Dealing in Damascus

BEIRUT -- Regional and international players have been meeting in Damascus for thousands of years, to do one of two things: make war, or make a deal. This week's four-way summit of the leaders of France, Syria, Qatar and Turkey in Damascus perpetuates the age-old tradition of deal-making -- in this case bargaining over strategic assets and positions, rather than fine-thread carpets.

Bargaining to strike a deal in Damascus, whether in the world of commerce or politics, is defined by a few basic rules: the process takes time; it often requires third parties to come in and out of the picture like catalysts in a chemical equation; some gains are not calculated immediately but materialize later; and, a deal is consummated only if all sides obtain their key demands in a win-win situation.

This week's Damascus meeting testifies dramatically to the changing Middle East, which has become incredibly complicated in view of the many conflicts that are now entangled in a single large regional dynamic. It also points to greater changes ahead, because of Syria's contradictory position on some core issues related to Iran, Lebanon and Israel.

The most striking common denominator in this gathering comprises the roles of France, Qatar and Turkey as important new diplomatic mediators in the Middle East, filling the large gap left by the United States, which has increasingly marginalized itself by its own mistakes and biases. The United States, Europe -- and the UN to a lesser extent -- have dominated diplomacy on Israel-Palestine, Syria, Lebanon, and Iran, but they have systematically failed to achieve breakthroughs. The 2006 Israel-Hizbullah summer war reminded everyone of the terrible carnage that will surely occur when simmering tensions erupt into war. The Iraq war revealed how conflict in one area spills over into and destabilizes other parts of the region. Last year's brief war between the Lebanese army and the Fateh el-Islam radical Salafist group pointed to the new terror threats the entire region faces.

The vacuum created by the United States' diplomatic auto-demotion is being filled quickly, so that the regional conflicts do not erupt into active warfare. Qatar, Turkey and France are the main players offering to mediate; others also seek roles, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan. The focus on Damascus now is solely because Syria has its hands in almost every major conflict in the region -- Lebanon, Iraq, Iran, Palestine, Israel, for starters. It must be engaged and placated to an extent, to prevent a deterioration that results in widespread war and destruction.

Syria's reasonable demands can be met, such as regime survival, territorial integrity, a return of its occupied Golan Heights, and no political intrigues or military threats emanating from Israel or Lebanon. Wider goals of dominating Lebanon and Jordan are not reasonable and will be resisted. Many Lebanese understandably remain unsure how far the major international and regional players will go to preserve Lebanon's sovereignty, should Syria try to regain control or major influence there.

The two big players watching the Damascus talks are Iran and Hizbullah, and this is where Syria's position seems untenable. Syria cannot realistically claim it is interested in negotiating permanent peace with Israel while also maintaining its strong alliances with Iran and Hizbullah. A Syrian-Israeli peace is a strong possibility in the coming two years, and if it happens it will trigger Lebanon-Israel peace talks, and major changes in Hizbullah's strategy and behavior in Lebanon. Syria cannot credibly make peace with Israel while supporting those who resist and fight Israel.

The prevalent international view is that today's diplomacy aims to separate Syria from Iran. That is unlikely to happen in the short run, but certain to happen in the longer run. The Syrian-Iranian strategic relationship is an unnatural one, and is also untenable for very long in the face of possible Syrian-Israeli ties.

Syria is bargaining to regain its land, and its place in the heart of the Arab world, rather than remain it its quarantine ward. The prospects of peace with Israel, a secure Assad-led regime, normal ties with the major Western and Arab states, and large injections of development aid have all the trappings of a deal that must appeal to Damascus. Syria will work towards this goal slowly and steadily, according to the established rules of bazaar bargaining -- without making abrupt and major concessions, or humiliating its many partners. It will change slowly, and also will seek to have others change with it.

The most intriguing thing going on in Damascus is not about Syria alone. It is rather that events in Damascus could be a harbinger of what could soon take place in Iran -- where they also know carpets, and when to strike a reasonable deal before the good buys, and your bargaining power, disappear.