Dealing with Disinformation: Lessons from Taiwan and Korea

With a research grant from the Belfer Center, three Harvard Kennedy School students—Casey Corcoran, Bo Julie Crowley, and Raina Davis—traveled to Taiwan and South Korea in January to conduct research on disinformation campaigns that have long been part of East Asian politics. They describe their goals, methods, and takeaways in a forthcoming report, “Disinformation Threat Watch: The Disinformation Landscape in East Asia and Implications for U.S. Policy.”

Why did you select East Asia for conducting election disinformation research?

We chose to study disinformation (intended false information) in East Asia to better understand the global landscape of disinformation and gather lessons learned for the U.S. While the 2016 election highlighted the impact of disinformation on U.S. politics, disinformation is a global challenge and has a long legacy in Taiwanese and South Korean politics. As democracies, Taiwan and South Korea share the challenge of combating disinformation while preserving civil liberties.

How did you go about gathering the information you needed?

We interviewed more than 50 government officials, journalists, and civil society members to develop our case studies.

Taiwan: Taiwan faces a systematic disinformation campaign by the People’s Republic of China aimed at influencing election outcomes and public opinion to advance Chinese interests. Increasing social and political polarization, as well as a sensational media climate, have amplified the spread and impact of disinformation. Taiwanese civil society has developed a range of creative solutions to combat disinformation, but individual organizations struggle to reach a broad audience and scale their limited resources.

Republic of Korea: Disinformation has not definitively influenced the outcome of South Korean elections, but scandals that implicate political aides and intelligence officials may instigate a “race to the bottom” where the use of automated software to sway public opinion becomes more widespread. Additionally, the weaponization of “fake news” by domestic politicians threatens civil liberties and undermines trust in public institutions.

From your research, what recommendations did you take away for U.S. elections?

Speak Out Early and Often: Government leaders should develop an interagency response plan to address disinformation as early and forcefully as possible.
Increase Transparency: Intelligence agencies should release open source data to explain how they attributed content to foreign actors. This will improve independent research and public trust in the government’s conclusion.
Acknowledge Capability Gaps and Support Civil Solutions: Civil society is better-positioned to respond to some kinds of disinformation without infringing on civil liberties. Government should support civil society groups with grants to enable their work while maintaining their independence.
Engage in Intelligence Sharing: The United States should increase cooperation with partners and allies to help each other manage domestic information landscapes.

Compel Private Sector Action: Technology companies must do more to combat disinformation on their platforms. Content platforms can undertake specific actions to achieve this, such as:

Incorporate third party apps that label disinformation;
Verify citizenship requirements for all political ad purchases;
Establish direct channels with election officials globally to enhance rapid response capabilities;
Create operating standards to remove or de-emphasize disinformation;
Provide open APIs to researchers and government officials.

What is the main lesson you learned for the U.S. and other governments?

In the long term, government must address the root of the problem: The most effective disinformation plays on real world fears or insecurities. Leaders need to create dialogues and policies that address the legitimate concerns and grievances of citizens and promote a proactive message to counteract malicious ones.