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Long Term US Interests Converge Around the Rule of Law and Human Rights

Long Term US Interests Converge Around the Rule Of Law And Human Rights
by Maureen Greenwood

Maureen Greenwood is Advocacy Director for Europe and the Middle East at Amnesty International/CSA

Summary

Both the US business community and human rights organizations share a common interest in promoting respect for the rule of law and the development of democracy. Policies which trade off human rights for business opportunities or military cooperation are short-sighted and counter-productive, as they may help legitimize and entrench corrupt or irresponsible regimes which will not serve US long-term interests. The US can play a more active role in pressing governments to respect human rights and encouraging the sort of individuals and groups who can help build a civil society. Regrettably, human rights violations are reported from all countries of the Caspian region, and in some they have been increasing in recent years. Some illustrative cases are documented in an appendix to the paper.

* * *While the human rights community has long been concerned about the widespread human rights violations in the Caucasus and Central Asia, the US government has been slower to accept that the lack of rule of law undermines overall US economic and political goals. Many argue that fossil fuel pipeline development will naturally flow into civil society development, but without concrete efforts to simultaneously establish democratic foundations, the US emphasis on pipelines can have the opposite effect of undermining efforts to promote rule of law.

For example, in Kazakhstan, during the Cold War, human rights activists counted on the US as the voice of democracy. In the early days of independence in the 1990s, the first US embassy in Kazakhstan actively supported and met with the human rights community, and promoted human rights issues with the government of Kazakhstan. Over time, however, the embassy came to prioritize negotiating the next round of fossil fuel pipelines, and at times backed away from the human rights agenda, going so far as to avoid meeting with human rights defenders to avoid irritating Kazakhstani officials. The US should have been supporting the civil society elements that push for democratic reforms that ultimately would bolster a market economy. Instead, the civil society activists felt betrayed, and many saw the US government''s attempt to foster investment as hurting human rights development.

The US often uses human rights slogans, but when forced to craft policy, the US often selects business concerns over human rights. Placing a signed oil contract as a higher priority than supporting human rights groups and developing rule of law is short-sighted. US policy toward the Caucasus and Central Asia is wrong-headed by focusing more on short-term development of business rather than on long-terms development of rule of law and democracy that would create a better climate for both business and political cooperation.

This paper represents the opinions of the author and does not represent the views of Amnesty International. My personal point of view has benefited greatly by the expertise of Maisy Weicherding, Nicola Duckworth, and others at the Amnesty International Secretariat research staff. It will examine US interests in the Caucasus and Central Asia and the political and economic problems that result when the US promotes business interests at the expense of rule of law issues. This paper will make recommendations about what the US should do and will examine the internal sources of change within Caspian societies for building a rule of law culture. The appendix will cover the facts about the massive violations and, in some cases, the deteriorating human rights situation in the Caucasus and Central Asia countries, including jailing prisoners of conscience, restrictions on religious freedom, limitations on free speech, unfair trials for political prisoners, and routine torture.

What are US Interests in the Caucasus and Central Asia?

Specialists argue that US interests in the Caspian include promoting the independence and the stability of the new states in the Caucasus and Central Asia; limiting the influence of Iran and Russia; building fossil fuel pipelines that link the region to the West; limiting the spread of "Islamic extremism;" and controlling the flow of narcotics.

In the future, changes for the worse in the Caspian region could endanger US national interests. The threats center on the potential for a series of failed states with collapsed economies resulting in the emergence of ungovernable territories. Armed opposition groups with an anti-American agenda, who use "Islam" for political purposes, could increase who have access to the old Soviet arsenal. Another regional player, such as Russia or Iran, controlling the Caspian fossil fuels also could threaten US interests.

The realpolitik framework of US interests mentioned above neglects an understanding that robust business development and human rights protection are related. Choosing between human rights and business development is a false dichotomy. The real challenge is between desirable short-term and long-term goals. In the long-term, the goals of political stability, democracy, and business development converge in a rule of law state.

