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Summary
As India struggles to deter threats from Pakistan, the leadership in Delhi appears to be developing a nuclear arsenal that extends beyond the country’s declared policy of credible deterrence and no first use of nuclear weapons. Statements from former Indian defense officials and India’s quest for enhanced nuclear capabilities reveal a possible strategy of a preemptive strike against Pakistan’s nuclear forces in a crisis. This strategy could produce a cycle of escalation between India and Pakistan with implications that extend far beyond South Asia.
Christopher Clary and Vipin Narang, “India’s Counterforce Temptations: Strategic Dilemmas, Doctrine, and Capabilities,” International Security, Vol. 43, No. 3 (Winter 2018/19), pp. 7–52, https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00340.