Georgia on the Eve of Local Elections

On May 29, Kakhi Kenkadze, a fellow at Harvard's Weatherhead Center for International Affairs who previously served as a foreign policy adviser to Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze, spoke at a Caspian Studies Program Seminar on the topic of "Georgia on the Eve of Local Elections."

Kenkadze set the stage for Georgia's June 2 local elections by offering general comments on the evolution of the outside world's perceptions of Georgia over the past several years. He explained that Georgia has received greater international attention these past few months due to the Pentagon's decision to send 200 U.S. Special Forces troops to the country to train the Georgian military to deal with terrorist threats emerging from the Pankisi Gorge in the northeastern part of the country. He also said that Georgia has increased in geopolitical importance in recent years because the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline— which is expected to serve as the main conduit between Caspian oil fields and the international market— will run through Georgia.

In light of Georgia's greater prominence on the regional and international stage, Kenkadze said that policymakers concerned with the Caucasus should pay attention to upcoming local elections in Georgia since "all politics is local." Georgia's domestic political trends will certainly have an influence on the country's foreign policy and on regional energy considerations.

The rest of Kenkadze's prepared remarks focused on the impact that two previous cycles of Georgian domestic politics have had in determining the shape of the contemporary political scene in Georgia.

Georgia Endures Civil War, 1992-1995

The cycle of Georgian politics that lasted from 1992 through 1995 was characterized by the emergence of Eduard Shevardnadze as the country's president. According to Kenkadze, the Georgian government had three main priorities during this four-year period: protecting the new state's territorial integrity, ending its civil war, and restoring public order.

Georgia did not manage to preserve its territorial integrity due to the secession of the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. One decisive factor in this centrifugal turn of events was Georgia's reluctance to join the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). If Georgia had joined this organization, it might have served as a prelude to some sort of agreement with Russia on ways to deal with separatist challenges emerging from the region situated between Georgia and Russia. However, Shevardnadze did not want Georgia to join the CIS in 1992, because he was still trying to consolidate his power and was also eager for Georgia to develop an identity that was independent from Russia.

The Georgian government did manage to end the country's civil war in 1994, but only after Abkhazia and South Ossetia had effectively left the Georgian union, and after Shevardnadze went to Moscow and arranged for Georgia to join the CIS. After this agreement was made, Russian President Boris Yeltsin sent the Russian navy to western Georgia in order to help quell insurrection among rogue elements in the Georgian military.

As for the Georgian government's third goal of restoring public order, Shevardnadze used his own connections among the police (with whom he worked closely during the Soviet period of Georgian politics) in order to ensure a significant reduction of the very high levels of crime and violence that plagued Georgian society during this early period of independence.

Georgia's Fitful Transition toward Democracy, 1995-1998

The next cycle of Georgian politics lasted from 1995 through 1998, and was characterized by Eduard Shevardnadze's preservation of his presidential power. During this four-year period, Shevardnadze successfully coordinated his policies with Kakha Targamadze, the minister of police in Georgia, and Zurab Zhvania, the leader of the "young reformers" in the Georgian parliament. According to Kenkadze, Shevardnadze was the main factor in ensuring political stability in Georgia during this period, while Zhvania and other young reformers were initiating democratic reforms that improved Georgia's image on the international scene.

Kenkadze indicated that Shevardnadze and Zhvania's young reformers found themselves in harmony until 1998, at which point Zhvania decided that he wanted to seize more power within the Georgian government. Zhvania was the leader of the Union of Citizens Party (the ruling partner in the Georgian parliament at that time), but President Shevardnadze appointed most of the ministers in the Georgian cabinet. When Zhvania demanded that he be allowed to appoint his own ministers, an agitated Shevardnadze refused his request.

This dispute over the power to appoint cabinet ministers led to a significant breach between Zhvania and Shevardnadze. Zhvania, the man whom many Georgians thought Shevardnadze would designate as his presidential heir apparent, defected from the Union of Citizens Party and started the Christian Conservative Party. Another young reformer, Mikhail Saakashvili, also parted company with Shevardnadze and started his own party— an example of the splintering of political parties that has come to characterize the Georgian political scene over the past several years.

Kenkadze closed his remarks by saying that the June 2 local elections in Georgia may serve as a barometer to determine which of Georgia's six or seven main political parties will emerge as the strongest domestic political forces leading up to the country's crucial 2003 parliamentary election and 2005 presidential election.

