Books
Islam, Iran, and Prospects for Stability
in the Caspian Region
by Brenda Shaffer
Brenda Shaffer is an International Security Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University.
Summary
For most Muslims of the Caspian region, Islam serves as a component of their ethnic and regional identity, but is not their primary collective identity. Loyalties to family, clan, region, and ethnic group are more important than religion; but the rhetoric of Islamic revival is used by political forces, both governments and opposition movements, to stigmatize their enemies and bolster their cause. The role of Iran itself has less to do with Islamic fundamentalism than with conventional geopolitical concerns, most notably worries about the spread of ethnic assertiveness among the Azerbaijanis who inhabit North-Western Iran.
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With the Soviet breakup, estimates abounded that Central Asia and the Caucasus would be transformed into an arena of instability, specifying that the demise of Soviet power created a political "vacuum" providing fertile ground for Islamic radicalism and Iranian influence, and that the Caucasus had emerged as a "fault line" between Orthodox Christianity and Islam. Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations: Remaking of the World Order (New York: Touchstone, 1996), p. 278. In contrast to those initial assessments, events suggest that religion plays a small role in the conflicts raging in the region, especially in the Karabakh conflict, and that these conflicts, are largely based on other collective identities, such as regional or ethnic groupings, are highly influenced by the policies of the major secular powers in the region, such as Russia. Moreover, Iran''s policy in the region is largely guided by geo-political state interests and less by ideological goals, such as promotion of Islam. In areas not bordering Iran''s territory, such as Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, the ideological Islamic element seems to have more impact on Tehran''s policy.
One of the important factors contributing to the relative internal stability in the new Muslim states in the Caspian region since the Soviet breakup is the strength of the local, traditional power structures that have survived as a bulwark against major turmoil in the region, allowing continuity in leadership and reducing the influence of external, radical forces. These local power structures, such as family and regional groupings, endured in the Soviet period and the Soviet-era political elite in the region were most often grounded in these traditional structures. Their survival under the Soviet Union and their duration after its demise help explain why no "vacuum" was created that could have been utilized by foreign or other radical factors.
Collective identity exists on a variety of levels in the Caspian region: family or clan, regional grouping, ethnic group, religion, state and, for some, a certain "Soviet" identity. Whereas in the West, ethno-linguistic identity is often the object of primary collective, in the Caspian region it is not a priori the chief identity of the residents of the region. Thus, the potential for internal tensions on an ethnic basis, for instance, seems to have been unduly overemphasized in the West, especially in the case of Kazakhstan, where instability was anticipated due to the multi-ethnic character of the population, despite the fact that relative co-existence between the various ethnic groups there prevails. These traditional groupings, such as extended family networks in Azerbaijan, have filled some of the functions no longer executed by the state and thus softened the blows of the shift to market economy and the collapse of the social net previously provided by the state. The relative lack of violence inside states like Azerbaijan, even during heightened political upheaval, can be partially explained by the functioning of the extended family representatives serving as a facilitator between parts of the government and the demands of the wider public. Moreover, family ties are held with highest regard among most of the peoples of the Caspian region, and frequently link members of rival political camps, such as Heydar Aliyev and Abulfez Elchibey in Azerbaijan, and members of the Kazakh opposition and government. Thus, often periods of instability and political upheaval in the region, such as those in Azerbaijan, are not marked with high degrees of violence. The common primary allegiance to extended family members weakens the potential allure of other collective ideologies, such as Islam, although, of course, it is also present in the region. At the same time, these strong family allegiances impede state-building and foster national solidarity, which can be sources of stability.
