Nagorny Karabagh: Is a Solution Imminent?

September 18, 2000

Summary by Emily van Buskirk

There are two "very competing versions of reality" on either side of the Karabagh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan: "black is white on one side, and white is black on the other." These are the words of Tom de Waal, a journalist for the BBC who spoke about solutions to Nagorny Karabagh at a seminar sponsored by the Caspian Studies Program at the Kennedy School on September 18th. De Waal has embarked on a book project aiming to present a balanced view of the Karabagh conflict starting with the outbreak of violence in 1988: "In English, there has not been a proper book, as far as I am aware, and I am aware, that looks at the Karabagh issue from both sides. That is my task," he explained.

The main concern of the peoples living in this troubled spot in the Caucasus is economics, not politics, de Waal reported to the group based on his extensive travels: the economies of all three Caucasian republics are depressed, and outward migration is an enormous problem. Fifty percent of the Armenian population lives outside the country (1.5 million people out of an official 3.5 million population are not there), and 20% of the Azerbaijani and Georgian populations live outside of their respective countries. Many of those who have left are males in their twenties, who otherwise would be a very active segment of the population. The closed borders between Azerbaijan and Armenia, and between Karabagh and Azerbaijan, are what freeze the region economically. For Azerbaijan, closing the borders to Armenia acts as an economic weapon to keep Armenia weak. As de Waal explained, "Obviously one can understand that rationally, but it is a bit like a suicide pact. 'We are going to make things bad for you, and things are going to be bad for us too. But, if we are stuck in this suicide pact, maybe one day we will both decide to live.'"

The main principle between Armenians and Azerbaijanis is one of antagonism, according to de Waal: Armenians see themselves as historic freedom fighters who struggled to recover their homeland, and Azerbaijanis see themselves as victims of Armenian irredentism. De Waal went further to debunk the misconceptions on both sides; misconceptions which prolong the settlement process. For the Armenians, "they still talk about the blockade as though it is some kind of siege, which really isn't the case: it is more in the mind." Despite the blockade, Armenia's international trading relationships function through Iran and through Georgia. Another misconception of the Armenians is that the Azerbaijanis have forgotten about Karabagh, that it does not really matter to them, while it is in fact high on the Azerbaijani political agenda. In addition, Shusha does matter to Azerbaijanis, most prominently as a home to their poets and writers.

One Azerbaijani misconception is that Armenia is "on its knees, about to capitulate," with a little more patience and some more economic pressure. Armenia is poor, but it has Russian and American economic aid, and a nuclear power station that brings 24 hour/day electricity to Stepanakert. A second Azerbaijani misconception is that Russia is to blame. Russia's aid, which was really secondary, becomes an excuse to Azerbaijanis to feel that they are helpless victims of a Russian plot. Finally, Tom de Waal voiced his dismay for the propensity among Azerbaijanis to inflate the numbers of refugees and the amount of land that is occupied. After a careful review of the figures, de Waal determined that including Nagorno Karabagh, about 12,000 square kilometers of Azerbaijani land is under Armenian control: that is about 14% of Azerbaijan (not 20%, as most Azerbaijanis, including Heydar Aliyev, insist). De Waal argued that it is important to get the facts right. "I don't think the Azerbaijanis would lose any friends if they suddenly started saying fourteen percent instead of twenty percent," he said. On the issue of refugees, de Waal stated that the total number is 750,000, not 1 million (again, as many assert).

Next de Waal decided to share his impressions of Karabagh, "since it is obviously a non-visited place." He described it as interesting and beautiful, with beautiful hills and a nice climate. The Karabakhis speak Azeri and have warm memories of their coexistence with Azerbaijanis; they are very different from the "lowland Armenians." Many Karabakhis would like to trade with Azerbaijan. Some of them joke that they hate both lowland Armenians and Azerbaijanis, but love the Russians and Persians.

Karabagh itself is under Armenian control, and while parts of it remain devastated, the diaspora and USAID have been pouring money in. Stepanakert has been rebuilt, and "one of the best roads in the Caucasus" connects Stepanakert to Goris and Lachin in Armenia. There have been positive political developments as well, which the local population has welcomed. For example, Samvel Babaian, a war leader and Minister of Defense of Karabagh, was arrested in the spring. While Defense Minister, Babaian had tremendous power over all kinds of decisions in the country, including those economic, but he was running a tough one-man state. The president, Ghukasian, "is a much more conciliatory figure," de Waal noted.

After thus giving the listeners an impression of the situation in the Caucasus, de Waal discussed the negotiation process. His position was that compromise, and not more war, was needed between Azerbaijan and Armenia. He spoke about the OSCE Minsk Group, which is chaired by France, Russia and the United States, and which has been working on peace proposals for many years. He argued, "the consensus now is that these external powers have so many complex and often conflicting interests that the OSCE, as it were, has become too cumbersome a mechanism to deliver a settlement on its own." He said that Kocharian and Aliyev are comfortable with one-to-one dialogue, have a good working relationship, and have met 11 times face to face to negotiate. Many say the two leaders were close to an agreement a year ago, when several gunmen burst into the Armenian parliament and assassinated the prime minister and other leading politicians.

De Waal concentrated on two possible peace proposals. One is "the idea of a territorial exchange in which the strip of land between Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan, Meghri, is exchanged for the strip of land between Armenia and Karabagh, Lachin. Karabagh has a strong status as de facto Armenian, de jure part of Azerbaijan. Lachin is given to Armenia, and Meghri is given to Azerbaijan." This proposal, according to de Waal, is popular in the US because it weakens Iran by taking away its border with Armenia, and strengthens Azerbaijan. Russia is against this proposal for the same reasons. When Tom de Waal spoke with Kocharian about the proposal in May, the leader said he ruled it out.

The other idea, which Azerbaijan has been unwilling to accept so far, is that of a "common state." As de Waal described, "It is an associated state in which Karabagh would have horizontal relationships with Baku. It would be formally part of the Azerbaijani state, but basically its association with the Azerbaijani state would be on the basis of equality." This, de Waal said, would be a likely solution, although complicated security guarantees would have to be worked out. One obstacle to a settlement, or at least a factor that slows down the process is that, in part because of the authoritarian style for both Kocharian and Aliyev (and their control over the media), there is little pressure from below for peace settlements. However, several factors exist that will help a settlement. For one, the leaders themselves have, "primarily for economic and strategic reasons," accepted the need for a settlement, according to de Waal. Also, de Waal mentioned that Carey Cavanaugh, US Special Negotiator for Nagorno Karabagh, has come up with specific pledges of economic aid from International Financial Institutions for reconstruction, were a settlement to be reached.