participation. This allowed internal forces to provoke the population to an expression of will that led to conflicts."
However, the current situation is different. The most important factor now is the peoples' experience with conflicts. People know what happened in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabagh, and they have no desire to repeat it. People in Abkhazia and South Ossetia are tired of conflict and would give up today if they fully trusted the government, Machavariani stated.
At this point, Machavariani argued, the conflicts are either frozen or developing towards resolution; they do not escalate. Therefore, the probability is low that the territory of the conflicts will enlarge. The conflicts are largely localized.
Machavariani remarked that the proposed Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline is far from the conflict zones and therefore it is not probable that territorial conflicts will influence the situation. "Already in 1998, Baku started to export early oil to Supsa via railway and the old, smaller pipeline. And there have been no incidents." Thus Machavariani provided a practical example of successful transportation of Caspian oil to the West.
Machavariani maintained that regional security has been more or less achieved. "There are no active conflicts, and the probability of re-escalation of old conflicts or the development of new conflicts is rather low."
More broadly, Caucasian security is not institutionalized, and the reason Machavariani named is that two out of the three South Caucasian states are involved in war with each other (Azerbaijan and Armenia). "There is no possibility that security mechanisms will become institutionalized," he said. Armenia is not part of GUUAM, one of the leading economic and security organizations in the region. Despite Armenia's absence, GUUAM is, according to Machavariani, on the way to institutionalization and may broaden to include Bulgaria and Romania. GUUAM enlargement would be a positive outcome for the region, and would in effect signify "the cancellation of the Soviet Union," since the organization would include more than successor states. The Black Sea Economic Cooperation, which involves both Armenia and Azerbaijan is much less effective than GUUAM, Machavariani remarked.
The regions that are clearly not under the control of the Georgian government, i.e. Abkhazia and South Ossetia, take up about 15 percent of the Georgian territory. "Legally speaking, they are held by rebels," said Mr. Machavariani. He stressed that the Georgian government cares about them and is making an effort to rehabilitate the infrastructure on both sides. "We would like to have the whole territory controlled by a legally elected government."
Mr. Irakli Machavariani closed by reiterating his main points. He concluded that the conflicts prevent the institutionalization of regional security arrangements, because they are not only of intrastate nature but involve two state entities in war against each other. Since the reasons for the conflicts continue to exist, they can present a threat for the energy transportation.
DISCUSSION
The discussion was opened with a question about why the South Ossetian conflict seems to be close to a solution while Abkhazia does not.
Irakli Machavariani answered that this situation has both internal and external reasons. Practically since the time of President Gamsakhurdia, the Georgian government has had the same position: namely to convince Russian government and political forces that Georgia can be Russia's strategic partner and ally in the South Caucasus. But it failed. The failure can be blamed on Georgia as well as Russia. "I do not know whose fault it is, but the fact is we failed," Mr Machavariani stressed. Current relations are very bad. "I can hardly imagine it becoming worse. Even during the war in Abkhazia, which was practically between Georgia and Russia, there were meetings between negotiators and the atmosphere was not that bad as it is now." He pointed out that of the two states, Russia is much more mighty and has therefore much more capacity to influence mutual relations. "Georgia has not less capacity to create trouble for Russia than vice versa."
The situation in South Ossetia is more fruitful for resolution. First, the persons and players get along better. But also, Machavariani argued that the main reason lies with Russia. "The efficiency of negotiations is inversely proportional to Russia's strategic influence in the region," said Machavariani. "Regions of high interest for Russia such as Nagorno-Karabagh have more resources (political and diplomatic) devoted to them." South Ossetia little strategic value for Russia, therefore Russia pays limited attention to it. However, Abkhazia is a strategically valuable Black Sea region. Machavariani expressed his belief that with good conflict management efforts there is a reasonable chance to overcome Russia's negative effect and to solve the conflict.
Further, the conflict in South Ossetia was in fact not even a war according to Machavariani. It was a "guerilla war," (in the meaning of little war), which concerned mainly neighboring villagers. The Abkhaz conflict, however, developed into regular war with repeated involvement of troops and aviation. According to Machavariani, Russia would be in principle willing to give up Abkhazia, but they do not want to do it without any exchange and Georgia has nothing to offer.
The next question explored the links between the economic developments in the regions and the conflicts. Mr Machavariani admitted that the economy is not blossoming but in his opinion this has many causes. He stressed that he had spoken about the direct impact of the conflicts on the energy transportation and not on the economic developments in a broader context.
On the issue of Nagorno-Karabagh, Machavariani stated that since it is not an intrastate conflict, it is very difficult to predict its further development, but that it could potentially escalate. As to the Russian role in the Nagorno-Karabagh negotiations, he argued that Russia is only simulating cooperative involvement. In fact it is very unlikely that the conflict, taken into account the its complexity, will be resolved any time soon. He mentioned that the idea of common state (first proposed by Primakov for the Akkhaz conflict but also considered for Nagorno-Karabagh) is not a very helpful concept because it lacks the necessary legal clarity. In Machavariani's view, the problems on the agenda for the Nagorno-Karabagh peace talks are far behind the issues being discussed for Abkhazia and South Ossetia. For example, communication between the two sides that are trying to come to peace over Nagorno-Karabagh is worse now than it was between the two warring sides in Georgia during the height of the Abkhaz conflict.
Further questions dealt with the issue of Russian military bases in Georgia. Machavariani predicted that Russia would eventually be forced to give up the bases, because "Georgian requests are justified an accepted by the international community."