Islam in the Caspian Region
For most of the Muslims of the Caspian region, Islam serves as a component of their ethnic and regional identity, but is not their primary collective identity. Solidarity on an Islamic basis with Muslims beyond Central Asia and the Caucasus is minimal. Most members of the region hold in high regard their local cultures, and are not particularly susceptible to primary identification with the broader Muslim world. Furthermore, Islam rarely serves as a unifying ideology or primary identity uniting the Muslims residents in the region. Islam came late to some parts of the region, such as most of Kazakhstan, and in these areas its hold on the majority of the population is quite superficial.The overwhelming majority of the Muslims of the Caspian region are Sunni, whereas the Azerbaijanis are predominantly Shi''s. However, the Shi''s factor has no influence on the Azerbaijanis'' political orientation or activity; actually Azerbaijan has tense relations with its Shi''s neighbor, Iran. In the region, Islam is predominately a cultural force, and scarcely a political force, especially in Azerbaijan. Islam forms the framework for marking major rites of passage, such as birth, death, and marriages, but appears in few political contexts. In the northern Caucasus, Sufi Islam has been very prominent and does not traditionally aim for the formation of political or highly institutionalized frameworks, and as such can potentially contribute to fostering political moderation. The ruling regimes in the new states in the Caspian region have declared in their constitutions a clear separation between religion and state and have not granted any special status to Islam. In contrast, in the north Caucasus within Russia, some of the local regional governments granted special status to Islam. As part of their drive for clear separation between religion and state, courts in Azerbaijan demanded that women remove head coverings for photos for their official documents, and most of the states of the region have declared religious parties of any denomination illegal. All the Muslim states of the Caspian region have, with varying degrees of success, established official clerical hierarchies, mosques, and institutions of religious learning, predominantly in the attempt to control Islam and mobilize segments of its proponents in service of the regime. The official clerical establishment in most of the Caspian region tends to promote stability and discourage any form of Islamic radicalism and most kinds of Islamic-based political activity. These elements are seen as their rivals for power and position. In many instances, such as in Chechnya and in connection to the Karabakh conflict, the Muslim clerical establishment has promoted moderation and attempted to advance conflict resolution. Nonetheless, it must be noted that due to their collaboration with the ruling state elite in the region, most of the establishment clerics are delegitimized in the eyes of the more radical and devout Muslims in the region. Subsequently, they have little influence over extremist Muslims in the area, and many influential independent clerics are operating in the region.Not having undergone Western colonialism, many residents of the area do not harbor an anti-Western orientation; however, they maintain an ambivalent relationship toward Moscow. Even enthusiastic supporters of the region''s independence are often willing to recognize the contributions that the interaction with Russia played in their national development. At the same time, some residents of the region are angered by the incursion on traditional local values and culture by the onslaught of Western culture in the post-Soviet period. Yet, it seems that Moscow and the West are equally blamed for that cultural assault.Outside forces have too easily labeled mass forms of dissent in the region as "Islamic." For example, when Azerbaijanis removed border posts in December 1989 in an attempt to make contacts with their co-ethnics beyond the border in Iran, Western sources tended to interpret this as a desire for cultivating ties to "Khomeinism" in Iran. More recently, the activity of Chechens involved in what they view as a national struggle for independence has predominately been termed in the West as "Islamic" violence and activity, despite the fact that Islam plays a secondary role in the conflict. Islam in and of itself is not destabilizing and not all ethnic or regional conflicts in which Muslims are involved are inherently religious. Nor should all acts of violence and terror perpetrated by Muslims be seen as Islamic terror. The Islamic label and the Muslim origin of most of the people of the Caspian region are being manipulated by a variety of forces, both within and from outside the region, for promotion of their own agendas. With Western audiences, Moscow forthwith throws the Islamic label on movements of Muslims within its border demanding political independence or autonomy in order to cast aspersion on them and to attain American sympathy and acceptance of its policies against the insurgents. Muslim radicals in the Middle East are also