Reports & Papers
from
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
"The Future of Russian Democratic Development"
Vyacheslav Igrunov, Russian State Duma Deputy, Yabloko Faction
Andrei Mironov, Human Rights Activist
Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project, Harvard University
June 18, 2001
Summary by Lyndon Allin
Vyacheslav Igrunov, Vice-chairman of the Duma Committee on CIS Affairs and former Vice-chairman of the Yabloko party, spoke on the topic, "The Future of Russian Democratic Development" on June 18, 2001, at the John F. Kennedy School of Government. His remarks in Russian were interpreted by human rights activist Andrei Mironov. Regional specialists, students, and professors attended the seminar, which was sponsored by Harvard''s Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project.
Mr. Igrunov began by remarking on the high level of uneasiness shared by Russian and foreign politicians about the current Russian political situation. He noted that there is indeed reason to fear for the future of democracy in Russia. However, many of the threats to democratic rule in Russia emerged not during the past year, but rather in 1992-93. The Russian Constitution adopted in 1993, both in its structures and in the way it was formulated and implemented, made it possible for anti-democratic trends to develop on the current Russian political scene. Contemporary observers tend to link all current anti-democratic trends to President Putin and his administration. However, Putin is actually acting within the framework of the existing Constitution, using methods little different from those used by the democrats in the early to mid-1990s. The current threats to Russian democracy arose many years ago, and the situation is better characterized as a chronic malaise than as an acute illness.
Russian democratic development during the 1990s proceeded relatively smoothly because Boris Yeltsin was a passive ruler who was little interested in the goals of the state. Now that Putin''s Administration has made staying in power its primary goal, the existing Constitutional mechanisms have proven quite useful for the purpose of concentrating power in a single leader or at most a small group of people. Under the 1993 Constitution, the Russian President holds far more power than the Communist Party (CPSU) General Secretary ever did under the Soviet system. Today, even harsher mechanisms to concentrate power in the hands of the President are being created. Furthermore, while President Yeltsin had a robust democratic opposition movement to contend with, today, under the more authoritarian Putin, there is practically no such opposition. The main reason for this, in Mr. Igrunov''s view, is that the democratic revolution left the majority of the population seriously disappointed. Most citizens lost out as a result of this revolution. Furthermore, social stratification has taken place and serious disparities have emerged. Today, citizens'' rights are violated on an everyday basis far more broadly than before the democratic revolution.
Mr. Igrunov noted that only two small strata of the Russian population emerged from the democratic revolution as winners: those who became the owners of privatized state enterprises; and those intellectuals to whom freedoms of speech, thought, and travel are worth more than material goods. The country found itself in a situation of economic collapse, frightful corruption, and violation of basic civil rights, and all of this provoked a feeling of extreme revulsion toward the Yeltsin regime. Despite the fact that Putin is continuing Yeltsin''s policy line, his actions are interpreted by the majority of the population as showing concern for the average citizen. Most politicians are also able to identify with Putin''s policies.
Mr. Igrunov posed the question, "What has Putin done to achieve this support?" First, Putin reformed the Federation Council, which has played a rather ambiguous role in Russian politics. As the Federation Council functioned before, it defended the interests of powerful regional leaders, gave those leaders unchecked power within their regions, supported separatism within Russia, promoted the steep rise of corruption, and at the same time provided parliamentary immunity to individuals with huge financial resources at their disposal. Strengthening the state and restoring the power of the government was impossible without reforming the Federation Council. For this reason, as soon as Putin declared his intention to reform this body, he was supported by practically the entire political elite.
Other reforms are being conducted in a similar fashion, stated Mr. Igrunov. Currently the two most widely discussed reforms are of the political party system and of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD). In the case of the MVD, the power to appoint people to all major posts in this ministry has passed into the hands of the President. Previously, the appointment process was driven by the Minister of Internal Affairs as well as by regional leaders, but they have been deprived of this influence. In a sense, the MVD is becoming a direct extension of the Presidential Administration. It would seem that this is a wrongheaded step that will lead to an excessive concentration of power. However, this reform is being supported by the vast majority of politicians and a substantial portion of the population. This is because the MVD had become the most corrupt institution in Russia. Corruption had penetrated this institution from the rank-and-file policeman to the Minister himself, and the MVD had no internal mechanism to rid itself of this corruption. The MVD would inevitably have become more and more criminalized, and specific personnel changes were required in order to prevent this. There is no structure or institution in the entire country capable of legally making these changes except the President himself. In this way, actions which are supported by the majority of the population, including the democratically-minded population, lead to an increased level of authoritarianism in Russia.