Business Investments and the Rule of Law
Previous experience in the former Soviet Union and around the world has demonstrated how both business and political problems emerge when the US government focuses only on advancing US investments instead of the rule of law and broader political and social development. The lack of rule of law impacts negatively on US interests in the following ways:

First, in the Caucasus and Central Asian countries, without rule of law, extensive foreign operations and their employees are not physically safe. The growing number of murdered bankers and business persons in Russia over the last decade demonstrates these dangers.

Second, in an environment where theft and corruption are rampant, there is no way to ensure that money flows to its intended purpose. In a system that lives on bribery, businesses are forced to pay more money to more and more people as the people in positions of power change. In a corrupt economy, American companies also may be disadvantaged compared to foreign competitors because US laws prohibit bribes.

Third, without rule of law, companies have weak legal protection for their investments. The government or a competitor may confiscate holdings or change the rules. For example, in October 1999 in Russia, as reported in the Wall Street Journal, Dmitrii Vasiliev resigned as Russia''s top securities watchdog, citing the lack of rule of law and "complaining that the government is showing little interest in enforcing the country''s still-nascent laws to protect shareholder rights." Alan S. Cullison, "Top Watchdog for Securities in Russia Quits in a Dispute," Wall Street Journal, 17 October 1999.

A court decided private investors should return their shares in the famous Lomonosov Porcelain Factory to the government, after factory managers said they were "unhappy" at foreigners controlling 54% of a Russian national treasure. The Wall Street Journal continued, "Mr. Vasiliev called the ruling a ''very dangerous precedent'' that could lead to the reversal of other privatizations."Fourth, without a strong state that can uphold the rule of law, companies have trouble with enforcing contracts, collecting debts, and resolving disputes. As Princeton law professor Stephen Holmes argued, US businesses have learned from their experiences in the former Soviet Union that a market economy is not "a natural state of being" and that solid government institutions need to protect their investments. Stephen Holmes, "Can Foreign Aid Promote the Rule of Law? Reflections on the Russian Experience," a seminar at Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies Seminar, as reported by Joseph Dresden, 15 April 1999.

Finally, without a strong parliament or independent prosecutors, lawyers, and judges, there is little ability to fight the corruption. Even if members of the educated, Western-oriented elite intend to create an American style system of management in the Caucasus and Central Asia, parliaments in these countries have effectively no ability to control their budgets or appoint officials. Ideas influenced by conversations with Evgenyi Zhovtis, Director, Kazakstan-International Bureau on Human Rights.

It is argued that businesses make their own determinations about profitability and that stability and rule of law are not essential. For example, in Colombia, although armed groups regularly destroy a portion of pipeline, the company simply figures that expense into its risk calculations and the pipeline remains profitable. For business interests, however, it would be better in the long run to avoid the risk. Additionally, the added cost for rebuilding the pipeline ultimately hurts the consumer in the form of higher prices. Further, while the violence against the pipeline may not negate pipeline profitability, US political interests have been hurt by the violence in the form of the growth of organized crime and rampant drug trafficking.

The US policy of pushing for business development at the expense of human rights also creates political problems. It is asserted that a pipeline brings wealth, which will trickle down and create a new-middle class, followed by rule of law development and human rights improvements. Pipeline developments in other parts of the world prove the opposite. In Nigeria, what has trickled down to the Ogoni people is not wealth but negative environmental consequences, health problems, and repression. In Azerbaijan, despite significant investments, oil wealth has not yet reached the people. Ganja, the nation''s second-largest city, fails to meet the most basic needs of its people since it cannot provide electricity or water 24 hours a day. Pipeline development actually can be detrimental to encouraging rule of law, because it reinforces the corruption-based economy, enriches the ruling elite and provides sustainability to the current regime.

Current US policy may also be counterproductive because it runs the risk of coddling dictators to promote "stability" in order to protect investments while at the same time fostering the conditions for real instability. Some Caspian states have attempted to create an illusion of stability by ruling in an authoritarian style and destroying the political opposition. Without democratic institutions, however, the states lack clear mechanisms for the transition of power to the next leader, which leads to uncertainty about the political future. As the academic Ian Bremmer wrote in World Policy Journal in spring 1998, "Although dictatorships may be oil-friendly, (and so facilitate our efforts to secure pipeline arrangements), questions of leadership succession will inevitably undercut the long-term success of a US policy that turns a blind eye to the abuse of power." Ian Bremmer, World Policy Journal, 1998.