likely to attach the Islamic stamp to uprisings in the wider Caspian region, and often grant support to political movements in this area, even if the basic goal of the movement is not Islamic in nature. In the long run, the radicals can gain influence in this manner. Religious based radical behavior seems most prevalent in areas of the region where many people live outside their traditional places of residence. Affected by the alienation of new surroundings, often in large cities, without the welfare safety nets provided by their homes or social constraints on their behavior, individuals are more susceptible to radical influences and prone to behavior of this type in their non-traditional settings. In attempt to assess the extent of the hold of Islam on the population in the Caspian region, it is important to distinguish between indicators of social conservatism and Islamic piety. In many parts of the region, social norms, many of them pre-dating Islam''s arrival to the region, are in place, which mandate strict behavioral codes in fields such as sexual activity and dress. Many factors such as social segregation and occupational differentiation between the sexes, modest dress and the covering of the hair among the women have been interpreted by many researchers as external signs of Islamic religiosity and identity. Many Azerbaijanis, for instance, are secular in their outlook and do not observe many explicit Islamic laws (such as the prohibitions on alcoholic drinks and eating pork), even though they observe many conservative social customs. It seems that much of this traditional behavior is rooted in practices that the practitioners did not necessarily associate with the Islamic religion when observing them. Nearby examples of the results of wide political violence and Islamic radicalism, such as neighboring Afghanistan and Tajikistan, and to an extent Chechnya, serve as constant reminders to the residents of the Caspian region of the dangers of extremism of this type. Even many religious people in the region have stated that radical Islamic-based political action must be avoided so that their country doesn''t become "another Afghanistan." In terms of export of Islamic radicalism to the Caspian region, the most active external forces are from countries with a Western security orientation, such as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. Although most of the Islamic groups are not associated with the ruling governments, many are in opposition to the regimes, especially in Turkey. Ankara is also active in fostering its official version of Islam in the region through the institutions and employees of its Ministry of Religious Affairs. Residents of the Caspian region have remarked that even Turkey''s version of non-political Islam is more religious than that which is prevalent in the region and, thus, Ankara may inadvertently be promoting Islam through these programs. Moscow''s recent actions in the name of combating potential Islamic terror against "Caucasians" residing in the capital and other major cities in Russia, booting them home to the Caucasus and depriving many of their livelihood, may bolster the potential supporters for Islamic and other radical politics and add to the instability of the region. A source of potential instability in the region emanates from the "Afghani Arabs." This term is used to refer to the Arab and other Muslim volunteers that came from outside Afghanistan and joined in the struggle in the 1980s against the Soviet Union. Service together in Afghanistan created an international network of Islamic radicals, sharing knowledge and experience in low-intensity warfare and terror. This network often offers assistance to different movements in the region and attempts to encourage them to undertake radical activity. Some of the local movements have accepted this aid. All in all, though, external elements have not been able to turn Islamic-based political activity into a major force at this juncture in the Caspian region.Iran and the Caspian Region
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Iran grasped that its once stable northern border had been replaced by a potentially conflict-laden zone and that influences from the new states could permeate the internal Iranian arena. From the inception of its independence, Tehran took a very sober attitude toward the establishment of the new Muslim republics, seeing in this development the dangers that emanate from the internal ethnic factor in addition to the opportunities for expanded influence. The first ground for concern from the point of view in Tehran is the lack of political stability in the newly independent republics. The unstable conditions in those republics could be a serious cause of insecurity along the lengthy borders (over 2,000 kilometers) Iran shares with those countries. Already foreign hands can be sensed at work in those republics, especially in Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, with the ultimate objective of brewing discord among the Iranian Azeris and Turkmen by instigating ethnic and nationalistic sentiments. Tehran Times, 30 December 1991.