Regarding the reform of the party system, Mr. Igrunov remarked that political parties in Russia today, with the exception of the Communists, cannot be considered parties in the traditional sense. They are small groups of people that either depend on their financial sponsors or reflect the interests of the group''s members. At the outset of the reform process, the President appealed to the population with a critical assessment of the existing parties. Since negative attitudes toward political parties and weariness of their tactics are widespread in Russia, the claim that political parties do not represent anyone was met with universal agreement. Thus, the draft law on party reform proposing to substantially increase political party membership has met with support. The proposal to broaden the scope of the state''s control over political parties is seen as an attempt to create honest political parties. At the same time, Mr. Igrunov believes this draft law would create a party system very similar to those of the former "people''s democracies" in Eastern Europe. Under such a system, there is a government party and several "decorative" opposition parties which act within boundaries prescribed by the state.
In sum, the intellectuals in Putin''s team have set out to create a system in which power is concentrated in the hands of one person, while at the same time pretending that such a system is in the interests of the Russian people. The result of this process, in Mr. Igrunov''s opinion, will be the creation of a system very similar to that of the former Soviet Union, with several differences. First, there will be no unitary state ideology. There will be elections which will appear to be democratic from the outside; a market economy; many different newspapers; and citizens will be permitted to leave the country. At the same time, Russia will be ruled almost in the same authoritarian way as under Brezhnev. The parliament functions, but decides nothing. Political parties exist, but public policy does not. All political decisions are made in the Kremlin, and parties dare to speak only about issues they have cleared in advance with the Kremlin. A very small niche remains for the hard-core opposition, and those leaders who occupy this niche have a negligible chance of being elected to political office.
Does this mean the end of democracy in Russia? Mr. Igrunov does not think so, and stated that in fact there is nothing abnormal about these developments. He noted that if one examines certain democratic countries today, there is much that seems strange. For example, in Japan, practically all political decisions are made within a single political party, which is always the party of power. There is freedom of the press, there is a multi-party system, but the fundamental decisions are not made by way of public discussion. This is the sort of system toward which modern Russia is gradually moving. The fact that Russia is moving so slowly toward such a system is not unusual. Recall that the French Revolution took place at the end of the 18th century, but a democratic republic was not established in France until 1870, and the legal structures which ensure democracy in France were not in place until the beginning of the 20th century.
Many Russian democratic politicians believe that Putin is creating an extremely efficient system, and this horrifies them. They say that they have no niche of their own, but in Mr. Igrunov''s opinion, Russian democrats have the opportunity to continue to build democracy, brick by brick. However, he mentioned certain areas that concern him. Because the political system being developed by Putin is so similar to the one used by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, it could soon become very inefficient indeed. Mr. Igrunov described a view held by some in Russia, that the Communists held power for 70 years and Putin''s system could last just as long, and expressed his disagreement with this view. The modern world is substantially more dynamic than the world of the first half of the 20th century, and in order for a country to remain successful, it must have many decision-making centers. Thus, hyperconcentration of power in a single center can lead a country to ruin, and can be efficient only for a brief period of time. Mr. Igrunov presented the example of the Allied nations which developed more authoritarian decision-making processes for several years during the Second World War but democratized swiftly after the war''s end. Mr. Igrunov suggested that the establishment of an authoritarian regime in Russia might be a temporary phenomenon, and that within the next ten years, the authoritarian aspects would be changed.
Discussion
Mr. Igrunov answered questions and elaborated on additional points during the discussion. Below are the highlights.
Q: What will happen to Putinism when Putin loses popularity?
A: There are many steps which Putin has not yet taken, so as to keep them in reserve and use them when his popularity drops. But it is obvious today that the level of Putin''s public support is totally unprecedented, and it is in no danger of declining. Moreover, even Putin''s failures have been interpreted in a positive light and have raised his popularity rating or kept it steady. Putin is not the first politician to encounter this phenomenon. Two regional governors, Nazdratenko in Primorskii Krai and Kondratenko in Krasnodar Krai, both saw their popularity rise as the situation in their region became worse. Studying the mechanics of this sort of popularity is one of the primary tasks for today''s Kremlin analysts. Currently there is no basis for saying that Putin''s popularity will decline in the near future. Some political scientists warn that oil prices will drop and Putin will be unable to implement his policies, but Mr. Igrunov suggested that a decline in oil prices would not have significant consequences for Putin''s popularity.
