How a French-led Force Could Save Somalia

To prevent Somalia from reverting to insecurity and warlordism, immediate, concerted action by the powers of Europe and the United Nations is essential. Only a seemingly neutral, outside force under European Union and UN authority will be able to provide effective security as the Ethiopians withdraw across the international frontier.

The French have ample troops and firepower in nearby Djibouti . The UN and the EU should call on them to stabilise Somalia , with Italian soldiers and gendarmes and other UN recruits to follow. It would take too long to mobilise a full African Union troop mission, other than the 800 soldiers Yoweri Museveni , Uganda 's president, has promised to deploy. Besides, most Somalis will be wary of African troops.

Once such a rapid response force has replaced the Ethiopians and given the inhabitants of Mogadishu , Merca, Kismayo and other towns the security that they require to resume their day-to-day lives without fear, the UN should quickly bolster the efforts of the AU-anointed Transitional Federal Government in beginning to reconstruct what is a classic collapsed state. Because the transitional government is largely dominated by a particular clan its legitimacy within Somalia is shaky. (The Islamic Courts Union also suffered from having a narrow clan base.)

In partnership with the UN, however, such a government could demonstrate its good intentions. It might openly or subtly need to cede operational control of a Somalia undergoing reconstruction, however, to a tightly run UN mission. After 15 years of state deterioration and the absence of much governance, plus a brief period of brusque control by the Islamic Courts Union, Somalia desperately needs a period of tutelage under UN auspices. What the UN did in East Timor and in Cambodia provides a partial model, but a new Somali mission should be constructed with greater care and be planned to last for at least a decade.

Such a long-term, resumed "trusteeship" is required to return Somalia to good governance. That implies a new rule of law, whether under sharia or, preferably, under the mixed system that the transitional regime seems to support. It also requires jump-starting the country's ruined economy, refurbishing its schools and almost non-existent health system, opening airports and harbours and building roads – while the same time nurturing greater political freedom. At some point a fully participatory meeting of clan elders and other leaders should be convened to chart and charter the political future of Somalia .

No Somali government can undertake alone the huge tasks that are demanded, even with outside financial assistance. Only a credible, external body can do so; the UN, under its new "responsibility to protect" mandate, should assume this major responsibility. Assisted by the EU rapid reaction force, the UN could also undertake the delicate task of disarming and demobilising the many Somali militias, uncovering buried caches of arms and keeping order, in the short and long term. No reconstruction will be possible without such stability (as the debacles in Iraq and Afghanistan show).

Whether or not the Islamic Courts Union was linked in any substantial manner to al-Qaeda, it may have harboured a small knot of terrorists responsible for perpetrating the US embassy bombings in 1998 and the Mombasa attacks of 2002. Given the upheaval in Somalia – with reduced questions about sovereignty, Ethiopian military hegemony and information about those terrorists – it made sense for US special forces to strafe the swamps and forested areas south of Kismayu. They found targets of opportunity in the ongoing battle against al-Qaeda, but US involvement in Somalia will henceforth remain more indirect.

An effective UN intervention to rebuild Somalia need only worry about the south, not about Somaliland and Puntland to the north. Somaliland , although devoid of international recognition, functions well as a virtually independent, increasingly democratic entity based on pre-1960 borders and a British colonial heritage. Puntland is semi-autonomous, with its own elected, almost democratic system. The Islamic Courts Union never attempted to enter either territory. The main battles for the foreseeable future will be in the south, for hearts and minds, for credibility and for a better Somali future.

To prevent  Somalia from reverting to insecurity and warlordism, immediate, concerted action by the powers of Europe and the United Nations is essential. Only a seemingly neutral, outside force under European Union and UN authority will be able to provide effective security as the Ethiopians withdraw across the international frontier.

The French have ample troops and firepower in nearby Djibouti. The UN and the EU should call on them to stabilise Somalia, with Italian soldiers and gendarmes and other UN recruits to follow. It would take too long to mobilise a full African Union troop mission, other than the 800 soldiers Yoweri Museveni, Uganda's president, has promised to deploy. Besides, most Somalis will be wary of African troops.

Once such a rapid response force has replaced the Ethiopians and given the inhabitants of Mogadishu, Merca, Kismayo and other towns the security that they require to resume their day-to-day lives without fear, the UN should quickly bolster the efforts of the AU-anointed Transitional Federal Government in beginning to reconstruct what is a classic collapsed state. Because the transitional government is largely dominated by a particular clan its legitimacy within Somalia is shaky. (The Islamic Courts Union also suffered from having a narrow clan base.)

In partnership with the UN, however, such a government could demonstrate its good intentions. It might openly or subtly need to cede operational control of a Somalia undergoing reconstruction, however, to a tightly run UN mission. After 15 years of state deterioration and the absence of much governance, plus a brief period of brusque control by the Islamic Courts Union, Somalia desperately needs a period of tutelage under UN auspices. What the UN did in East Timor and in Cambodia provides a partial model, but a new Somali mission should be constructed with greater care and be planned to last for at least a decade.

Such a long-term, resumed "trusteeship" is required to return Somalia to good governance. That implies a new rule of law, whether under sharia or, preferably, under the mixed system that the transitional regime seems to support. It also requires jump-starting the country's ruined economy, refurbishing its schools and almost non-existent health system, opening airports and harbours and building roads – while the same time nurturing greater political freedom. At some point a fully participatory meeting of clan elders and other leaders should be convened to chart and charter the political future of Somalia.

No Somali government can undertake alone the huge tasks that are demanded, even with outside financial assistance. Only a credible, external body can do so; the UN, under its new "responsibility to protect" mandate, should assume this major responsibility. Assisted by the EU rapid reaction force, the UN could also undertake the delicate task of disarming and demobilising the many Somali militias, uncovering buried caches of arms and keeping order, in the short and long term. No reconstruction will be possible without such stability (as the debacles in Iraq and Afghanistan show).

Whether or not the Islamic Courts Union was linked in any substantial manner to al-Qaeda, it may have harboured a small knot of terrorists responsible for perpetrating the US embassy bombings in 1998 and the Mombasa attacks of 2002. Given the upheaval in Somalia – with reduced questions about sovereignty, Ethiopian military hegemony and information about those terrorists – it made sense for US special forces to strafe the swamps and forested areas south of Kismayu. They found targets of opportunity in the ongoing battle against al-Qaeda, but US involvement in Somalia will henceforth remain more indirect.

An effective UN intervention to rebuild Somalia need only worry about the south, not about Somaliland and Puntland to the north. Somaliland, although devoid of international recognition, functions well as a virtually independent, increasingly democratic entity based on pre-1960 borders and a British colonial heritage. Puntland is semi-autonomous, with its own elected, almost democratic system. The Islamic Courts Union never attempted to enter either territory. The main battles for the foreseeable future will be in the south, for hearts and minds, for credibility and for a better Somali future.