Controlling Warheads and Fissile Materials: An Urgent Nonproliferation Priority

February 26th presentation | March 30th presentation

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CONTROLLING WARHEADS AND FISSILE MATERIALS:

AN URGENT NONPROLIFERATION PRIORITY
Presentation to the Council on Foreign Relations
Matthew Bunn
Assistant Director
Program in Science, Technology, and Public Policy
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
John F. Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University

February 26, 1998

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Outline:

1) Context -- how many warheads, how much material, under what conditions

2) Current strategies and programs to address the problem

3) A few proposals for new initiatives

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WHY DO WE CARE?

• 
  
  
  
• Prevent "loose nukes" -- fundamental to entire nuclear proliferation regime
  
  
• Provide foundation for deep, transparent, and irreversible arms reductions
  
  
• Strengthen incentives for others to support nonproliferation, arms reduction efforts

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CONTEXT: WHAT ARE THE CONTOURS OF THE "LOOSE NUKES" PROBLEM?

• 
  
• Approx. 1050 tons HEU, 160 tons Pu
  
  
• Approx. 50% outside of weapons, 50+ locations in FSU
  
  
• Approx. 50% inside of weapons, deployment sites (100s), storage sites (10s)
  
  
• Warheads better secured, on average, than fissile material
  
  
• Fissile material: outdated security and accounting systems
  
  
• Economic turmoil and rampant corruption
  
  
• Multiple documented cases of "insider" theft of weapons-usable material
  
  
• CIA:
  • 
    
  • Nuclear material more accessible "than at any other time in history"
    
  • "None" of the FSU facilities has "adequate safeguards or security"

The essential ingredients of nuclear weapons could fall into the wrong hands at any moment; forestalling this should be a top priority for U.S. security policy.

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CONTEXT: HOW MANY WARHEADS EXIST, IN WHAT CATEGORIES?

* Many of these may not in fact be slated for dismantlement under current plans
Both the United States and Russia appear to be planning to retain total stockpiles of nuclear warheads several times the 2,500 START III figure.

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Context: How Much Fissile Material Exists,
And How Much Is Needed to Support Reduced Weapon Stockpiles?
(Albright et. al. estimates in metric tons, end 1994)

The amounts of fissile material declared excess to date leave military reserves large enough to support a rapid return to Cold War nuclear arsenals.

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CONTROLLING WARHEADS AND FISSILE MATERIALS: THE STRATEGY

TASK I: PREVENTING THEFT AND SMUGGLING

TASK II: VERIFYING REDUCTIONS THROUGH DATA EXCHANGES AND MONITORING

TASK III: HALTING ACCUMULATION OF EXCESS STOCKS

TASK IV: CARRYING OUT DISPOSITION OF EXCESS STOCKS

TASK V: STABILIZING NUCLEAR CUSTODIANS

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TASK I: PREVENTING THEFT AND SMUGGLING

MPC&A: Expanding Budgets Expanding Progress

Program Budgets:

Sites With Agreements, and With Upgraded MPC&A Systems:

• 
  
• Comprehensive plan to upgrade all sites by end of 2002
  
• Continue cooperation after 2002 to:
  • 
    
    
    
  • Ensure system maintenance and development
    
  • Foster "safeguards culture"

Risks of theft remain high; a huge amount of work remains to be done

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TASK I: PREVENTING THEFT AND SMUGGLING (cont.)

Mayak Fissile Material Storage Facility

• Construction continuing (but roof did not get on by winter)
  
• First module to open in 2000
  
• Little progress on bilateral transparency or international safeguards
  
• Japanese contribution (containers)

Warhead Security

• Transportation security assistance essentially complete
  • 
    
  • Armored blankets
    
  • "Supercontainers"
    
  • Emergency response equipment
    
  • Secure railcars
• Assistance for storage security expanding
  • 
    
  • Computerized accounting systems
    
  • Personnel clearance procedures
    
  • "Quick fix" equipment
    
  • "Model" secure storage facility near Moscow
    
  • Russian-designed long-term security upgrades

Nuclear Smuggling Cooperation

• Training and equipment for police, customs, border guards
  
• Information-sharing and "nuclear forensics" cooperation
  
• Early stages -- no comprehensive plan developed as yet

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TASK II: VERIFYING REDUCTIONS THROUGH DATA EXCHANGES AND MONITORING

• 
  
• Controlling Weapons, Materials -- Key To Deep Reductions, Nonproliferation
  
  
• Transparency Can:
  • 
    
  • Confirm Warheads Dismantled, Material Not Re-Used
    
  • Build Confidence in Size, Security of Stockpiles (Essential for Defense, Arms Control Planning)
    