Q: Putin has lately been solidifying his power not only within Russia, but also in the "near abroad." Please comment on the change in Russian foreign policy toward the former Soviet countries under Putin.
A: First of all, there has not been a change in policy, but rather the appearance of a policy where one had not previously existed. The essence of this policy is that the post-Soviet space is an area of significant national interest for Russia. This being the case, Russia would like to have these countries as allies, but now those in the Kremlin understand that this will not happen of its own accord. The Kremlin is now working on creating ties between Russian businesses and neighboring countries; between Russian political parties and those in neighboring countries; and even on the cultural level. In a sense, the President''s Administration has instituted a policy very similar to that of the Soviet Union during the Cold War, the major difference being that the current policy is limited in scope to the former Soviet countries. Today''s version of this policy also relies much less on coercion, since Russia is not in a position to send troops into Ukraine or Georgia. Other mechanisms are used instead, primarily of an economic nature.
With regard to the impact on the former Soviet countries, each case must be examined separately. In Belarus, for example, the Kremlin is interested in replacing the current leader not with one that is more democratic, but with one that is more easily influenced and predictable than President Lukashenka. But a weaker government in Belarus will inevitably mean the rise of democratic tendencies there. Even today, Mr. Igrunov believes that the Kremlin is prepared to facilitate contacts between the Russian democratic movement and their Belarusian counterparts, as strange as this may seem. In Ukraine, despite the extreme corruption and instability of President Kuchma''s regime, civil society development is moving forward with the support of Russia. In Kyrgyzstan, while supporting President Akayev''s government as a guarantor of political stability, Russia looks to cooperate with the democratic opposition with the goal of preventing this opposition from taking on a predominantly Islamic tone. In this way, an increase in authoritarian tendencies in Russia may paradoxically have some benefit for the democratic movements in these countries.
Q: What interest does Russia have in civil society development in neighboring countries?
A: Russia is concerned first and foremost with the political stability and predictability of these countries. In Belarus, Lukashenka is erratic and exercises unchecked power, and his presence obstructs the economic reforms which are necessary for further integration with Russia. Ukraine is Russia''s most important partner, and the instability which was manifested in the aftermath of the Gongadze murder caused alarm among Russian officials. Mr. Igrunov stated frankly that the stable democracy which Russia would like to see instituted in Ukraine is a rather bizarre form of democracy, resembling that which exists in Russia. He defined it as an attempt to construct democracy by means of manipulating the public. Perhaps, he mused, this is the only mechanism that the Kremlin is aware of to bring about stability. In general, the actions of the Putin Administration are very self-contradictory. Regarding the reform of the MVD, the battle with corruption within this institution is more than just a war of words, but at the same time the Presidential Administration is also rife with corruption. Many of the Kremlin''s programs, after all, are underwritten by private funds which are not funneled through the budget or any type of accounting system. How can we be sure that the battle against corruption will be effective if those waging it are using dirty money? Actually, this dirty money is a factor in the activities of all Russian political parties, and in this sense the Kremlin is not atypical.
Q: What about Putin''s foreign policy toward the former Soviet Bloc countries?
A: Moscow is of course interested not just in the former Soviet Bloc, but in an even wider sphere of nations. However, as they say in Russian, "its hands are too short." For this reason, in the next 10 to 15 years, it is unlikely that Russian foreign policy will focus on anything beyond the former Soviet countries.
Q: Could you please elaborate on the possibilities for Russian political parties to combat Putin''s authoritarianism?
A: Mr. Igrunov framed the problem in terms of "who will fight authoritarianism in Russia?" Regarding the existing democratic parties, which could offer resistance, he is very pessimistic. Putin, after all, reflects the mindset of Russian society, and the democratic parties consist of people from this society. Yabloko, for example, has far more internal authoritarianism than Putin''s Administration. It is the party of one man, who does not permit the formation of any decision-making centers within the party other than himself. He can resist Putin, which Mr. Igrunov believes is a good thing, but within Yabloko there are the same sort of people as in Putin''s inner circle. Looking at the Union of Right Forces, the mechanism of party management is such that the party membership has no say in its political stance. The party line is determined by five or six people, none of whom are themselves independent, with the possible exception of Chubais. Their positions are determined by their sponsors, so to a significant degree they merely broadcast the will of the largest oligarchs. Can such parties really resist the current regime? In Mr. Igrunov''s opinion, they absolutely cannot. They can only find a more or less comfortable niche from which to play their game in the present conditions. For this reason, Mr. Igrunov sees no alternative to Putin''s regime in the near future. Nevertheless, he believes that Russian democrats must continue along the slow path to democracy. Years of becoming accustomed to elections and to publicly expressing one''s opinion will bring about the appearance of politicians who are much better prepared for a democratic society than those in power today.
