Karabagh Conflict: Approaches to its Resolution (Event Summary)

A discussion with Professor Ronald Suny, a professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago who has written extensively on the Caucasus. One of his latest publications on the topic appeared in the winter 1999/2000 volume of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs' journal International Security.
Below is a summary as reported by the Caspian Studies Program staff of the main points raised at the event:

• Prof. Suny pointed out that recognizing collective identities as constructs assists in bringing about the perception that conflicts are defusable. For if identities flow and change, there is room for learning and reconciliation, and the enmity erodes and dissipates. He stated that the Kocharian government's approach to the Karabagh conflict is a "complete dead-end." He recommended that the Armenian government change its course of action before President Aliyev dies in Azerbaijan. He opposes the idea of a settlement that entails putting up additional walls in the Caucasus. The Armenians, Turks, Azerbaijanis and Georgians are going to continue to live in the same region, and a solution should be found that reflects their living together. Terrible events have occurred as a part of the Karabagh conflict— such as the events at Sumgait and Khojali, but none on such as scale as to prevent people from living together again. There is a common society, language and culture in the Caucasus. Suny stated that among the principles for the settlement of the Karabagh conflict:
  
  
  

It must be a compromise for both sides.
Karabagh should remain de jure part of Azerbaijan, but a new understanding of sovereignty must be employed, and de facto Karabagh must be self-governing. This way both the principles of territorial integrity AND national self-determination can be observed.

• Participants in the discussion raised the point that the solution to Karabagh would affect the parameters of solutions for other conflicts, ones in which the U.S. is involved: such as Kosovo and Bosnia. Thus, options for a solution, in the eyes of U.S. policymakers, are often constrained due to the fear of the implications for U.S. policy in other arenas. For instance, if Karabagh becomes part of Armenia, without Azerbaijani consent, this action will set a precedent in other conflict zones.
  
• According to Suny, state sovereignty does not take a single ordained form: there can be different versions and thus changes in our concept of it.
  
• Debate ensued over the importance of international presence and peacekeepers. Gerard Libaridian, former Senior advisor to the President of Armenia, pointed out that this cease-fire has held for six years, without international peacekeepers or monitors. If the peace is good, he argued, it will hold without them, and if the arrangement is not good, foreign peacekeepers cannot prevent the conflict from flaring up again. Brenda Shaffer noted that foreign countries played a large role in the early stages in sustaining and escalating the conflict to all-out war, and that in the current period, the rivalry between the U.S. and Russia in the Caucasus is projecting negatively onto the Karabagh conflict. Afghan Abdullayev, Dean of the School of Humanities at Khazar University and recipient of a US-Azerbaijan Chamber of Commerce fellowship to the Kennedy School, stated that, left alone, Azerbaijan and Armenia can attain a solution, and that outside influences have played a large role in the conflict between the sides. Abdullayev stated that Russia had contributed greatly to the conflict, and its resolution will be largely dependent on Russian behavior. Libaridian termed current Russian-U.S. interaction in the Caucasus as "neo-Cold War" behavior.
  
• Participants discussed the merits of various options for compromise, such as land swaps and joint sovereignty. Monica Toft, Assistant Professor at the Kennedy School, stressed that ambiguity in arrangements often facilitated agreements, whereas Gerard Libaridian countered that lack of clarity can create opportunity for external powers' involvement and manipulation. International Security Program Fellow Laura Donohue stated that in the case of Northern Ireland, ambiguity facilitated the agreements, since concessions on major symbolic issues were not clear to the wider constituencies on each side. In contrast, KSG student Yehuda Shaffer pointed out that in terms of the Oslo Agreement, the interim period in which major issues were left unresolved encouraged the radicals to use violence and shatter the confidence of the Israelis and Palestinians in each other, in order to prevent the conclusion of a final agreement which would involve major concessions from both sides.
  Gerard Libaridian argued that four major dimensions had to be resolved in the Karabagh conflict:
  Defense and security policies: the status of the different armies and police forces, conscription;
  Tax and fiscal relationships between Karabagh and Baku;
  Legislative relations between Karabagh and Baku;
  Symbolic issues.
  
• Libaridian pointed out that the peace has been kept for six years between Azerbaijan and Armenia due to a balance of power: Armenia has no incentive to change the status quo by going to war, while Azerbaijan does not feel powerful enough at this point to change it successfully.
  
• Participants discussed the impact of the internal situation in Yerevan, Baku, and Karabagh on each side's ability to pursue a peace process. The regime in Armenia is very weak and not in a position to carry out an important decision on this issue, while the legitimacy of Aliyev's regime has been hurt by his actions to promote his son as presidential successor. Gerard Libaridian stated that many field commanders in Armenia (not the professional soldiers) who built their careers through the conflicts oppose concessions on Karabagh. A "fatigue factor" is emerging in each country: Armenia is encountering incredible difficulties and the population is leaving in droves, while Azerbaijan had tremendously high expectations, and the disappointment is great.
  
• Suny noted that the area suffers from too much history. Certain periods become forgotten in the public memory, and it is therefore interesting to take note of what is remembered and what is disregarded. The history of conflict in the region is long, far preceding Stalin's policies. In addition, there is an atmosphere where the present is mistaken for the past-conflicts occurring now are assumed to have existed before. Tense atmospheres of hostility create great fragility and potential for explosive conflicts based on small acts of violence by "thugs."