Sponsored by the Caspian Studies Program and the Harvard Forum for Central Asian Studies
Summary by Emily Van Buskirk
Professor and Doctor of Science Vitaly Naumkin, President of the International Center for Strategic and Political Studies (Moscow) and Editor-in-Chief of "Vostok-Oriens" magazine of the Russian Academy of Sciences, spoke at the Belfer Center on Friday, April 7th 2000. He outlined the ethno-political, geographic, and economic problems that will shape the future of the countries in Central Asia and the Caucasus. The subsequent discussion largely centered around Russia's past and future policies in the region.
After describing the politicized nature of the very choice of terms for the region of Central Asia and the Caucasus, Dr. Naumkin summarized a number of key hypothetical scenarios for the region's future. For example, many see a potential for unification in the region: a greater Turkey, a Central Asian Union, integration with either Russia or the Middle East, etc. However, Dr. Naumkin's own opinion is that the tendency for each country to strengthen its independent development will prevail. After all, the leading concept of the state is ethno-territorial, and each state seeks to protect its identity. As far as reintegration with Russia is concerned, Naumkin explained that neither the political will nor the financial capital exists to support such a scheme.
While Russia may employ the rhetoric of reintegration, Naumkin pointed out, its actions show that there is no serious interest in economic or national reintegration; the only interest lies in security. Russia's "triad" of security policies has consisted of 1) border guards 2) military bases and 3) peacekeeping forces. Even this "triad" has been eroding in recent years. Security also stands out as an issue with the potential to foster cooperation between many states of the Caucasus and Central Asia, especially as the belief in a real Islamic threat takes hold.
A recipe for conflict
The Soviet heritage and the status quo since the break-up of the empire have left the region in a difficult position. The main titular nation or ethnicity was turned into the basis of the state. For example, even while President Nazarbayev may be in favor of a multi-ethnic state, the Kazakhstani Constitution declares that the Kazakh State is the state of the self-determined Kazakh nation. However, the reality is that the populations in Central Asia are dispersed and intermixed in ways that ignore or contradict the ways in which borders are drawn. For this reason, Dr. Naumkin agreed with those who see a future of border disputes in the region. The seeds of these conflicts are already visible in disputes over water and other resources, and existing irredentism could also pose problems.
In the Caucasus, one of the major sources of tension is the structure of populations, especially in Georgia and Azerbaijan. Dr. Naumkin is pessimistic about ethnic harmony, based on the sheer number of ethno-political conflicts in the region. He sees no possible rapid solutions to Karabakh, mainly due to the deep-rooted issues that are involved.
Looking at a map of Central Asia, the region's strange geography becomes obvious, as does the most sophisticated of border arrangements. Kazakhstan, for example, acts as an umbrella, separating the rest of the region from Russia. These countries are not only landlocked, but doubly landlocked. Within each country (Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan are prime examples), there is a very uneven geographical distribution of resources and an uneven level of development between different regions (especially in Kazakhstan).
The issue of external actors in the region is very complex-also based on geography. It suffices to consider Kazakhstan's borders with China and Russia and the problem of so-called South Azerbaijan (the Northern part of Iran) as examples.
Change vs. the Status Quo
The main dilemma in the region remains whether to accept the stability of the status quo, (however imperfect it is) or to instead opt for change (which could be destructive). One potential agent of change is the Islamic opposition in countries like Uzbekistan; many believe such agents might wreak destruction.
Every one of these countries has an authoritarian government, Dr. Naumkin argued, although some are more authoritarian than others. He remarked on the despotic features of the Uzbekh state. For external actors, then, the dilemma becomes whether to support authoritarian elites or democratic change; most will continue to opt for the status quo, Naumkin predicted.
The Oil Dilemma
Is oil production and development in the region solving or exacerbating the serious socio-economic crises in the region? There are both positive and negative examples of the effects of oil in countries around the world, so it is difficult to predict the consequences for the Caspian region. However, even if there is indeed plenty of oil, the funds, technology, qualified labor force, transport mechanisms, and stability still must be there as necessary ingredients for success. And even if all these problems are solved, there is still no guarantee that profits won't end up in the pockets of elites, Naumkin warned. Destabilization is a very real possible consequence of oil development.
There are no grounds for a new Great Game in the region, he concluded. The interests invested (in Central Asia in particular, more so than the Caucasus) are just not great enough.
In conclusion, he stated, despite the presence of oil, the problems that face these countries are likely to remain for quite some time, at least until new leaders emerge and the world becomes more interested in real economic issues and democratic development in the region.
Discussion
Russian Language in Kazakhstan
In answer to a question about discriminatory language policies directed against Russians in Kazakhstan, Dr. Naumkin explained that Russians will be forced to lower their status over time, in order to allow for greater Kazakh cultural autonomy. Leaders of CIS countries in general prefer to marginalize certain spheres of their culture (i.e. Russian) in favor of others. "Russian culture is a very strong culture," so it is understandable why others fear its strength and influence.
"Red Line" Issues for Russia
Dr. Naumkin was asked to identify the "red lines" for Russian policy makers in the region-issues that should not be crossed. He singled out as a "red line" the inclusion of these countries in the spheres of influence of third powers, especially on security matters (the military sector). For example, a military alliance with Turkey would be seen as a "red line" issue.
Russia and the CIS under President Putin
Responding to the "worst case scenario" that has been formulated based on statements of patriotism and a strong state— where Putin tries to recreate the Soviet Empire in some of its dimensions— Dr. Naumkin played down all fears by saying "lots of Russian foreign policy can be seen as neo-isolationist." He did state that beginning with Primakov's tenure as premier, certain steps have been taken in Russia to raise the importance of cooperation with the CIS. However, while Russia is in many senses a natural partner for countries in the Caucasus and Central Asia, it nevertheless does not have the funds for a serious effort. Thus one should not always believe declarations about the rising importance of the CIS for Russia. If Russia does decide to make the CIS a priority, it will have to invest more in the relations, and meanwhile sacrifice other areas of interest. But Russia's main priorities are domestic.
Russia's reaction to multiple pipelines
When asked whether pipeline routes (such as Baku-Ceyhan) represented a "red line" issue for Russia, Dr. Naumkin said definitely not. Russians understand, he argued, that if Western governments and businesses are determined to finance certain pipelines, Russia cannot do anything about it. Also, the Russian political elites understand the necessity to diversify routes beyond the northern route through Russia. They also realize that stable, developed states in the Caspian will be better for Russia. However, it is unclear at this point whether Baku-Ceyhan is feasible.
Chechnya
Dr. Naumkin argued that while President Putin may be willing to compromise with the West on Chechnya, or at least to explain his moves clearly to them, the problem is that if Russian troops withdraw from Chechnya now, the conception will be that everything has been in vain. However, he predicted that the Russian military presence there will be diminishing over the coming weeks and months.
Responding to a question about the effects of the Chechen conflict on the Caucasus, Dr. Naumkin spoke specifically of Georgia. He believes that the understanding between Russia and Georgia over border issues has improved much since the early days of this conflict. Based on cooperation with Russia, the Georgians have stopped letting terrorists pass through their borders. Naumkin described how his earlier visits to the Middle East and discussions with people there proved to him that it was common knowledge among terrorists and volunteers to the Chechen cause that the way to Chechnya was through Georgia.
Naumkin ended with stating, "I am a big pessimist on Chechnya."