  • Contribute to Cooperative Security Upgrades
    
  • Build Public, International Support
    
• Wide Range of Complementary Measures Needed
  • 
    
  • Makes Strategically Significant Lie Difficult
    
• U.S. and Russia Have Agreed in Principle On:
  • 
    
  • Data Exchange on Warhead and Materials Stockpiles (9/94)
    
  • Reciprocal Inspections of Dismantled Weapons Components (3/94)
    
  • Negotiating Agenda for Next Steps (5/95)
    
  • Safeguards on Material Excess to Defense Needs (4/96)
    
  • Pursuing Warhead Dismantlement Transparency in START III (3/97)
    
• Little Progress, Russia Has Canceled Further Talks On Most Aspects
  

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TASK II: VERIFYING REDUCTIONS THROUGH DATA EXCHANGES AND MONITORING

A Specific Case: Verification of Excess Materials

U.S.
227 tons declared excess (175t HEU, 52t Pu)

90 tons available for safeguards or committed to be made available soon

12 tons actually under safeguards

IAEA monitoring HEU blend-down at Portsmouth

Russia
550 tons declared excess (500t HEU, 50t Pu)

None available for safeguards -- but Yeltsin commitment on Mayak

U.S. monitoring HEU blend-down for HEU purchase

Monitoring Mayak

• Unilateral transparency under Nunn-Lugar -- little progress
  
• Reciprocal transparency under "MRI" -- never implemented
  
• "Trilateral initiative" -- little progress
  • 
    
  • legal issues -- how to make "irreversible" commitment?
    
  • financial issues -- who will pay?
    
  • technical issues -- how to protect proliferation-sensitive information?

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TASK III: HALTING ACCUMULATION OF EXCESS STOCKS

• 
  
• Bilateral U.S.-Russian plutonium reactor shutdown agreement (6/94)
  
  
• Revised to become reactor conversion agreement (9/97)
  • 
    
    
    
  • Reactors to be converted by 2000
    
  • HEU or LEU fuel?
    
  • Will MINATOM pay its share?
    
  • What happens after reactors' useful lives expire?
    
• Russia continues to produce separated civilian Pu
  • 
    
  • RT-1 -- foreign currency from E. European reprocessing
    
  • RT-2 -- plan unlikely to be fulfilled
    
• Currently no transparency to confirm non-production of HEU
  
  
• No progress on multilateral cutoff
  

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TASK IV: CARRYING OUT DISPOSITION OF EXCESS STOCKS

• 
  
• Reduce stockpiles of weapons-usable material
  • 
    
  • Reduce theft risk
    
  • Reduce arms-reduction reversal risk
    
• Blend HEU to LEU
  • 
    
  • HEU Purchase Agreement: 500 tons Over 20 Years (2/93)
    
  • 36 metric tons blended and delivered (as of 12/97)
    
  • 5-year contract on delivery rates and prices (11/96)
    
  • Dispute on marketing of natural uranium component
    
  • Transparency measures agreed and working
    
  • Blending of U.S. HEU begun, with IAEA verification (12/97)
    
  • USEC privatization underway -- may complicate deal
    
• Plutonium Disposition
  • 
    
  • Pu Has No Value: Requires Large Subsidy
    
  • Reactor Fuel or Disposal?
    
  • How to Finance and Manage?
    

