Going All the Way with Iran

The Obama administration must be given high marks for initiative and courage in its fresh approach to all four conflicts. Yet it is also obvious from both the public debate and private discussions here in New York and at the United Nations that Washington remains hobbled by a structural weakness that may be an occupational hazard or a genetic defect of all superpowers: an exaggerated sense of honor that prevents one from taking that final leap into sensibleness and realism, after starting down that courageous path.

It is striking, for example, how wisely the Obama administration acted in moving quickly to reach out to Iran. It reaffirmed its wisdom this weekend when it announced that it would join the six other world powers that are already talking with Iran on nuclear and other issues. Common sense seems to stir anew in Washington.

Yet, the United States also hobbles itself -- and retards the chances of progress in the talks -- in two ways. First, it refuses to accept that it has lost the standoff of recent years and now -- having vowed never to do so -- meets and negotiates with Iran without preconditions, preferring to speak only about “reaching out” or “engaging” Iran.

Second, Washington continues to approach the negotiations by laying down both the expected end results and a series of punishments and sanctions that Tehran can expect if it does not, before the talks start, signal its acceptance of American demands. America’s courage in negotiating with Iran is being totally negated by its diplomatic arrogance and amateurism in conducting the process.

The four conflicts I mentioned above are relevant because they reveal a pattern of failure that should be assessed and absorbed if we hope to achieve any future successes, especially with Iran. It is shocking, but not surprising, to note that after all the effort, money and sacrifice in dead and injured troops that the United States made in Afghanistan and Iraq, its military presence is widely resented and often publicly rejected and violently resisted in both countries. Its approach to Israel/Palestine and Iran generates equally prevalent regional criticism.

This is a consequence of decades of American policies in these four cases and the surrounding Arab-Asian region. My reading is that Washington has interacted there primarily through warfare, pre-emptive regime change, multi-year occupations, threats and sanctions, supporting local dictators, acquiescing in long-term Israeli occupation and colonization, supporting warlords and militias, pressuring foes to change their core positions before it will speak to them. In most cases of providing substantial economic and military aid, it seeks primarily to fulfill US security goals or to transform local societies in America’s image.

These approaches have collectively brought the United States to its current calamity in the region. Persisting in these tactics is likely only to aggravate things all around, and to strengthen those foes in Iraq, the Levant, Afghanistan and Iran who are clearly helping each other master the business of blowing up American military or civilian vehicles, or blowing up American diplomatic initiatives.

It would be a tragic wasted opportunity for the United States now to enter into talks with Iran using the same old approaches. It is particularly juvenile, offensive and counter-productive for American officials and analysts to say, as some do regularly, that the US is talking to Iran only to be able to impose tougher sanctions soon with a clear conscience, based on the fact that it had tried talking but got nowhere. How do you think the Iranians will respond if they sense they are being asked to enter talks whose main aim from the US side is to clear the way to tighten the screws on Iran? Why does the US ask Iran to act like an adult, but treat it like a child?

A more sensible approach that the United States and its six powerful partners should ponder is to say that they have major disagreements with Iran (or Hamas, Hizbullah, Sudan, Cuba, or anyone else) which they seek to resolve on the basis of four principles, with three aims. The four principles should be: conducting sustained, honest and comprehensive negotiations, without the use of military force, on the basis of prevailing international law and conventions, with a view to simultaneously addressing the core, legitimate demands of both sides. The three aims should be: to satisfy the minimum critical demands and rights of both sides, to end the state of enmity or conflict, and to achieve bilateral and regional peace and security for all.

This sounds to me like the American way of doing things. Why is it not being used with Iran?