A Baker Institute Study in April 1998 noted other conditions that could create instability include a "high incidence of political repression and lack of democratic processes; visible corruption among members of the ruling elite; an increasingly younger population with diminishing employment and educational opportunities; ... and a growing disparity between the richest and poorest part of the population." "Unlocking the Assets: Energy and the Future of Central Asia and the Caucasus," Baker Institute Study, James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy of Rice University, No. 6, April 1998.If basic economic and social needs of the people are not met, the ground is potentially ripe for religious extremism or other radical political alternatives. Islam itself can be a moderate constructive social force, providing an economic safety net and spiritual meaning. The local mosques, as in Turkey or Uzbekistan, help with food, shelter, and clothing for the vulnerable, as well as take unemployed young men off the streets and give them a purpose. When the state is failing in economic and political terms, however, opposition groups can use radical Islam as a vehicle to provide a political alternative. Examples from the last two decades such as Algeria and Iran show how Western-supported corrupt and ineffective governments gave rise to political opposition in the form of Islamic extremism.

In the long term, US national interest in the Caspian including economic development is best served by simultaneously developing civil society, a distribution of economic resources, rule of law, and human rights protections.

What Should the US Government Do?

The US can take a series of actions to facilitate goals in the areas of both business development and human rights protection. The US government should support:

  • rule of law as opposed to arbitrary decision making by bureaucrats, based on connections or politics;
    legal protection before the law and independent judicial institutions instead of politicized decision making;
    transparency in transactions as opposed to corruption and bribes;
    free press and an active civil society to expose corruption; and
    real elections as opposed to an entrenched state apparatus; to enable voters to remove corrupt politicians from office.
    How much effect can the US have on the domestic situation in another country? Admittedly, the US government''s ability to control and change deeply entrenched and historic cultures is limited. But the US has more ability to promote human rights and democratic institutions than it often uses. In fact, it often under-utilizes its levers of influence. When I was living in the former Soviet Union in 1993, I personally saw how a phone call from a US embassy official to a foreign ministry could bring about a quick result in a human rights case, such as a prisoner release. The US also has long-term influence in promoting human rights by spreading democratic values.

The US government should work with foreign governments to help develop new laws in accordance with international standards. Even more importantly, the US should help with consistent application of the law and help clarify contradictory laws. In a post-totalitarian country, even when certain democratic principles and norms are stipulated in a constitution or law, they "can be abridged by authoritarian methods in second and third levels of enabling legislation." Evgeny Zhovtis, "Freedom of Association and the Question of Its Realization in Kazakhstan," Civil Society in Central Asia, Eds. M. Holt-Ruffin and Daniel Waugh, 1999, p. 61. Laws, orders and regulations are often contradictory and it is not clear what is the "supreme law of the land." Laws on the books mean nothing unless the authorities implement them fairly. Consistent application of the law is a huge challenge given vestiges of the Soviet-era mentality, the regional disrespect for federal laws, as well as the susceptibility of officials to political pressure and bribes. The US should also continue to train Caspian lawyers, judges, prosecutors, and law-enforcement officers.

In order to combat corruption, the US should work with Caspian governments to develop accountability mechanisms to improve prosecution of corrupt acts. It should also work to reform the agencies to reduce opportunities for corruption, professionalize the workforce, and improve transparency, especially in customs and internal revenue areas. Professionalizing the workforce can be enhanced though better remuneration, performance-based rewards, and training. The US can also work with the foreign governments to advance competition in procurement procedures and in the provision of public services. Phyllis Dininio, "Defining Anti-Corruption for USAID," Democracy Dialogue, Global Center for Democracy and Governance, United States Agency for International Development, June 1999. Cooperation with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development on the anti-bribery convention, as well as with the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and other international actors on anti-corruption activities will also expand the impact.

Furthermore, promoting a free press, civil society, and fair elections should be standard US priorities, not just given lip service but with real backing. The US ought to clearly and consistently express the need to meet the international obligations for human rights norms and standards.