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TASK V: SUPPORTING NUCLEAR EXPERTS AND CUSTODIANS

Collapse of government funding for nuclear weapons:

• economic crisis in nuclear complex
  
• creates incentives for "brain drain," theft, and corruption
  

Existing programs focus on "brain drain," research grants to scientists:

• International Science and Technology Centers
  
• Initiatives in Proliferation Prevention (formerly Industrial Partnering Program)
  • 
    
  • Many thousands of former weapons scientists receiving grants
    
  • Additional funding needed to support projects approved by peer review

New initiative needed to focus on stabilizing nuclear city economies
(workers, guards with access to fissile material as well as scientists)

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PROPOSAL: QUICK CONSOLIDATION AND DISABLING
OF THOUSANDS OF "UNREGULATED" WARHEADS

• 
  
• Warheads unregulated by arms control -- strategic reserve, tactical, awaiting dismantlement -- represent the vast majority of each side's total stockpile
  
  
• U.S. concerned about security of Russian "unregulated" warheads -- and reversal of arms reductions
  
  
• Russia concerned about reversal of arms reductions, given U.S. "upload" potential
  
  
• Clinton should announce that, if Russians will do the same, he will:
  • 
    
  • Consolidate nearly all strategic reserve and most tactical warheads at small number of secure storage facilities
    
  • Permit Russian monitoring of consolidated storage facilities
    
    
    
  • Rapidly, verifiably, and permanently disable warheads with "pit-stuffing"
    
  • Commit that these warheads will eventually be verifiably dismantled
    
• Within 2-3 years, 70-90% of each side's warhead stockpile could be at secure, monitored sites, and disabled -- without any further reductions in deployed forces
  
  
• Addresses both U.S. theft concerns and Russian reversal concerns, could help ratification of START II
  

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WHAT IS "PIT-STUFFING"?

• 
  
• Technology offers means of quickly, cheaply, verifiably, and permanently disabling thousands of warheads -- also can serve as non-intrusive dismantlement verification
  
  
• Each modern weapon contains a "pit" -- hollow sphere with a tiny tube into it
  
  
• If pit is stuffed with steel wire inserted through the tube, it cannot be compressed and the weapon cannot go off -- weapon cannot be used until it is dismantled, pit cut open to remove wire and remanufactured, and weapon reassembled
  
  
• In most weapons, tube can be reached while weapon still assembled
  
  
• So: thousands of weapons could be permanently disabled with minutes per weapon
  
  
• Verification: inspectors observe insertion of wires into tubes -- with shrouds to conceal warhead design details
  
  
• After warheads are dismantled, inspectors take gamma-ray image of one square inch of canister containing pit -- confirms presence of hollow sphere of plutonium stuffed with wire
  
  
• Confirms that the pits now being observed came from the warheads observed before (wire is essentially a tag inserted inside the weapon)
  
  
• Provides high-confidence dismantlement verification at low cost and intrusiveness -- minimal inspector-days, no access to dismantlement plants required

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WARHEAD DISMANTLEMENT: A FACT AND TWO QUESTIONS

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PROPOSAL: TARGETED SUPPORT FOR NUCLEAR CITY CONVERSION

RANSAC proposals Gore-Chernomyrdin call for nuclear cities conversion initiative

3 key elements:

• More nonproliferation and arms control cooperation -- build up nonproliferation and arms control capabilities comparable to those at U.S. labs
  
  
• More nuclear cleanup cooperation -- contract with Russian facilities and experts for technology development and field testing
  
  
• Provide support for development of commercial enterprises
  • 
    
  • Training in business management, market analysis, etc.
    
  • Assistance in identifying commercially viable technologies
    
  • Assistance with business plan development
    
  • Assistance in contacting potential investors -- Russian and foreign
    
  • Initial start-up capital
    

Congress should provide $30M in FY99 to initiate such an effort; other government resources (Russian regional investment initiative, OPIC, etc.) should also be brought to bear

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PROPOSAL: RAPID BLEND-DOWN OF HEU TO 19%

• 
  
• HEU deal is currently 500 tons over 20 years -- pace limited by commercial market
  
  
• Strong security arguments for moving farther, faster
  
  
• Blending to 19% could be accomplished far more rapidly with existing capabilities

Concept: Offer Russia up-front payment (ca. $100M?) to blend all 500 tons to 19% in next four years

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Proposal: Incentives for a Moratorium on Plutonium Reprocessing

• 
  
• Reprocessing of weapons plutonium (1.5 t/yr) likely to phase down when reactors converted
  
  
• Civilian reprocessing (>1 t/yr) continuing at Mayak
  
  
• Creates proliferation risks:
  • 
    
    
    
  • Build-up of separated, weapons-usable plutonium (>30 t already at Mayak)
    
  • Large-scale bulk-processing provides opportunities for theft
    
• Civilian reprocessing earns hard currency from Eastern Europeans, provides jobs
  
