Abstract
Since the initial success of remote-sensing technology, government policy has been preoccupied with the maintenance of its original technical objectives, instead of concerning itself with the transition from “proof-of-principle” to a “user-friendly” delivery of routine services to customers. As with other segments of the space applications program, well-conceived R&D was not accompanied by an adequate business plan in anticipation of technical success. This success seems to have surprised government planners, with the result that other countries have had an easier route to a strong competitive situation. Although they started from a less advanced technological base, they have consciously focused their efforts on the delivery of services which respond to user needs and demands, rather than on technical leadership for its own sake. In addition, US ambivalence about allowing sensitive technology to get into the hands of potential military and commercial competitors has stimulated satellite capability in many other countries. The situation has been much more dynamic than was allowed for in US government planning.