The US should reform its own grant-giving mechanisms, especially in light of the Silk Road Strategy Act, which would provide a new source foreign aid and humanitarian assistance to the countries in the Caucasus and Central Asia, with the exception of limitations to Azerbaijan. The US government should have learned from the previous mistakes in foreign aid provisions. Whether the aid actually benefits the citizens depends entirely on how the aid is implemented. To better ensure the aid does not disappear before it reaches its targets, aid should be distributed with clear guidelines; transparent, competitive, and fair funding process; well-researched choices by the grant givers; and strenuous tracking efforts.

In order to promote stability and rule of law, US military policy needs to be rethought. Current US military goals include helping the region maintain independence from Russia, integrating the region into security arrangements through Partnership for Peace, building military cooperation, and learning about its military capacity. The US gives Foreign Military Financing and International Military Education and Training and other military assistance to Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Uzbekistan. But joint military exercises with Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan could prove very dangerous in a region with such instability. Do we really want Uzbekistan''s military to be very powerful and efficient, so that it might make powerful intrusions into its neighbors?

The US also needs more oversight of US military aid. Increasing the use of the Leahy Law, or "Limitation on Assistance to Security Forces," should be encouraged to ensure that US taxpayer money is not flowing directly to security units who have committed human rights violations. "None of the funds made available by this Act may be provided to any unit of the security forces of a foreign country if the Secretary of State has credible evidence that such unit has committed gross violations of human rights, unless the Secretary determines and reports to the Committees on Appropriations that the government of such country is taking effective measures to bring the responsible members of the security forces units to justice," in Limitation on Assistance to Security Forces, Sec. 568 of Foreign Operations Appropriations Act for 1999. The Leahy Law should also be vigorously implemented to ensure that the US carefully screens military units that have abused human rights so that they cannot participate in joint exercises or US military training. "None of the funds made available by this Act may be used to support any training program involving a unit of the security forces of another country if the Secretary of Defense has received credible information from the Department of State that a member of such unit has committed a gross violation of human rights, unless all necessary corrective steps have been taken," in Training and Other Programs, Sec. 8130 in Defense Appropriations Act for 1999.

Not just the US but the entire international community must foster rule of law in the region. In some cases, the role of the international community is murky and may give legitimacy to a regime in ways that harm real human rights progress. For example, I attended a 1996 OSCE conference in Tashkent where diplomats widely praised Uzbek efforts to create the office of the ombudsman. Yet, three years later, this ombudsman often fails to answer responsibly basic inquiries by Amnesty International or Uzbek citizens.

To create a rule of law climate, all companies ought to adopt an explicit company policy on human rights. British Petroleum, for example, has a "policy commitment to ethical conduct," which supports all "the principles set forth the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights." BP Social Report, 1997. All companies should ensure that any security arrangements protect human rights and are consistent with international standards for law enforcement. Companies also should engage the community by meeting with community leaders and voluntary organizations.

Internal Sources of Changes in Human Rights Policy

The US can better promote rule of law by better understanding the sources of change within Caspian societies and working to support the progressive elements. Too often, the US looks to the officials as a source of change instead of to civil society. Several internal factors within Caspian societies influence the potential to improve the rule of law, including the type of person needed to initiate change, the ease of change, and the psychological components of change.

One factor is the type of person needed to build civil society. In effect, there is a continuum between the dissidents of the closed authoritarian societies and activists of more open societies. In the Soviet system, to be a dissident like Andrei Sakharov, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, or Larisa Bogoraz, meant to speak the truth to those in power. In 1968, it was enough simply to walk into Red Square to protest the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia to receive both a long jail term and become a folk hero. The more closed the system, the more power that words alone have. The characteristics of such a dissident are strong opinions, individuality, and fearlessness. Most dissidents work only within a small circle of trusted friends, a "gulag fraternity," leading to an insular mentality that shuts out working with new people. Operating out of their kitchens, dissidents do not necessarily have the skills or equipment needed in a modern economy, such as faxes, emails, and fundraising.