Q & A
Lucan Way of Harvard's Weatherhead Center for International Affairs asked Kenkadze if Shevardnadze's position in Georgian politics was similar to Boris Yeltin's position in Russia before 1999, where Yeltsin was the most powerful figure in national politics but situated himself largely outside the country's political party structure. Kenkadze answered this question by describing some of Shevardnadze's reasons for distancing himself from the Union of Citizens Party. This party was only able to come to power because it had the support of Shevardnadze, which is why the president was upset when young political leaders like Zurab Zhvania tried to leapfrog over older politicians in positions of authority within the Georgian government. Shevardnadze felt as though these younger politicians should wait their turn before assuming power— especially since they have only had support among the intelligentsia and do not have much in the way of a popular base.

Walter Clemens of Boston University asked whether Georgia's political culture will be able to sustain more genuine democracy over the long run. Kenkadze acknowledged that Georgia still faces considerable obstacles in its move toward full democratization, but the country also has a very strong desire to promote the institutions that sustain healthy democracy— a desire demonstrated by the its ability to develop an increasingly independent media over the last several years. He also pointed out that Georgia's challenge in creating a democratic political culture is complicated by the fact that it recently endured a seventy-year period of totalitarian Soviet rule. Kenkadze likened Georgia to post-Franco Spain— a country that emerged from a totalitarian past and needed the European Union's supportive presence to help promote domestic democratic reforms. It is Kenkadze's belief that a similar external democratizing force (possibly the European Union) will need to play a role in Georgia if the country is to maintain its course toward democracy.

Abby Williamson of the Kennedy School asked whether or not Georgia was fulfilling its promise to the Council of Europe that the country's regional governors be elected rather than appointed. Kenkadze said that Georgia is not yet living up to this agreement, but explained that organizations like the Council of Europe are often willing to make compromises with President Shevardnadze because his presence is so important to the overall stability of the Caucasus.

Bob Brannon of the National Security Program asked about Georgia's opinion of the improved relationship between Russia and the United States since the September 11 terrorist attacks. Kenkadze explained that Georgia welcomes this new chapter in U.S.-Russian relations, especially since it views Russia as its most important neighbor and the United States as the country that can exert the most positive influence on regional stability. Kenkadze was also heartened by the fact the United States made it clear that Russia, despite its new relationship with NATO, would not be allowed to restrict the alliance's decisions on expansion. This is important to Georgia since NATO membership is one of the country's most important foreign policy objectives.

Oleksander Kopets of the Kennedy School of Government asked whether or not Abkhazia would be an issue in the next few Georgian elections. Kenkadze said that Georgian politicians do not typically make Abkhazia a campaign issue because they accept that the region has de facto independence. Kenkadze did, however, express his concerns about whether Abkhazia would be able to make a successful transition from regional status to full independence— as he argued Taiwan has done— or whether it might struggle with more autonomy— as he argued Chechnya has done.

Mevlut Katik of the London School of Economics asked whether or not the upcoming local elections in Georgia can really serve as an effective barometer of democratization when so many of the country's important political positions are filled through appointments. Kenkadze argued that these local elections should give the country's nascent political parties an opportunity to demonstrate their strength. This is especially important to politicians like Mikhail Saakashvili, who are only beginning to build their political bases and want to demonstrate their viability before the national parliamentary and presidential elections in 2003 and 2005, respectively.

Rolf Nikel of the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs asked Kenkadze to elaborate on the issue of Georgia's post-Shevardnadze political succession, especially in light of the president's advancing age and the previous attempts on his life. Kenkadze explained one of the reasons he did not focus in his remarks on the possibility of a post-Shevardnadze era before the 2005 presidential election is because the international community has made a consistent effort to coordinate with Shevardnadze and recognizes his stabilizing influence on Georgian politics. Kenkadze did concede that if Shevardnadze were to suddenly disappear from the political scene that it could have a very negative impact on Georgian politics, especially on foreign investment into energy pipeline projects in Georgia.

Annaliis Abrego of the Caspian Studies Program asked whether or not any of the young reformist politicians in Georgia (such as Nino Burdjanadze, Mikhail Saakashvili, and Zurab Zhvania) could find themselves at odds because of their desire to become Shevardnadze's successor. Kenkadze said that there are no significant differences in these young reformers' political philosophies, and that they may be able to cooperate in a post-Shevardnadze era because Georgia has had successful experiences with coalition governments in the past. Kenkadze also warned that if Zhvania, Saakashvili, and Burdjanadze refuse to cooperate with each other, they might find their parties left out of the parliament completely.

David Rekhviashvili of the Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project asked about the sort of missions the Georgian military might undertake once it has received counterterrorism training from the U.S. armed forces. Kenkadze answered this question by saying that Georgians realize that there can be no military solution to their problems with Abkhazia and Ossetia, and that Georgia can only improve its relationship with these separatist regions through political and economic means. Kenkadze acknowledged that building up this level of trust among former warring powers will take time, but he firmly believes it can happen.

— Summary by John Grennan, Caspian Studies Program