Iran is a multi-ethnic society with approximately 50 percent of its citizens of non-Persian origin. The largest minority group is the Azerbaijanis, which comprise close to a third of the population of Iran. Other major groups include the Kurds, Arabs, Baluch, and Turkmen. Many of these groups are concentrated in Iran''s frontier areas, and most have ties to co-ethnics in adjoining states, such as Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Pakistan, and Turkey. Thus, Iran''s ethnic groups are especially subject to influence by events taking place in these bordering states, and the ethnic question is not merely a domestic matter. One of Tehran''s chief goals in the region has been to prevent both destabilization in Iranian Azerbaijan and a rise ethnic-based activity among the Azerbaijanis in Iran.Iran''s cautious attitude toward the Caspian region is quite justified. Following the independence of the Republic of Azerbaijan, a flurry of activity associated with the probing of ethnic and national identity occurred among Azerbaijanis in Iran. The establishment of the Republic of Azerbaijan challenged the national identity of co-ethnics beyond the borders of the new state, and served as a stimulant for many Azerbaijanis in Iran to identify with the Azerbaijani ethnic group, though not necessarily with the new state itself. In the early 1990s, a significant rise in expressions of Azerbaijani ethnic identity in Iran has been observed, as well as important political manifestations of this identity. This rising Azerbaijani identity has generated few calls for the Azerbaijani provinces to secede from Iran and join the new republic, but rather has provoked calls for increased cultural rights within Iran.The non-ideological nature of Iran''s policy toward the region is illustrated by its close relations with Armenia. Despite its rhetoric of neutrality in the Karabakh conflict, which is in and of itself inconsistent with the official ideology of a state that portrays itself as the protector and champion of the Shi''i in the world, throughout most of the post-independence period, Iran has cooperated with Armenia despite its struggle with Shi''i Azerbaijan for control of Karabakh. Evidently, Iran prefers overall that the Republic of Azerbaijan remain involved in a conflict, making it less attractive to Iran''s Azerbaijanis and unable to allocate resources to stir-up "South Azerbaijan." Tehran adopted anti-Armenian rhetoric only at times when the results of the conflict directly threatened Iranian state interests. Yet, the non-ideological nature of Iran''s policy toward the Karabakh conflict, for instance, has not strengthened the stability of the region. Rather, Iran''s cooperation with Armenia and its tacit support in the conflict with Azerbaijan over Karabakh strengthened Yerevan''s actual and perceived power and consequently may have lessened its sense of urgency to resolve the conflict. Moreover, Iran''s perception of fear of the Republic of Azerbaijan serving as a model for rising ethnic-based identity of its own Azerbaijani community has led it to have an interest in prolonging the Karabakh conflict, albeit on a low level of intensity. Iran has come to share an interest with Russia in protracting the strife. Thus this factor has cemented Russian-Iranian cooperation in the Caucasus, additionally complicating conflict resolution here. Russia is interested in sustaining the conflict since it provides a means of influence and manipulation to promote Moscow''s strategic, economic and political interests in the Caucasus, an area which it still considers a zone of highest importance, especially in the military and economic spheres. Moreover, the perpetuation of the conflict provides a means of preserving Yerevan''s dependence on Moscow and thus its acquiescence to the stationing of Russian troops in its territory. External involvement and manipulation has been a major factor that has aggravated the Karabakh conflict, contributing to its protraction and escalation. Moreover, the dispute over the rights of the Azerbaijani minority in Iran and Baku''s often irredentist activities serve as a major factor of tension in the relations between the Republic of Azerbaijan and Iran which have led to an increase in Baku''s sense of isolation and vulnerability. This tension has impeded cooperation between Iran and Azerbaijan. It has also aversely affected wider regional cooperation, while contributing to Baku''s drive to seek association with Western security systems, advancing the projection of Iranian-American rivalry into the already troubled Caucasus region. The advancing Western presence in the Caspian region has reinforced Iran''s threat perception from these developments in an area that borders its territory, and added an element of potential instability.
Two-way Influence with the Middle East
The stability of the Caspian region may be affected by future political developments in Iran, where they appear to be headed toward serious intensification. The question is often posed as to the impact of ideologies and events in the Middle East on the new Muslim states in Central Asia and the Caucasus. However, it is important to inquire as to the opposite flow of influence, investigating how the establishment of six new Muslim states in the region has impacted the Middle East, and especially Iran, which shares a border with two of the new states (Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan). Also, significant numbers of co-ethnics from both of these states live in Iran. The establishment of these new states has already served as a catalyst for rising ethnic identity among some of the Azerbaijanis in Iran. This is a factor that can affect the overall stability of the ruling regime in Iran, and can cause Iran to concentrate its resources on its internal situation. Moreover, if the new states in the Caspian region succeed in establishing pluralistic, open and prosperous societies, they may serve as an example to their neighbors and encourage the fostering of open societies with strong ties to their Muslim culture while enacting tolerance and pluralism. This indeed is the chief importance of the Caspian region to the West, something which extends far beyond the question of energy resources.