But entering a more open system, such as Russia under the clamor of glasnost during the mid-1980s, society is not interested in what the dissidents are saying. Their voices are lost in the noise of a more freewheeling society. What is actually needed now are activist/organizational/managerial types - people who not only articulate criticism but also devise solutions. They need the ability to maneuver in an ever changing and increasingly complicated society, to interact constructively with the government, and to possess such skills as management, accounting, grant writing and often English language proficiency.

One current hazard is competition and distrust between dissidents and activists, heightened by government persecution. Uzbekistani dissidents, for instance, instead of focusing their venom at the intractable state, sometimes direct it at each other in unproductive ways. The governments augment the confusion by creating fictitious "Government Organized NGOs" (GONGOs), attempting to create an illusion of active civil society for Western consumption. Many of Uzbekistan''s best and brightest activists in a generation, the most creative elements in Uzbek society who could have been constructive, have been "broken" by the state. Some died prematurely after constant harassment, others went crazy, and others are scattered in exile in Europe and the US. Those were the very people the US could have had as partners to build a rule of law state.

A second factor in examining internal sources of rule of law improvements is to look at the relative ease of change. Certain changes are easier to execute, because a single individual can make the change. For instance, a regional procurator can decide to stop harassing a human rights defender, or a justice ministry official can decide to re-register an environmental NGO. Other changes, however, require major institutional shifts, such as the creation of an independent judiciary, fair trials, and well-trained lawyers.

The ease of change also can be measured along a financial spectrum. Certain rule of law improvements do not directly cost money, and thus are easier to initiate, such as lifting restrictions on the press. Now that some post-Communist governments no longer officially limit the media, governments have now found other indirect ways of limiting debate, such as when government owned factories make paper prohibitively expensive or by owning all TV or radio owned airwaves. In other policy areas, economic limitations restrict the ability to make human rights improvements at least as much as political factors, such as the enormous sums needed to improve the gulag prison system, or to provide housing and other basic necessities to the thousands of internally displaced persons and refugees. Other human rights changes are easier to implement because the government finds them less threatening. NGOs that focus on social questions such as poverty, drugs, environmental hazards, or street children are less controversial than human rights NGOs or alternative political parties.

A third factor in analyzing internal sources of change are the psychological shifts needed to underlie the foundation of democratic institutions. Development of rule of law must be built into the basic mentality of a society. The human rights community can occasionally triumph after campaigning on a celebrated prisoner of conscience case, but building democratic institutions is a long-term endeavor. Last month, I met with a high-ranking Russian political attaché, whose manners made me at first mistake him for an American. As we discussed the case of a famous prisoner of conscience, he said, "He has not proved that he is not guilty." Despite his Americanized exterior, internally, he still maintained the Soviet attitude of the presumption of guilt instead of the presumption of innocence. One can create Western institutions - jury trials, ombudsman, bar associations and others - but forming underlying Western intellectual underpinnings will take a new generation.

Conclusion

US national interest in the Caspian centers on promoting the independence of the new states and creating access to new energy sources. It includes limiting potential Russian and Iranian control and the development of anti-American armed opposition groups who use Islam for political purposes. The US policy of advancing short-term business investments at the expense of rule of law will feed into bribery and organized crime, as well prop up a corrupt elite and provide sustainability to an inefficient regime.

The US should take a series of actions to help construct a society based on rule of law, which in the long term will better assist US economic goals. In order to protect US investments, the US should also help with consistent application of the law, with efforts to combat corruption, and develop a free press, an active civil society and fair elections. A thorough reform of US grant-giving procedures and humanitarian assistance is also needed, as well as a rethinking of US military policy. The US also needs a more sophisticated approach to civil society to better support the internal sources of change.

It is not too late for the US to change course, prioritize developing the rule of law and create actions behinds its democratic slogans. While US influence has limits, the US still has a great opportunity to help develop rule of law, which would foster a more advantageous business climate, as well as more stable and democratic societies.