  
• Mayak operations not economically viable without foreign contracts (<$50M/yr)
  
  
• Concept: 2-pronged approach:
  • 
    
  • Provide alternatives (dry cask storage, reliable fuel supply) to Eastern Europeans, with incentives for them to take alternative
    
    
    
  • Offer package of alternative jobs, income for Mayak in return for moratorium on plutonium reprocessing
    

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CONTROLLING WARHEADS AND FISSILE MATERIALS:
SOME KEY NEXT STEPS

Presentation to the Council on Foreign Relations

Matthew Bunn
Assistant Director
Program in Science, Technology, and Public Policy
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
John F. Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University

March 30, 1998

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OUTLINE OF A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

• 
  
  
  
• Secure ALL warheads and fissile material
  
• Train, equip, share info with RELEVANT police, customs, border, intelligence forces
  
• Monitor ALL warheads and fissile material -- including reductions, starting with excess
  
• End ALL further production of fissile material -- military and civilian
  
• Disposition EXCESS fissile material as fast as possible -- and make excess the vast majority of the total
  
• Assist conversion of ALL nuclear cities -- reduce production capabilities, ensure that ALL scientists, workers, and guards who could pose proliferation threat are reliably paid

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TWO KEY OBJECTIVES IN SOLVING THE "LOOSE NUKES" PROBLEM

• 
  
• Get the Russian government itself -- from the President to safeguards operators -- to give improved security and safeguards high priority, including in resource allocations (requires: A) motivation; B) resources)
  
• Create a structure within the U.S. government that keep these issues continuously on the agenda of senior policy-makers, and coordinate relevant efforts

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PROPOSAL: BUY ANOTHER 100 TONS OF HEU, UP-FRONT, WITH PROCEEDS TO PAY FOR PAYING GUARDS, OTHER MEASURES TO IMPROVE NUCLEAR SECURITY

• 
  
• U.S. government could buy HEU much faster than it could be absorbed on commercial market -- separate from ongoing commercial HEU purchase
  
• Material could be held as "strategic uranium reserve" to moderate future price fluctuations, comparable to "strategic petroleum reserve"
  
• Cost <$2B, possibly much less depending on blending arrangements
  
• Negotiate with Russia to reach agreement that approx. 50% of proceeds will go to ensuring guards at all nuclear facilities are paid, security systems maintained and improved
  
• Provides Russia with both the incentive and the resources to put its own funds into upgrading security
  
• Senior Russian officials indicate they would be willing to sell another 100 tons of HEU

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PROPOSAL: PUT "LOOSE NUKES" ON SAME AGENDA WITH RUSSIA-IRAN NUCLEAR, MISSILE COOPERATION

• 
  
• "Loose nukes" even more important -- including larger potential impact on risk Iran will acquire nuclear weapons
  
• Key objective: move Russian government from passive acquiescence in cooperation to active determination to put its own resources into improving security
  
• Expand mandate of President's special representative (Gallucci) to include "loose nukes" as well
  
• Move back to the forefront of summit, Gore-Chernomyrdin, Albright-Primakov agendas (as Iran cooperation is)
  
• Convince allies to make the issue a high priority in their meetings (as we have attempted to do with Iran cooperation)
  
• Focus intelligence, policy experts on "loose nukes" problem (as we have with Iran cooperation)
  
• Get Congress to press Administration for more action (as they have with Iran cooperation)

---

PROPOSAL: QUICK CONSOLIDATION AND DISABLING OF THOUSANDS OF "UNREGULATED" WARHEADS

• 
  
• Warheads unregulated by arms control -- strategic reserve, tactical, awaiting dismantlement -- represent the vast majority of each side's total stockpile
  
• U.S. concerned about security of Russian "unregulated" warheads -- and reversal of arms reductions
  
• Russia concerned about reversal of arms reductions, given U.S. "upload" potential
  
• Clinton should announce that, if Russians will do the same, he will:
  • 
    
  • Consolidate nearly all strategic reserve and most tactical warheads at small number of secure storage facilities
    
  • Permit Russian monitoring of consolidated storage facilities
    
  • Rapidly, verifiably, and permanently disable warheads with "pit-stuffing"
    
  • Commit that these warheads will eventually be verifiably dismantledm
• Within 2-3 years, 70% of each side's warhead stockpile could be at secure, monitored sites, and disabled -- without any further reductions in deployed forces
  