Q: Will constitutional reform be necessary to ensure democratic development in the long term?
A: Even a well-written law cannot change cultural traditions. Regardless of the type of constitution in place today, Russia would still be traveling the same path. The only difference can be in the speed of movement along this path. If the constitution had more democratic mechanisms, Mr. Igrunov allowed that there would be somewhat more time to marshal the truly democratic forces within Russia and that the path to true democracy would be somewhat shorter. But such a constitution would not be able to counteract the current trend. Of course, Russia will need a new constitution eventually. However, given the current political mentality, none of the today''s leading politicians would be inclined to democratize the existing system, even if they were to come to power. Besides, the legal procedure for amending the Constitution is so complex as to make it nearly impossible to do so. For these reasons, Mr. Igrunov thinks there will be a long evolutionary process in which political precedents are established which alter the means by which the Constitution is applied, and that rewriting the Constitution will not be necessary in the next 10 to 15 years.
Q: What can the U.S. do to increase the prospects for democracy in Russia?
A: Mr. Igrunov first remarked that he had had his own opinions about the way the US should have acted in 1991, 1993, 1996, and that each time the US acted exactly the opposite way. Today, he thinks the US should intervene as little as possible. Regarding NMD and NATO, they will not generate any positive sentiment in Russia. Mr. Igrunov expressed his belief that Russia is resigned to the expansion of NATO, so that further expansion could hardly lead to more anti-Americanism in Russia, although it will not improve matters. Russians more and more consider themselves a European society and as they feel less like a superpower, there is less interest in the affairs of the US and in matters like Putin''s relationship with Bush. If NMD is developed, Russian society will become more militarized, leading to more cooperation with China, especially if Russia is unable to find a common language with the countries of Europe. The US can afford to pay less attention to Russian military might than in the past, but it cannot ignore Russia completely or it risks damage to its relations with European countries.
Q: Describe the foreign policy decision-making process and how it has changed in recent years.
A: Mr. Igrunov found this a difficult question to answer precisely, since this process is very much a closed mechanism. In practice, policy decisions are made not by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The real Ministry of Foreign Affairs is contained within the Presidential Administration. The Administration has created a parallel system of research centers which develop policy recommendations, and the most important decisions are made in the Kremlin. Mr. Igrunov stated that as far as he was aware, the real decisions are made by no more than two or three individuals, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs merely transmits these decisions.
Q: What specific weapons does Putin have if he decides to take on additional oligarchs?
A: The key point here, stated Mr. Igrunov, is that there is not a single major company in Russia which operates fully within the law. Any of them could have serious charges filed against it. Putin has shown no intention to overturn the results of privatization, but he has also not indicated he feels they should be sacrosanct, and if he were to seek reversals of privatization in specific cases, legal grounds for this would exist. Mr. Igrunov noted that this threat is far too serious for any of the oligarchs to stand in Putin''s way. In addition, Putin can use other mechanisms to influence Russian corporate leaders. He recently enacted a tax code favorable to big business, but the forces arrayed against this type of tax code have enough persuasive arguments that public opinion could easily be changed and the tax code drastically altered. Mr. Igrunov believes that the current tax code was enacted in exchange for the oligarchs'' unofficial agreement to cooperate with the Kremlin.
Q: Does Putin''s rapid rise to popularity indicate ongoing volatility on the Russian political scene?
A: Mr. Igrunov does not believe so. He posed the question, "Why did Putin become such a great leader?" Because he corresponded to the expectations of the public. Otherwise, it would have been impossible to transform him into the nation''s leader within the span of several months. Putin''s public persona was similar to Primakov''s, in that both have an air of the Soviet era about them. That is why it was easy to make them both into national leaders. And once Putin came onto the national stage, he initiated reforms which had been beyond Yeltsin''s scope. The people had awaited an unknown hero, and as long as his face was unknown, people could choose among several different versions. Today, the people know the face of their true hero, and will follow him or his direct heir. Mr. Igrunov indicated that this trend would continue for a period of years, and that the time had passed when a leader could rise to popularity in a matter of months.