Appendix

Widespread and Severe Human Rights Abuses Continue in Caucasus and Central Asia

While I cannot conclude that human rights in the Caspian region are improving, public relations skills of the Caspian countries are skyrocketing. The following section will attempt to go beyond the public relations materials from the foreign embassies and disclose the facts, based on Amnesty International research. The following information is based on Amnesty International (AI) research. Additional information is available at www.amnesty.org or www.amnesty-usa.org.
Amnesty International is a worldwide volunteer movement that works to promote all the human rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other documents. Amnesty International campaigns to free all prisoners of conscience; ensure fair and prompt trials for political prisoners; abolish torture and the death penalty, and end political killings and "disappearances." AI has 300,000 members in the United States, and works in fifty other countries. AI has members in the Caspian region, including groups in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan, Russia, and Turkey. Amnesty International neither supports nor opposes punitive measures such as sanctions, divestment, or boycotts. Amnesty International is impartial and independent of any government. Amnesty does not compare countries nor rank the levels of human rights abuse. This paper will mention only a few selected cases to illustrate broad patterns. It will emphasize the human rights violations in the pipeline route countries (Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Georgia), but Amnesty International has major human rights concerns such as torture in every Caspian country.

How one measures the level of democratic institutional development depends on the time period for comparison. Compared to the Soviet period, improvements have occurred in many countries in basic freedoms such as speech, assembly, and religion, with Turkmenistan a notable exception. In other countries, compared to two, three, or five years ago, the trend is moving backward, as leading human rights defenders in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan assert.

While US foreign policy has dramatically changed since the end of the "evil empire" of the Soviet Union, the human rights situation in some countries such as Turkmenistan has barely changed since the Soviet days. The government of Turkmenistan does not tolerate an independent press or any activities of independent non-governmental human rights or political organizations. Turkmenistan continues to imprison prisoners of conscience, and harass human rights defenders and opposition supporters.
Durdymurad Khodzha-Mukhammed, for example, gave interviews to US-sponsored Radio Liberty reportedly critical of the Turkmenistani regime. In September 1998, he was walking home from a meeting at the British embassy, when three unidentified men in civilian clothes assaulted him. They reportedly drove him to a lake on the outskirts of Ashgabat, where they beat and kicked him until he lost consciousness. Two weeks after the attack he was still unable to walk by himself. Durdymurad had previously been confined against his will to a psychiatric hospital for two years, solely because of his political beliefs. The practice of placing political dissidents in psychiatric hospitals was one of the most universally abhorred aspects of the Soviet regime - yet it continues in Turkmenistan, just as in the Soviet days.

In Turkmenistan, religious freedom is also restricted. Jehovah''s Witnesses Oleg Voronin, Roman Karimov, and Kurban Zakirov were arrested for their conscientious objection to serving in the military in 1998 and 1999.

In Azerbaijan, torture continues to be widespread. Police routinely torture journalists, demonstrators, and suspects in criminal and political cases. The overall institutional system continues to facilitate torture, allows poor conditions in pre-trial detention and lacks the requirement that the detained be brought promptly before a judge. The system also fosters torture through the lack of access to independent medical practitioners and the defense lawyer''s obstacles to gain access to the detained. Defendants also face judges that are reluctant to exclude testimony obtained under duress, and the threats against their relatives.

For example, the regional police administration in Khachmas reportedly summoned Ibrahim Ikramaeddin oglu Yuzbeyov, a Jehovah''s Witness from the village of Alekseyevka, to discuss a compliant regarding his proselytizing in August 1999. He reported that police officers verbally abused him, and beat him around the face, trying to force him to renounce his religion.

In another case, three officials reportedly beat a 12-year-old boy, Vusal Yasha oglu Rasulov, in order to extract information about his mother, after his mother intervened when a local inhabitant was illegally detained. The officials reportedly shut the boy''s fingers in the door and beat him on the soles of his feet. Doctors at Mingechevir''s Polyclinic No. 2 are said to have confirmed the presence of bodily injuries, but then destroyed the documents under political pressure.

In Azerbaijan, the official lifting of censorship in 1998 signaled a positive step, but authorities essentially created censorship under another name by targeting the media through lawsuits charging libel, with highly irregular court proceedings and vast punitive damages.