• Addresses both U.S. theft concerns and Russian reversal concerns, could help ratification of START II
  
  
  
• Big and visible enough to draw public, senior policy-makers attention
  

---

PROPOSAL: TARGETED SUPPORT FOR NUCLEAR CITY CONVERSION

RANSAC proposals => Gore-Chernomyrdin call for nuclear cities conversion initiative

3 key elements:

• More nonproliferation and arms control cooperation -- build up nonproliferation and arms control capabilities comparable to those at U.S. labs
  
  
• More nuclear cleanup cooperation -- contract with Russian facilities and experts for technology development and field testing
  
  
• Provide support for development of commercial enterprises
  • 
    
  • Training in business management, market analysis, etc.
    
  • Assistance in identifying commercially viable technologies
    
  • Assistance with business plan development
    
  • Assistance in contacting potential investors -- Russian and foreign
    
  • Initial start-up capital
    

---

PROPOSAL: RAPID BLEND-DOWN OF HEU TO 19%

• 
  
• HEU deal is currently 500 tons over 20 years -- pace limited by commercial market
  
• Strong security arguments for moving farther, faster
  
• Blending to 19% could be accomplished far more rapidly with existing capabilities
  
• Concepts exist for overcoming the obstacles that have blocked rapid-blend-down proposals in the past (e.g., blending as oxide w/ 1.5% enriched oxide)
  
• U.S. could offer Russia up-front additional payment (ca. $200M?) to blend all 500 tons to 19% in next four years

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PROPOSAL: OFFER RUSSIA INCENTIVES FOR TRANSPARENCY PROGRESS

• 
  
• Virtually no progress on transparency for several years, despite Clinton-Yeltsin commitments -- unable to overcome Russian secrecy barriers
  
• Russian officials have had little incentive to do the hard work and take the political risks of opening up formerly secret nuclear activities
  
• One area where transparency measures are working -- HEU purchase, where big money is involved
  
• U.S. could offer Russia financial assistance for warhead dismantlement, and reciprocal verification of U.S. warhead dismantlement, if Russia would agree to verification of warhead dismantlement
  
• U.S. could offer to purchase 5% of whatever HEU stockpile Russia declared, if Russia agreed to carry out the stockpile data exchange (data on stockpiles of warheads, Pu, and HEU)
  
• Incentive strategies will have to be handled carefully to avoid "selling secrets" charges -- full reciprocity will be essential

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PROPOSAL: PUT TOGETHER AN INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL PACKAGE TO FUND DISPOSITION OF RUSSIAN EXCESS PLUTONIUM

• 
  
• Financing is the key issue -- disputes on technologies, nonproliferation conditions are close to resolution, would be resolved quickly if money was on the table
  
• Russia hasn't got the funds to pay the full cost itself, U.S. won't pay for both its own cost and the full Russian cost
  
• U.S. could put together a package proposal involving contributions from the U.S., Russia, and all the other P-8 countries -- "Irreversible Disarmament Fund"
  
• If total cost is $1.5B, average P-8 country pays only $180M -- $30M/yr over a plausible six-year time for major construction
  
• Proposal would include roles for, benefits to, firms from the largest contributing nations
  
• Once proposal is developed, place high priority on negotiating it with P-8 states, with goal of agreement in principle at P-8 summit in 1999

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PROPOSAL: INCENTIVES FOR A MORATORIUM ON PLUTONIUM REPROCESSING

• 
  
• Reprocessing of weapons plutonium (1.5 t/yr) likely to phase down when reactors converted
  
• Civilian reprocessing (>1 t/yr) continuing at Mayak
  
• Creates proliferation risks:
  • 
    
  • Build-up of separated, weapons-usable plutonium (>30 t already at Mayak)
    
  • Large-scale bulk-processing provides opportunities for theft
• Civilian reprocessing earns hard currency from Eastern Europeans, provides jobs
  
• Mayak operations not economically viable without foreign contracts (<$50M/yr)
  
• Concept: 2-pronged approach:
  • 
    
  • Provide alternatives (dry cask storage, reliable fuel supply) to Eastern Europeans, with incentives for them to take alternative
    
  • Offer package of alternative jobs, income for Mayak in return for moratorium on plutonium reprocessing