The government of Azerbaijan also limits alternative political activity. Many citizens with critical political views about the presidential elections were punished. Vahid Qurbanov, a member of the Azerbaijan Democratic Party, was detained in September 1998 while trying to join a demonstration. He alleges that he was severely beaten and detained. Without provocation, law enforcement officials allegedly beat many people attempting to demonstrate in favor of opposition candidates or parties boycotting the presidential election.

In Kazakhstan, it is unclear whether human rights freedoms are increasing or decreasing. A leading human rights activist, Evgeny Zhovtis, director of the Kazakhstan-International Bureau on Human Rights, argues that there are already three distinct political periods in human rights development since Kazakhstan''s independence.Zhovtis, ibid. From 1991-1994, there were significant developments in freedom of speech and media in Kazakhstan, characterized by a large number of relatively independent media outlets and a tolerance of peaceful assemblies and demonstrations.

The second period, according to Zhovtis, began in late 1994 and early 1995 when the Constitutional Court dissolved the Supreme Soviet (the parliament), which left the state without a legislative branch and "broke the evolutionary development of the political system in Kazakhstan." He argues that "the post-communist elite already felt comfortable in international politics and it became clear that the Western countries, transnational corporations, and international financial institutions were mostly interested in satisfying their geopolitical, strategic, and economic interests in this territory, and the superficial talk by Western governments about human rights and democracy did not result in any sanctions or pressure on the government of Kazakhstan in order to promote democracy."

According to Zhovtis, the period 1997-1998 marked the a third stage in political developments in Kazakhstan, where severe social and economic crises led to mass protests. Limitations of freedom of speech and assembly grew, for example as the prisoner of conscience Madel Ismailov, chair of the opposition Worker''s Movement of Kazakhstan, served a one-year prison term for allegedly slandering the president of Kazakhstan in February 1998.

In this third period in Kazakhstan, opposition supporters suffered short-term detentions during the presidential election. They include Mikhail Vasilynko, who was detained in September 1998 as he traveled to the capital Astana to distribute draft amendments to the constitution and the law on elections. Peter Svoik, co-chairman of the opposition Azamat movement, and Mels Yeleusizov, leader of an environmental movement, received three-day administrative detention sentences for holding an unauthorized meeting.

The media substantially covered the October 1999 parliamentary election, although the mass media engages in "self-censorship" out of fear. The media was restricted in both recent elections, and those media outlets who criticized the government were subjected to "legal and extra-legal harassment," including financial allegations of misconduct, closures, and surveillance.

In Georgia, allegations of ill-treatment in detention continue. In September 1998, members of the Special Police Unit of the Ministry of Internal Affairs allegedly beat three members of the Liberty Institute, a non-governmental organization engaged in human rights monitoring, in the capital, Tbilisi. Police detained Gogi Shiukashvshili in January 1998 on suspicion of stealing wheels. He alleges he was initially beaten without explanation, and then beaten with truncheons over a period of 15 days until he confessed to stealing wheels and several other crimes which he had not committed. In January he was acquitted, in part because of the allegations of torture, and he reported that police threatened him after the case. He is quoted as saying, "I was beaten by truncheons. My nose was broken as a result of the tortures and the beating. Presently I have severe headaches...I wake up at night and tremble." In Georgia, however, a civil society continues to develop, as NGOs are quite active. The government however has failed to implement the law on a civilian alternative to military service.

In Uzbekistan, the human rights situation has dramatically deteriorated over the course of 1999. Following six bomb explosions in Tashkent on 16 February 1999, in which more than 13 people died, hundreds of supposed conspirators, including members of independent Islamic congregations, members and supporters of banned political opposition parties, and their families were arbitrarily detained. There have been widespread reports of harassment of "independent" Muslims, including short-term arbitrary arrest, interference with worship and Islamic teaching, and harassment for observing Islamic dress codes.

Amnesty International is concerned that the Uzbek authorities are using the bombings as a pretext to further clamp down on perceived sources of opposition to President Karimov and to intensify the recent campaign against the perceived spread of "Wahhabism" in Uzbekistan. Scores of men were sentenced in 1998 and 1999 and their trials were marked by allegations that defendants were beaten and ill-treated in detention to force them to confess. Many fear that the conflict in Chechnya may give Uzbekistan more of an excuse to cloak its efforts to reduce the political opposition under the cloak of trying to wipe out "Islamic extremism."

For example, Mamadali Makhmudov was sentenced in August to 14 years on the charge of "threatening the president" presumably in relation to the February bombings, after a highly unfair trial. Makhmudov said he was constantly beaten, had his hands and feet burned, was suspended by his hands tied behind his back, had a gas mask put over his face with the air supply turned off and was threatened with rape and death. In addition, he was told that his wife and daughters had been taken into detention and they would be raped in front of his eyes if he did not confess and admit his guilt in front of a television camera. He also was given injections and made to drink unknown substances. All the defendants in this case charge that they were tortured in order to force them to incriminate the exiled leader of the banned democratic opposition party Erk.

The relatives of independent Islamic leaders in Uzbekistan continue to be harassed. Shazoda Ergasheva, the wife of imam Tulkin Ergashev, suffered severe medical problems after her detention beginning on 21 February 1999. She was allegedly held without food for three days during a 16-day detention and beaten by other female prisoners. Her physical condition deteriorated until she was no longer able to stand up and she fainted on several occasions. Released on 8 March, she was admitted several days later to Tashkent City hospital, where she spent at least a month in recovery and under observation.

A key example of the potentially positive results when the US government becomes involved was the release of five Christian prisoners on 20 August 1999, one week before the release of the new State Department Report on International Religious Freedom. Despite their release, according to the Keston News Service, on 10 October, harassment continued, as a Baptist congregation in the western town of Karshi was raided, and police beat and imprisoned participants. Felix Corley, "Uzbek Government Frees All Known Christian Prisoners," Keston News Service, 24 August 1999. See also Felix Corley, "After the Uzbek ''Thaw'': New Threats to Pentecostals and Jehovah''s Witnesses," Keston News Service, 10 October 1999. Ambassador Robert Seiple''s religious freedom efforts should be commended, but clearly the US needs to continue to push for releases of Islamic as well as Christian prisoners.

According to Lawrence Uzell of the Keston Institute, Uzbekistan''s 1998 law on religion is "the most repressive in the former Soviet Union. Only in Uzbekistan has the state formally criminalized religious dissent, by formally amending its criminal code to impose prison terms up to five years for unauthorized activity." As Charles Fenyvesi of RFE/RL wrote, "Karimov''s anti-Islamic sweep, resulting in the arbitrary arrest of thousands, may well give rise to the fundamentalist specter he says he is acting against." Charles Fenyvesi, "Is Uzbekistan the Worst Dictatorship in Central Asia?" RFE/RL Watchlist, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, vol. 1, no. 31, 21 October 1999. Human rights defender Abdumannob Polat wrote, "Violence may cause further radicalization of the opposition and further politicization of Islam in the region." Abdummanob Polat, "List of 14 Possible Political Prisoners who Died in Jail, 5 Disappearances, and 505 Possible Political Prisoners," Union of Councils'' Central Asian Human Rights Information Network, 9 September 1999.

In Armenia, individuals are also persecuted because of their religious beliefs. Jehovah''s Witnesses, whose religious beliefs preclude serving in the military, face imprisonment as conscientious objectors because they refuse to perform compulsory military service. Armenia offers them no civilian alternative to military service. Some have reportedly sustained beatings after trying to explain their religious beliefs to conscription officials.

Kyrgyzstan has been marked by an effort by the government to foster civil society, with fewer restrictions of freedom of speech and assembly. In Tajikistan, the resumption of executions in late 1998, especially in political cases, has been a cause of concern.

Against this continued pattern of systematic abuses, one possible area of small improvement in the Caspian countries is the abolishment of the death penalty, especially important because of the patterns of unfair trials and prevalence of torture used to extract confessions. Abolishing the death penalty is a criterion for joining the Council of Europe. Azerbaijan and Georgia already have abolished the death penalty, while Russia, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Armenia have taken serious steps toward its abolition. These steps toward abolishing the death penalty show that the Caspian countries are willing to make significant human rights improvements, if the international community demands the changes as the price of respectability and full participation in international institutions.